Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |         before he actually drew a conclusion, we should perhaps say that
  2      I,  2 |       known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related
  3      I,  2 |           be "appropriate" to the conclusion. Syllogism there may indeed
  4      I,  2 |         must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and
  5      I,  2 |         know them better than the conclusion: for the cause of an attribute’
  6      I,  2 |           truths more than in the conclusion. Moreover, if a man sets
  7      I,  2 |         the opposed and erroneous conclusion. For indeed the conviction
  8      I,  3 |         and better known than the conclusion; and the same things cannot
  9      I,  3 |         be", which above gave the conclusion "if A is, C must be": but
 10      I,  3 |          foundation for drawing a conclusion at all and therefore a fortiori
 11      I,  3 | assumptions on which the original conclusion rested, by circular demonstration
 12      I,  3 |           other figures either no conclusion is possible, or at least
 13      I,  5 |       fall into error because our conclusion is not in fact primary and
 14      I,  6 |          or else premise that the conclusion of demonstration is necessary
 15      I,  6 |           and that a demonstrated conclusion cannot be other than it
 16      I,  6 |           and then infer that the conclusion must be developed from necessary
 17      I,  6 |          A further proof that the conclusion must be the development
 18      I,  6 |         reasoned knowledge of the conclusion, since this conclusion does
 19      I,  6 |        the conclusion, since this conclusion does not owe its necessity
 20      I,  6 |       middle term; for though the conclusion is necessary, the mediating
 21      I,  6 |     cannot be knowledge.~When the conclusion is necessary, the middle
 22      I,  6 |           middle is necessary the conclusion must be necessary; just
 23      I,  6 |      premisses always give a true conclusion. Thus, if A is necessarily
 24      I,  6 |     predicated of C. But when the conclusion is nonnecessary the middle
 25      I,  6 |       cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connexion.
 26      I,  6 |      believe the necessity of the conclusion without knowing it, or else
 27      I,  6 |          inherence as a necessary conclusion. A difficulty, however,
 28      I,  6 |          why in dialectic, if the conclusion is not a necessary connexion,
 29      I,  6 |          then merely stated one’s conclusion? The solution is that determinate
 30      I,  6 | necessitate facts affirmed by the conclusion, but because these answers
 31      I,  6 |        affirm, he must affirm the conclusion and affirm it with truth
 32      I,  6 |           reasoned knowledge of a conclusion drawn from them (this is
 33      I,  6 |     through signs; for though the conclusion be actually essential, one
 34      I,  6 |           reasoned knowledge of a conclusion is to know it through its
 35      I,  8 |     commensurately universal, the conclusion of such i.e. in the unqualified
 36      I,  8 |         it is perishable will the conclusion be perishable; not commensurately
 37      I,  8 |           of others); so that the conclusion can only be that a fact
 38      I,  8 |     either a primary premiss or a conclusion of a demonstration, or else
 39      I,  9 |           It is clear that if the conclusion is to show an attribute
 40      I,  9 |           But that is not so: the conclusion must be homogeneous with
 41      I,  10|        geometer does not draw any conclusion from the being of the particular
 42      I,  11|     demonstration except when the conclusion also has to be expressed
 43      I,  11|           not not-animal, and the conclusion follows: for it will still
 44      I,  11|          application; so that the conclusion is not affected even if
 45      I,  12|           from which its peculiar conclusion is developed, then there
 46      I,  12|           which the "appropriate" conclusion of each science is developed.
 47      I,  12|           Again, is the erroneous conclusion one constructed from premisses
 48      I,  12|            perhaps, the erroneous conclusion is due to the drawing of
 49      I,  12|           easy, for premisses and conclusion would in that case inevitably
 50      I,  12|    Reciprocation of premisses and conclusion is more frequent in mathematics,
 51      I,  14|           for grasp of a reasoned conclusion is the primary condition
 52      I,  14|      second figure no affirmative conclusion is possible, and knowledge
 53      I,  14|           in the third figure the conclusion can be affirmative, but
 54      I,  16| disconnected from all B: then the conclusion inferred through a middle
 55      I,  16|          premisses were true, the conclusion would be true. Or again,
 56      I,  16|          premisses are false, the conclusion will equally be false.~In
 57      I,  17|           i) as long as the false conclusion is inferred through the "
 58      I,  17|          then, since to produce a conclusion the premiss C-B must be
 59      I,  17|           quality of A-C that the conclusion becomes its contradictory-i.
 60      I,  17|        the other hand, (b) if the conclusion is not inferred through
 61      I,  17|       because if there is to be a conclusion both must be posited as
 62      I,  17|         are changed in quality, a conclusion will follow and both of
 63      I,  17|          if it had been true, the conclusion too would have been true;
 64      I,  17|         cases where the erroneous conclusion is negative. If the conclusion
 65      I,  17|    conclusion is negative. If the conclusion is affirmative, (a) (i)
 66      I,  17|     unchanged if there is to be a conclusion, and consequently A-C, the
 67      I,  21|          negation. For a negative conclusion can be proved in all three
 68      I,  22|            This is true because a conclusion is demonstrated by the interposition,
 69      I,  23|          the "elements" of such a conclusion are the premisses containing
 70      I,  23|     elements" of the demonstrated conclusion as there are middle terms,
 71      I,  23|            When we are to prove a conclusion, we must take a primary
 72      I,  23|          D is to be denied in the conclusion.~(3) In the third figure
 73      I,  25|          is more certain than the conclusion.~Hence demonstration by
 74      I,  25|           has been proved that no conclusion follows if both premisses
 75      I,  26|          and that all C is B: the conclusion necessarily follows that
 76      I,  26|           When the falsity of the conclusion is the better known, we
 77      I,  26|        premisses are prior to the conclusion which follows from them,
 78      I,  26|            and "no C is A" is the conclusion, "no B is A" one of its
 79      I,  26|       impossibile is not a proper conclusion, nor are its antecedents
 80      I,  29|        relax is to change. So the conclusion can be drawn through middles
 81      I,  29|          ways of proving the same conclusion can be obtained by varying
 82      I,  30|         or general premisses, the conclusion being necessary if the premisses
 83      I,  32|       will be false because every conclusion which is a falsehood has
 84      I,  32|        all possible premisses any conclusion may be drawn. That would
 85      I,  32|         basic truths, and a fresh conclusion is only formed by the addition
 86      I,  32|        all possible premisses any conclusion may be proved, nor yet admitted
 87     II,  3 |      could, one might know such a conclusion also in virtue of its definition
 88     II,  3 |           we may draw the general conclusion that there is no identical
 89     II,  4 |        the middle term before the conclusion is drawn.~We may generalize
 90     II,  4 |       assumed, before drawing the conclusion, what the definable form
 91     II,  5 |         genuine demonstration the conclusion must not be put as a question
 92     II,  5 |        division is not to state a conclusion: as, when conclusions are
 93     II,  5 |         does not turn out to be a conclusion of inference.~
 94     II,  6 |           the thing-obtaining our conclusion? Or is the truth that, since
 95     II,  6 |       some one doubts whether the conclusion proved is the definable
 96     II,  8 |         the middle term, and, the conclusion proved being universal and
 97     II,  8 |       essential nature, because a conclusion containing essential nature
 98     II,  10|          the clouds, which is the conclusion of the demonstration embodying
 99     II,  10|      grammatical form, or (c) the conclusion of a demonstration giving
100     II,  11|       single middle term that the conclusion follows necessarily. The
101     II,  12|      exist, and the cause of this conclusion is C; for if D will exist,