Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 | comprehension of the meaning of the term used, and sometimes both
  2      I,  1 |         through a middle of a minor term as subject to a major. Before
  3      I,  1 |            unqualified sense of the term know the existence of this
  4      I,  2 |      because that part is true. The term "enunciation" denotes either
  5      I,  3 |            unqualified sense of the term.~The advocates of circular
  6      I,  3 |     positing of one thing-be it one term or one premiss-never involves
  7      I,  4 |           unqualified sense of that term, all attributes which (within
  8      I,  4 |             essential" attribute.~I term "commensurately universal"
  9      I,  5 |             this point is the first term in which it is found to
 10      I,  6 |             in C, yet B, the middle term of the demonstration, is
 11      I,  6 |             necessity to the middle term; for though the conclusion
 12      I,  6 |          through a necessary middle term; otherwise its possessor
 13      I,  9 |        connexion through the middle term in virtue of which it inheres,
 14      I,  9 |              so that if that middle term also belongs essentially
 15      I,  11|          universal goes, the middle term goes witb. it, and so demonstration
 16      I,  11|          must be a single identical term unequivocally predicable
 17      I,  11|       middle, or again to the minor term, the corresponding negative.
 18      I,  11|         negative. For grant a minor term of which it is true to predicate
 19      I,  11|            reason is that the major term is predicable not only of
 20      I,  11|           cover the original middle term and also what is not the
 21      I,  11|             not the original middle term.~The law that every predicate
 22      I,  12|            because it is the middle term in which the ambiguity lies,
 23      I,  13|            and so become the middle term of the demonstration. Thus (
 24      I,  13|     reasoned fact, since its middle term is the proximate cause.
 25      I,  15|             involve no intermediate term; since in that case the
 26      I,  15|        series of predication. If no term in the series ACD...is predicable
 27      I,  15|          ACD...is predicable of any term in the series BEF...,and
 28      I,  15|            series BEF...,and if G-a term in the former series-is
 29      I,  15|        atomic. If there be a middle term, one or other of them is
 30      I,  16|           inferred through a middle term C, that all B is A, will
 31      I,  16|            B; because when the same term is related atomically to
 32      I,  16|            if all B is A, no middle term can be with truth universally
 33      I,  17|           middle" I mean the middle term through which the contradictory-i.
 34      I,  17|  attributable to B through a middle term C: then, since to produce
 35      I,  17|            the "appropriate" middle term. In this case both premisses
 36      I,  17|            then, that if the middle term is not subordinate to the
 37      I,  19|           its premisses asserts one term of another, while the other
 38      I,  19|          while the other denies one term of another. It is clear,
 39      I,  19|           through some other middle term, and similarly that B inheres
 40      I,  19|       possible: so that if a middle term between A and B is credible
 41      I,  19|             Suppose, then, C such a term not itself attributable
 42      I,  19|            of no intermediate prior term, and suppose H similarly
 43      I,  19|             will be an intermediate term prior to B to which a is
 44      I,  19|          there may still be another term H prior to G, which is attributable
 45      I,  20|           descend from and find one term predicated of another ad
 46      I,  20|              whether from the first term or from a later one, is
 47      I,  21|         ascending from the ultimate term (by "ultimate term" I mean
 48      I,  21|         ultimate term (by "ultimate term" I mean a term such as was,
 49      I,  21|             ultimate term" I mean a term such as was, not itself
 50      I,  21|           ultimate from the primary term (by "primary term" I mean
 51      I,  21|           primary term (by "primary term" I mean a term predicable
 52      I,  21|              primary term" I mean a term predicable of a subject
 53      I,  21|             plain that if the major term is denied of a term D prior
 54      I,  21|           major term is denied of a term D prior to B, D will have
 55      I,  21|            is denied of yet another term prior to D, this term must
 56      I,  21|       another term prior to D, this term must be predicable of all
 57      I,  22|      predicated of a quale, nor any term belonging to an adjectival
 58      I,  22|            category of another such term, except by accidental predication;
 59      I,  22|          the series must end with a term (A) not predicable of any
 60      I,  22|            A) not predicable of any term prior to the last subject
 61      I,  22|     predicated (B), and of which no term prior to it is predicable.~
 62      I,  22|        where each is related to the term below it as odd is to number,
 63      I,  22|          the apposition, of a fresh term. If such interposition could
 64      I,  23|           virtue of a common middle term. Isosceles and scalene possess
 65      I,  23|           virtue of a common middle term that a single attribute
 66      I,  23|   demonstrated if there is a middle term. Further, the "elements"
 67      I,  23|            hand, there is no middle term, demonstration ceases to
 68      I,  23|   demonstrated if there is a middle term or a term prior to B in
 69      I,  23|         there is a middle term or a term prior to B in which A does
 70      I,  23|             falls outside the major term. In the case of negative
 71      I,  23|             falls outside the major term whose inherence is in question;
 72      I,  24|         then, triangle is the wider term, and there is one identical
 73      I,  24|     definition of triangle-i.e. the term is not equivocal-and since
 74      I,  24|             universal as its middle term approaches nearer to the
 75      I,  24|           and C, B being the higher term would render the demonstration
 76      I,  29|            the immediately cohering term e.g. by taking C, D, and
 77      I,  31|        commensurately universal-the term we apply to what is always
 78      I,  31|           by perception, unless the term perception is applied to
 79      I,  32|       apposition of a fresh extreme term or the interposition of
 80      I,  33|            the reason is the middle term; so that, since the former
 81      I,  34|             hitting upon the middle term instantaneously. It would
 82     II,  4 |          subject through the middle term; on the other hand (b) its
 83     II,  4 |          definition, and the middle term connecting them must be
 84     II,  4 |           will appear in the middle term before the conclusion is
 85     II,  6 |          must be through the middle term, the definable form is once
 86     II,  6 |             but in this premiss the term we assert of the minor is
 87     II,  6 |      neither the major itself nor a term identical in definition,
 88     II,  8 |            cause must be the middle term, and, the conclusion proved
 89     II,  8 |             definition of the other term, viz. in these examples,
 90     II,  8 |        these examples, of the major term A; for eclipse is constituted
 91     II,  8 |             definition of the major term A. If there be a further
 92     II,  10|             various meanings of the term definition, and in what
 93     II,  11|             these can be the middle term of a proof, for (a) though
 94     II,  11|         have a single common middle term. So it is from the assumption
 95     II,  11|    assumption of this single middle term that the conclusion follows
 96     II,  11|       efficient cause-is the middle term. (d) This is no less true
 97     II,  11|          efficient order the middle term must come to be first, whereas
 98     II,  11|             different senses of the term "nature", produces now for
 99     II,  12|            there cannot be a middle term homogeneous with extremes
100     II,  12|      occurred.~If we get our middle term in this way, will the series
101     II,  12|    contiguous", will a fresh middle term always intervene because
102     II,  12|          such connexions the middle term too must be a general rule.
103     II,  12|             consequently the middle term B must also be a general
104     II,  13|             the latter sense of the term: for these attributes taken
105     II,  13|            be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary, and
106     II,  13|         this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of
107     II,  13|        since there must be one such term. Having assumed this we
108     II,  13|         lower terms; for our second term will be the first of the
109     II,  13|       series, since when the higher term is excluded, that term of
110     II,  13|       higher term is excluded, that term of the remainder which is "
111     II,  13|        differentia. Now the primary term is a genus, and this term
112     II,  13|           term is a genus, and this term taken in conjunction with
113     II,  16|          deciduous), and the middle term B is the cause. But we can