Book, Paragraph

 1     II, I   |        to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something
 2     II, IX  |       himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them
 3     II, XI  | themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man
 4    III, IV  |      able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good man
 5    III, VIII|      would no longer hold good.~Suppose, once more, that we add
 6    III, IX  |   citizens~This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as
 7    III, IX  |         this be a state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter,
 8    III, XIII| co-exist. How are we to decide? Suppose the virtuous to be very
 9    III, XV  |         multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good
10     IV, IV  |      which a few are sovereign. Suppose the whole population of
11      V, I   |      that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal
12      V, IX  |        selection is to be made; suppose, for example, a good general
13      V, XII |     states. And it is absurd to suppose that the state changes into
14     VI, III |     qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich
15    VII, III |   things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule
16    VII, IX  |  councillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations
17    VII, XIII|  virtuous. For even if we could suppose the citizen body to be virtuous,
18   VIII, I   |        for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens
19   VIII, IV  |        this end. And even if we suppose the Lacedaemonians to be