Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |            Recognition of a truth may in some cases contain as
 2      I,  2 |           other than it is.~There may be another manner of knowing
 3      I,  2 |       conclusion. Syllogism there may indeed be without these
 4      I,  3 |         ground that demonstration may be circular and reciprocal.~
 5      I,  3 |         and if B is, A must be, A may be substituted for C above.
 6      I,  4 |        line or number as the case may be.~Extending this classification
 7      I,  5 |   primarily and as such. Case (3) may be thus exemplified. If
 8      I,  5 |      attribute remains. "But"-you may say- "eliminate figure or
 9      I,  6 |         premisses. For though you may reason from true premisses
10      I,  6 |        link, not being necessary, may have perished in the interval;
11      I,  6 |       through which it was proved may yet quite easily be non-necessary.
12      I,  6 |         which I here speak of it, may also not inhere, it is impossible
13      I,  6 |          it through its cause. We may conclude that the middle
14      I,  7 |        premisses of demonstration may be identical in two or more
15      I,  9 |      therefore, which the subject may share with another-and consequently
16      I,  10|        assumes. Yet some sciences may very well pass over some
17      I,  12|         to the questions which we may put to each man of science;
18      I,  12|          kind of error is it that may vitiate questions, and yet
19      I,  12|           dialectic the ambiguity may escape detection. E.g. "
20      I,  12|          to me to exist, which we may call B. I can now, since
21      I,  12|    indefinitely. Or the expansion may be lateral: e.g. one major
22      I,  12|        lateral: e.g. one major A, may be proved of two minors,
23      I,  13|        one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better
24      I,  13|     middle of the proof, however, may be reversed, and then the
25      I,  15|         15~Just as an attribute A may (as we saw) be atomically
26      I,  15|    subject B, so its disconnexion may be atomic. I call "atomic"
27      I,  15|          not the genus of B-for A may well have a genus which
28      I,  15|           is clear that one thing may be atomically disconnected
29      I,  16|           is true, positive error may befall one in alternative
30      I,  16|          alternative ways; for it may arise where one directly
31      I,  16|          or (b) one premiss only, may be false. (a) If neither
32      I,  16|       premisses will be false. (C may quite well be so related
33      I,  16|       Consequently both premisses may be false.) On the other
34      I,  16|           b) one of the premisses may be true, though not either
35      I,  16|        always be false, while A-C may be true. This is the case
36      I,  16|          error of non-attribution may occur either in the first
37      I,  16|    premisses in each case.~(c) It may occur when both premisses
38      I,  16|           when one is false. This may be either premiss indifferently.
39      I,  16|        premiss indifferently. A-C may be true, C-B false-A-C true
40      I,  16|      would be true. Or again, C-B may be true and A-C false; e.g.
41      I,  16|         the minor. Or one premiss may be wholly false, and it
42      I,  16|           be wholly false, and it may be either of them. Thus,
43      I,  17|     before. One premiss, however, may be false, and it may be
44      I,  17|     however, may be false, and it may be either of them. Thus,
45      I,  17|           affirmative, (a) (i) it may be inferred through the "
46      I,  17|         as before.~(b) The middle may be inappropriate. Then (
47      I,  17|            but D-B false; since A may quite well be predicable
48      I,  17|        always be false, while D-B may be either true or false;
49      I,  17|       either true or false; for A may very well be an attribute
50      I,  17|           science. Equally well A may be an attribute of no D,
51      I,  17|       premisses but either singly may be false.~Thus we have made
52      I,  19|   attributable to all B-and there may still be another term H
53      I,  21|           is required, plainly it may be shown either in the first
54      I,  21|    terminates in both these cases may be made clear by the following
55      I,  22|      another group of coincidents may have a different substratum.
56      I,  22|           of our contention these may carry conviction, but an
57      I,  22|         in things. Now attributes may be essential for two reasons:
58      I,  24|           24~Since demonstrations may be either commensurately
59      I,  24|     better? And the same question may be put in regard to so-called "
60      I,  24|      particular demonstration.~We may retort thus. (1) The first
61      I,  24| particular which is causative (as may be shown thus: that which
62      I,  25|     demonstration excels negative may be shown as follows.~(1)
63      I,  25|          shown as follows.~(1) We may assume the superiority ceteris
64      I,  25|           assumptions is superior may be set out in universal
65      I,  25|         such as are posterior, we may suppose two demonstrations
66      I,  32|           same basic truths. This may be shown first of all by
67      I,  32|         established principles we may argue the case as follows,
68      I,  32|          premisses any conclusion may be drawn. That would be
69      I,  32|          premisses any conclusion may be proved, nor yet admitted
70      I,  33|         concerned with that which may be true or false, and can
71      I,  33|    connexion, though actually so, may quite easily be otherwise;
72      I,  33|   essentially animal, that is, we may assume, may be other than
73      I,  33|           that is, we may assume, may be other than animal.~Further
74     II,  2 |          high and a low note", we may substitute "What ratio makes
75     II,  3 |          are not wholly the same, may they yet be partially the
76     II,  3 |    demonstrable definable; and we may draw the general conclusion
77     II,  4 |           conclusion is drawn.~We may generalize by supposing
78     II,  4 |          animal, or aught else it may be. Then, if we are to syllogize,
79     II,  6 |         same definable form", you may object. That I admit, for
80     II,  7 |       method of demonstration: we may not proceed as by induction
81     II,  7 |           meaning of its name, we may conclude that definition,
82     II,  8 |      actually exists. Or again we may ask which side of a contradiction
83     II,  10|     exists. Moreover, a statement may be a unity in either of
84     II,  11|           in time.~The same thing may exist for an end and be
85     II,  11|           too is of two kinds. It may work in accordance with
86     II,  11|         such as health or safety, may result from chance as well.~
87     II,  12|                     12~The effect may be still coming to be, or
88     II,  12|          to be, or its occurrence may be past or future, yet the
89     II,  12|          event. It is evident, we may suggest, that a past event
90     II,  13|      subject). while an attribute may inhere in every triad, yet
91     II,  13|         the essential nature they may be of use we will proceed
92     II,  13|          must be more than one. I may illustrate my meaning as
93     II,  13|     avoidance of equivocation. We may add that if dialectical
94     II,  15|  manifestation. This latter class may be exemplified by the questions
95     II,  16|          presence not of all that may cause it but only of a cause
96     II,  16|        not be the whole cause. We may, however, suggest that if
97     II,  17|         up through definition.~We may illustrate as follows. Deciduous
98     II,  17|        then, that the same effect may have more than one cause,