Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  2 |            we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends,
  2      I,  2 |             the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other,
  3      I,  2 |         related to them as effect to cause. Unless these conditions
  4      I,  2 |          thing only when we know its cause; prior, in order to be causes;
  5      I,  2 |              the conclusion: for the cause of an attribute’s inherence
  6      I,  2 |             that attribute; e.g. the cause of our loving anything is
  7      I,  2 |            primary premisses are the cause of our knowledge-i.e. of
  8      I,  4 |          because the cutting was the cause of death, not death a "coincident"
  9      I,  6 |           account which includes the cause has no scientific knowledge.
 10      I,  6 |      possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion
 11      I,  6 |            is to know it through its cause. We may conclude that the
 12      I,  13|               for then the proximate cause is not contained in them-a
 13      I,  13|        immediate, but instead of the cause the better known of the
 14      I,  13|             the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the
 15      I,  13|         middle term is the proximate cause. Another example is the
 16      I,  13|               b), in cases where the cause and the effect are not reciprocal
 17      I,  13|              for here too the strict cause is not given, and so the
 18      I,  13|            would not give the strict cause, because if not being an
 19      I,  13|              an animal should be the cause of respiration, according
 20      I,  13|             and cold elements is the cause of ill health, their proportion
 21      I,  13|              their proportion is the cause of health; and conversely,
 22      I,  13|               the negation of x must cause y’s non-inherence. But in
 23      I,  13|          syllogism with this kind of cause takes place in the second
 24      I,  13|      precisely consist in making the cause too remote, as in Anacharsis’
 25      I,  24|            syllogism that proves the cause, i.e. the reasoned fact,
 26      I,  24|       essential nature is itself the cause of the inherence, and the
 27      I,  24|        commensurate universal is the cause). Consequently commensurately
 28      I,  24|          more especially proving the cause, that is the reasoned fact.~(
 29      I,  24|           find an efficient or final cause, we regard the last step
 30      I,  31|               we should not know the cause of the eclipse: we should
 31      I,  31|           because it makes clear the cause; so that in the case of
 32      I,  31|              like these which have a cause other than themselves universal
 33      I,  34|              and quickly grasped the cause of this, namely that she
 34     II,  2 |        middle" here is precisely the cause, and it is the cause that
 35     II,  2 |             the cause, and it is the cause that we seek in all our
 36     II,  2 |              there or is there not a cause producing eclipse of the
 37     II,  2 |             is, "What, then, is this cause? for the cause through which
 38     II,  2 |               is this cause? for the cause through which a thing is-not
 39     II,  2 |             qualification is-and the cause through which it is-not
 40     II,  8 |              the same as to know the cause of a thing’s existence,
 41     II,  8 |             that a thing must have a cause. Moreover, this cause is
 42     II,  8 |              a cause. Moreover, this cause is either identical with
 43     II,  8 |         distinct from it; and if its cause is distinct from it, the
 44     II,  8 | indemonstrable. Consequently, if the cause is distinct from the thing’
 45     II,  8 |       demonstration is possible, the cause must be the middle term,
 46     II,  8 |         there be a further mediating cause of B, it will be one of
 47     II,  8 |              of anything which has a cause distinct from itself be
 48     II,  9 |             while some things have a cause distinct from themselves,
 49     II,  9 |              have a "middle", i.e. a cause of their substantial being
 50     II,  10|            do not genuinely know-the cause of this difficulty being,
 51     II,  10|             a formula exhibiting the cause of a thing’s existence.
 52     II,  11|           knowledge when we know the cause, and there are four causes: (
 53     II,  11|        consequent, (3) the efficient cause, (4) the final cause. Hence
 54     II,  11|       efficient cause, (4) the final cause. Hence each of these can
 55     II,  11|            semicircle. Then B is the cause in virtue of which A, right
 56     II,  11|      signifies. Moreover, the formal cause has already been shown to
 57     II,  11|            Persian war?" means "What cause originated the waging of
 58     II,  11|            is no less true where the cause is the final cause. E.g.
 59     II,  11|         where the cause is the final cause. E.g. why does one take
 60     II,  11|             to B. What, then, is the cause through which A, the final
 61     II,  11|           through which A, the final cause, inheres in C? It is B,
 62     II,  11|        explained by it. Why is B the cause of A’s belonging to C? Because
 63     II,  11|          proof through the efficient cause: in the efficient order
 64     II,  12|              past or future, yet the cause will be the same as when
 65     II,  12|           effect actually exists the cause is actually existent, if
 66     II,  12|            is coming to be so is the cause, if its occurrence is past
 67     II,  12|           its occurrence is past the cause is past, if future the cause
 68     II,  12|         cause is past, if future the cause is future. For example,
 69     II,  12|             the middle, which is the cause, namely total failure of
 70     II,  12|            shall occur.~This sort of cause, then, and its effect come
 71     II,  12|         effect resulting from a past cause different from itself, a
 72     II,  12|          future effect from a future cause different from it, and an
 73     II,  12|         which is coming-to-be from a cause different from and prior
 74     II,  12|          would be identical with the cause on the supposition that
 75     II,  12|          must have occurred; and the cause is C, for since D has occurred
 76     II,  12|           that A will exist, and the cause of this conclusion is C;
 77     II,  15|              is waning. Here the one cause is subordinate to the other.~
 78     II,  16|             be raised with regard to cause and effect whether when
 79     II,  16|            the effect is present the cause also is present; whether,
 80     II,  16|            there is present also the cause of the eclipse or of the
 81     II,  16|             one might argue, if this cause is not present, these phenomena
 82     II,  16|       phenomena will have some other cause: if it is present, its effect
 83     II,  16|             the middle term B is the cause. But we can also demonstrate
 84     II,  16|            has broad leaves, and the cause is its deciduous character.
 85     II,  16|              they cannot each be the cause of the other (for cause
 86     II,  16|              cause of the other (for cause is prior to effect, and
 87     II,  16|         earth’s interposition is the cause of the moon’s eclipse and
 88     II,  16|            demonstration through the cause is of the reasoned fact
 89     II,  16|        demonstration not through the cause is of the bare fact, one
 90     II,  16|          that the eclipse is not the cause of the interposition, but
 91     II,  16|            effect have more than one cause? One might argue as follows:
 92     II,  16|             and E, and B will be the cause of A’s inherence in D, C
 93     II,  16|            in E. The presence of the cause thus necessitates that of
 94     II,  16|         presence not of all that may cause it but only of a cause which
 95     II,  16|           may cause it but only of a cause which yet need not be the
 96     II,  16|            yet need not be the whole cause. We may, however, suggest
 97     II,  16|      commensurate, not only will the cause be a whole but also the
 98     II,  17|                           17~Can the cause of an identical effect be
 99     II,  17|         proportionals alternate. The cause when they are lines, and
100     II,  17| proportionals this is so. Again, the cause of likeness between colour
101     II,  17|         analogous.~The truth is that cause, effect, and subject are
102     II,  17|             of the inter-relation of cause and effect is demanded,
103     II,  17|           separately.~Thus, B is the cause of A’s inherence in the
104     II,  17|        otherwise why should B be the cause of A’s inherence in D any
105     II,  17|             in D any more than A the cause of B’s inherence in D? Now
106     II,  17|            by possessing some common cause other than B: otherwise
107     II,  17|              fail to be some special cause of A’s inherence in E, as
108     II,  17|            by possessing some common cause? This cause we must look
109     II,  17|              some common cause? This cause we must look for. Let us
110     II,  17|        effect may have more than one cause, but not in subjects specifically
111     II,  17|         identical. For instance, the cause of longevity in quadrupeds
112     II,  18|          i.e. several causes; is the cause of the property’s inherence
113     II,  18|             the species? Clearly the cause is that nearest to each
114     II,  18|          manifested, for that is the cause of the subject’s falling
115     II,  18|        illustrate formally: C is the cause of B’s inherence in D; hence
116     II,  18|       inherence in D; hence C is the cause of A’s inherence in D, B
117     II,  18|            inherence in C, while the cause of A’s inherence in B is