Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  2 |              that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is
  2      I,  2 |           opposition which of its own nature excludes a middle. The part
  3      I,  4 |             elements in its essential nature (e.g. line thus belongs
  4      I,  6 |             elements in the essential nature of their subjects, or contain
  5      I,  6 |       elements in their own essential nature. (The pairs of opposites
  6      I,  10|          assumed. Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential
  7      I,  22|            constituting the essential nature of a thing, it clearly terminates,
  8      I,  22|      constituting a thing’s essential nature must be finite in number.
  9      I,  22|            constituting its essential nature, or that it is in some way
 10      I,  22|              element of its essential nature, is infinite. For all such
 11      I,  22|            element in its substantial nature: these latter are limited
 12      I,  22|             elements in the essential nature of their subjects, or because
 13      I,  22|           elements in their essential nature. An example of the latter
 14      I,  22|             attribute of odd in whose nature odd was an essential element:
 15      I,  22|             essential elements in the nature of their subjects are equally
 16      I,  24|             through its own essential nature is itself the cause of the
 17      I,  25|          demonstration is more of the nature of a basic form of proof,
 18      I,  33|               substance and essential nature possesses opinion and not
 19      I,  33|             their essential definable nature these objects differ. The
 20      I,  33|              element in the essential nature of man is knowledge; the
 21      I,  33|            element in man’s essential nature is opinion: man is the subject
 22     II,  1 |               exists, (4) What is the nature of the thing. Thus, when
 23     II,  1 |       existence, we inquire as to its nature, asking, for instance, "
 24     II,  2 |               of the connexion or the nature of the thing, then we are
 25     II,  2 |         examples it is clear that the nature of the thing and the reason
 26     II,  2 |           maintain, to know a thing’s nature is to know the reason why
 27     II,  3 |               now state how essential nature is revealed and in what
 28     II,  3 |             held to concern essential nature and is in every case universal
 29     II,  3 |        definition is of the essential nature or being of something, and
 30     II,  3 |      demonstrations, for example, the nature of unity and the odd, and
 31     II,  3 |             Again, to prove essential nature is not the same as to prove
 32     II,  3 |          definition reveals essential nature, demonstration reveals that
 33     II,  3 |            the fact and the essential nature are not so related to one
 34     II,  4 |        demonstration-of the definable nature is possible or, as our recent
 35     II,  4 |          other hand (b) its definable nature is both "peculiar" to a
 36     II,  4 |       possible to prove the essential nature of man. Let C be man, A
 37     II,  4 |             be man, A man’s essential nature—two-footed animal, or aught
 38     II,  4 |            will also be the essential nature of man. Therefore the argument
 39     II,  4 |          since B too is the essential nature of man. It is, however,
 40     II,  4 |               who prove the essential nature of soul or man or anything
 41     II,  5 |             not exhibit his essential nature or definable form? Again,
 42     II,  5 |       question "What is the essential nature of man?" the divider replies "
 43     II,  6 |           attributes of its essential nature; (2) that such and such
 44     II,  6 |           attributes of its essential nature, and that the complete synthesis
 45     II,  7 |          prove substance or essential nature? We cannot show it as a
 46     II,  7 |         proves not what the essential nature of a thing is but that it
 47     II,  7 |            one cannot prove essential nature by an appeal to sense perception
 48     II,  7 |            definition prove essential nature? He who knows what human-or
 49     II,  7 |          exists; for no one knows the nature of what does not exist-one
 50     II,  7 |            but not what the essential nature of a goat-stag is. But further,
 51     II,  7 |           prove what is the essential nature of a thing, can it also
 52     II,  7 |          single thing, and what human nature is and the fact that man
 53     II,  7 |           prove in defining essential nature? Triangle? In that case
 54     II,  7 |             definition what a thing’s nature is without knowing whether
 55     II,  7 |            either a thing’s essential nature or the meaning of its name,
 56     II,  7 |             no sense proves essential nature, is a set of words signifying
 57     II,  7 |           that knowledge of essential nature is not to be obtained either
 58     II,  8 |              are not, and what is the nature of definition, and whether
 59     II,  8 |     definition, and whether essential nature is in any sense demonstrable
 60     II,  8 |             Now to know its essential nature is, as we said, the same
 61     II,  8 |          identical with the essential nature of the thing or distinct
 62     II,  8 |       distinct from it, the essential nature of the thing is either demonstrable
 63     II,  8 |            from the thing’s essential nature and demonstration is possible,
 64     II,  8 |             through another essential nature would be one way of proving
 65     II,  8 |              way of proving essential nature, because a conclusion containing
 66     II,  8 |       conclusion containing essential nature must be inferred through
 67     II,  8 |          middle which is an essential nature just as a "peculiar" property
 68     II,  8 |             cannot know its essential nature. Moreover we are aware whether
 69     II,  8 |            awareness of its essential nature; for we have not got genuine
 70     II,  8 |               for a thing’s essential nature when we are unaware that
 71     II,  8 |      knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is determined by the sense
 72     II,  8 |              element in the essential nature. Let A be eclipse, C the
 73     II,  8 |               know what its essential nature is. But when it is clear
 74     II,  8 |             are inquiring what is the nature of B: is it the earth’s
 75     II,  8 |             stated then how essential nature is discovered and becomes
 76     II,  8 |  demonstrative syllogism-of essential nature, yet it is through syllogism,
 77     II,  8 |             syllogism, that essential nature is exhibited. So we conclude
 78     II,  8 |             neither can the essential nature of anything which has a
 79     II,  9 |   arithmetician, who assumes both the nature and the existence of unit.
 80     II,  9 |           demonstration the essential nature of things which have a "
 81     II,  10|            the statement of a thing’s nature, obviously one kind of definition
 82     II,  10|      quasi-demonstration of essential nature, differing from demonstration
 83     II,  10|         stating what is the essential nature of thunder; since the first
 84     II,  10|             the statement of what the nature of thunder is will be "The
 85     II,  10|     demonstration embodying essential nature. On the other hand the definition
 86     II,  10|  indemonstrable positing of essential nature.~We conclude then that definition
 87     II,  10| indemonstrable statement of essential nature, or (b) a syllogism of essential
 88     II,  10|              a syllogism of essential nature differing from demonstration
 89     II,  10|        demonstration giving essential nature.~Our discussion has therefore
 90     II,  10|             what things the essential nature is demonstrable, and in
 91     II,  10|               it proves the essential nature, and in what sense and of
 92     II,  11|             of the natural world; for nature, in different senses of
 93     II,  11|         different senses of the term "nature", produces now for an end,
 94     II,  11|             and this is true alike in nature or in art. By chance, on
 95     II,  12|              house.~Now we observe in Nature a certain kind of circular
 96     II,  12|         instance and always is of the nature of the universal. But we
 97     II,  13|               explained how essential nature is set out in the terms
 98     II,  13|            belonging to the essential nature are necessary and that universals
 99     II,  13|            belonging to its essential nature, triad will thus possess
100     II,  13|             elements in its essential nature down to the last differentia
101     II,  13|              collecting the essential nature they may be of use we will
102     II,  13|              element of the essential nature. Thus, if the primary genus
103     II,  13|          inquiring what the essential nature of pride is, we should examine
104     II,  14|           there were a single osseous nature.~