Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |            and the existence of the thing. The reason is that these
 2      I,  1 |           and every instance of the thing. On the other hand, I imagine
 3      I,  1 |             knowing it. The strange thing would be, not if in some
 4      I,  2 |           scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it
 5      I,  2 |           scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause;
 6      I,  3 |            mere statement that if a thing exists, then it does exist-an
 7      I,  4 |          itself: e.g. "the walking [thing]" walks and is white in
 8      I,  4 |           another sense again (b) a thing consequentially connected
 9      I,  4 |            the subject is the first thing to which it can be shown
10      I,  12|     developed, then there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific
11      I,  14|       knowledge of the essence of a thing. In the second figure no
12      I,  14|        possible, and knowledge of a thing’s essence must be affirmative;
13      I,  15|          Hence it is clear that one thing may be atomically disconnected
14      I,  19|           which we say "That white (thing) is a man", which is not
15      I,  22|           the essential nature of a thing, it clearly terminates,
16      I,  22|           predicates constituting a thing’s essential nature must
17      I,  22|       without falsehood "the white (thing) is walking", and that big (
18      I,  22|             walking", and that big (thing) is a log"; or again, "the
19      I,  22|            of white that the white (thing) came to be a log, and the
20      I,  22|            be a log, and the white (thing) is consequently not a log
21      I,  22|           cannot inhere in a single thing, the ascending series is
22      I,  33|           sense, then, can the same thing be the object of both opinion
23      I,  33|             opine and know the same thing simultaneously; for then
24      I,  33|            would apprehend the same thing as both capable and incapable
25      I,  33|             and opinion of the same thing can co-exist in two different
26     II,  1 |    connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact, (2) what is the
27     II,  1 |            connexion, (3) whether a thing exists, (4) What is the
28     II,  1 |           What is the nature of the thing. Thus, when our question
29     II,  1 |      question concerns a complex of thing and attribute and we ask
30     II,  1 |    attribute and we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise qualified-whether,
31     II,  1 |             we have ascertained the thing’s existence, we inquire
32     II,  2 |             is a fact, or whether a thing without qualification is,
33     II,  2 |        whether the connexion or the thing has a "middle"; and when
34     II,  2 |     connexion is a fact or that the thing is-i.e. ascertained either
35     II,  2 |      connexion or the nature of the thing, then we are asking what
36     II,  2 |            and the existence of the thing as respectively the partial
37     II,  2 |            unqualified being of the thing, I mean that if we ask "
38     II,  2 |     question concerns a part of the thing’s being; for what we are
39     II,  2 |         such questions is whether a thing is this or that, i.e. has
40     II,  2 |          the unqualified being of a thing.)~We conclude that in all
41     II,  2 |           the cause through which a thing is-not is this or that,
42     II,  2 |        clear that the nature of the thing and the reason of the fact
43     II,  2 |           as we maintain, to know a thing’s nature is to know the
44     II,  3 |           possible to know the same thing in the same relation, both
45     II,  3 |        covers this too. Of a single thing qua single there is a single
46     II,  3 |           it, but in definition one thing is not predicated of another;
47     II,  6 |         actually demonstrate what a thing essentially and substantially
48     II,  6 |             them is peculiar to the thing; and thus-since in this
49     II,  6 |             and the definition of a thing’s contrary-if it has one
50     II,  6 |             one the contrary of the thing’s definition; then, if good
51     II,  7 |           the essential nature of a thing is but that it has or has
52     II,  7 |           the essential nature of a thing, can it also prove that
53     II,  7 |      definition exhibits one single thing and demonstration another
54     II,  7 |        demonstration another single thing, and what human nature is
55     II,  7 |             exists are not the same thing? Then too we hold that it
56     II,  7 |           know by definition what a thing’s nature is without knowing
57     II,  7 |             does not prove that the thing defined exists: since even
58     II,  7 |          centre, yet why should the thing named in the definition
59     II,  7 |          further guarantee that the thing defined can exist or that
60     II,  7 |         define is to prove either a thing’s essential nature or the
61     II,  7 |           name means any particular thing: neither, therefore, do
62     II,  8 |           as to know the cause of a thing’s existence, and the proof
63     II,  8 |          depends on the fact that a thing must have a cause. Moreover,
64     II,  8 |             essential nature of the thing or distinct from it; and
65     II,  8 |             essential nature of the thing is either demonstrable or
66     II,  8 |          cause is distinct from the thing’s essential nature and demonstration
67     II,  8 |       definable natures of a single thing this method will prove one
68     II,  8 |           way we cannot apprehend a thing’s definable form without
69     II,  8 |     Moreover we are aware whether a thing exists or not sometimes
70     II,  8 |           the soul as a self-moving thing. As often as we have accidental
71     II,  8 |       accidental knowledge that the thing exists, we must be in a
72     II,  8 |      existence, and to search for a thing’s essential nature when
73     II,  8 |         apprehend an element in the thing’s character there is less
74     II,  8 |        degree of our knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is determined
75     II,  10|            to be the statement of a thing’s nature, obviously one
76     II,  10|     accidentally whether or not the thing exists. Moreover, a statement
77     II,  10|           exhibiting the cause of a thing’s existence. Thus the former
78     II,  10| demonstration, and how far the same thing is both definable and demonstrable
79     II,  11|        comes last in time.~The same thing may exist for an end and
80     II,  11|          from stumbling. If then, a thing can exist through two causes,
81     II,  11|           work in accordance with a thing’s natural tendency, or by
82     II,  13|       inhere always in each several thing there are some which are
83     II,  13|             be the substance of the thing. For example every triad
84     II,  13|              For if every definable thing consists of two elements
85     II,  13|    differentiae distinguishing each thing from every single other
86     II,  13|             from every single other thing without knowing every single
87     II,  13|          knowing every single other thing; and one cannot, they say,
88     II,  13|         cannot, they say, know each thing without knowing its differentiae,
89     II,  13|            be the definition of the thing. But if we reach not one
90     II,  13|           definiendum cannot be one thing but must be more than one.
91     II,  16|         predicable of more than one thing as its primary subject,
92     II,  19|       repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for