Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |              on to recognize this as true in the instance before him
  2      I,  2 |       demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better
  3      I,  2 | demonstration. The premisses must be true: for that which is non-existent
  4      I,  2 |           other because that part is true. The term "enunciation"
  5      I,  3 |           Neither doctrine is either true or a necessary deduction
  6      I,  3 |   supposition that the premisses are true. The other party agree with
  7      I,  4 |             we mean by an attribute "true in every instance of its
  8      I,  4 |        universal" attribute. I call "true in every instance" what
  9      I,  4 |       instance of man, then if it be true to say "this is a man", "
 10      I,  4 |           this is an animal" is also true, and if the one be true
 11      I,  4 |              true, and if the one be true now the other is true now.
 12      I,  4 |             be true now the other is true now. A corresponding account
 13      I,  4 |             proposition put to us as true in every instance is either
 14      I,  4 |         occasion on which, it is not true. Essential attributes are (
 15      I,  4 |              the attribute which is "true in every instance" and the "
 16      I,  5 |            the demonstration will be true of the individual instances
 17      I,  5 |            demonstration will not be true of this subject primarily
 18      I,  5 |              When a demonstration is true of a subject primarily and
 19      I,  5 |             taken to mean that it is true of a given subject primarily
 20      I,  5 |            because being parallel is true of every instance of them.
 21      I,  5 |            the attribute vanishes. " True, but figure and limit are
 22      I,  6 |           though you may reason from true premisses without demonstrating,
 23      I,  6 |           popularly accepted and (2) true, such as the sophists’ assumption
 24      I,  6 |            just as you can infer the true from the not true. On the
 25      I,  6 |          infer the true from the not true. On the other hand, when
 26      I,  6 |           must be necessary; just as true premisses always give a
 27      I,  6 |              premisses always give a true conclusion. Thus, if A is
 28      I,  6 |            it with truth if they are true.~Since it is just those
 29      I,  8 |           can only be that a fact is true at the moment-not commensurately
 30      I,  8 |             universally. The same is true of definitions, since a
 31      I,  9 |       Consequently a proof even from true, indemonstrable, and immediate
 32      I,  9 |         attribute-the differentia of true knowledge. We think we have
 33      I,  9 |             if we have reasoned from true and primary premisses. But
 34      I,  11|            minor term of which it is true to predicate man-even if
 35      I,  11|     predicate man-even if it be also true to predicate not-man of
 36      I,  11|        follows: for it will still be true to say that Callias—even
 37      I,  11|           Callias—even if it be also true to say that not-Callias—
 38      I,  12|           other sciences the like is true. Of these questions the
 39      I,  12|             any account. The like is true of the other sciences. There
 40      I,  12|              This is correspondingly true in the other sciences.~Since
 41      I,  12|            premisses opposite to the true premisses, or is it formal
 42      I,  12|             otherwise it will not be true in every instance, which,
 43      I,  12|           then assuredly the same is true of an "objection"; since
 44      I,  12|           premisses could never give true conclusions "resolution"
 45      I,  16|          from a subject. Here, it is true, positive error may befall
 46      I,  16|              of the premisses may be true, though not either indifferently
 47      I,  16|              false, while A-C may be true. This is the case if, for
 48      I,  16|            indifferently. A-C may be true, C-B false-A-C true because
 49      I,  16|           may be true, C-B false-A-C true because A is not an attribute
 50      I,  16|      attribute of B; for if C-B were true, the premiss A-C would no
 51      I,  16|       premiss A-C would no longer be true, and besides if both premisses
 52      I,  16|       besides if both premisses were true, the conclusion would be
 53      I,  16|              the conclusion would be true. Or again, C-B may be true
 54      I,  16|           true. Or again, C-B may be true and A-C false; e.g. if both
 55      I,  16|          conversely should be wholly true. But this is impossible.
 56      I,  16|           wholly, false. The same is true if the major is made negative
 57      I,  16|   non-attributable to B, C-A will be true but C-B false. Again, actually
 58      I,  16|              then the premiss C-B is true but the major is false.
 59      I,  16|             of B, the premiss C-A is true but the minor wholly false.
 60      I,  16|             but of no A, C-B will be true but C-A false.~It is thus
 61      I,  17|          this premiss must always be true, for its quality is not
 62      I,  17|       becomes its contradictory-i.e. true. Similarly (ii) if the middle
 63      I,  17|       changed; so that D-B is always true, A-D always false. Such
 64      I,  17|        subordinate to A, A-D will be true, D-B false-A-D true because
 65      I,  17|          will be true, D-B false-A-D true because A was not subordinate
 66      I,  17|         false because if it had been true, the conclusion too would
 67      I,  17|       conclusion too would have been true; but it is ex hypothesi
 68      I,  17|            and not of B, C-A will be true, C-B false: or again if
 69      I,  17|             but to no A, C-B will be true, C-A false.~We have stated
 70      I,  17|            be false. This is equally true if (ii) the middle is taken
 71      I,  17|        subordinate to A, A-D will be true, but D-B false; since A
 72      I,  17|              while D-B may be either true or false; for A may very
 73      I,  22|              were divisible. This is true because a conclusion is
 74      I,  31|         commensurately universal and true in all cases one cannot
 75      I,  32|               1) Some syllogisms are true and some false: for though
 76      I,  32|             some false: for though a true inference is possible from
 77      I,  32|           has false premisses, while true conclusions have true premisses,
 78      I,  32|          while true conclusions have true premisses, and false and
 79      I,  32|             premisses, and false and true differ in kind. Then again, (
 80      I,  32|     confining-ourselves therefore to true conclusions. Not even all
 81      I,  32|         attributes.~Again, it is not true that the basic truths are
 82      I,  33|           there are things which are true and real and yet can be
 83      I,  33|             only things that can be "true", it follows that it is
 84      I,  33|     concerned with that which may be true or false, and can be otherwise:
 85      I,  33|     identical, just as the object of true and false opinion is in
 86      I,  33|             which some maintain that true and false opinion can have
 87      I,  33|              one sense the object of true and false opinion can be
 88      I,  33|              cannot. Thus, to have a true opinion that the diagonal
 89     II,  2 |              is; and this is equally true of things in so far as they
 90     II,  4 |           will merely be what it was true to say of C. Even if A is
 91     II,  4 |              being a man-since it is true that in all instances to
 92     II,  4 |           animal, just as it is also true that every man is an animal-but
 93     II,  5 |             whole of this formula be true of man, and yet not exhibit
 94     II,  11|               unprovoked raiding, is true of C, the Athenians, and
 95     II,  11|              the Athenians, and A is true of B, since men make war
 96     II,  11|              war waged upon them, is true of B, the initial aggressors,
 97     II,  11|         initial aggressors, and B is true of C, the Athenians, who
 98     II,  11|            term. (d) This is no less true where the cause is the final
 99     II,  11|           due to an end, and this is true alike in nature or in art.
100     II,  12|             infer that because it is true to say that A occurred,
101     II,  12|            occurred, therefore it is true to say that B, the subsequent
102     II,  12|          event as major. The like is true of future events too, since
103     II,  12|           events too, since if it is true to say that D will exist,
104     II,  13|            animal falls. The like is true of every other genus, whether
105     II,  19|            indivisible concepts, the true universals, are established:
106     II,  19|          truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error-opinion,
107     II,  19|             and intuition are always true: further, no other kind
108     II,  19|            is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific