Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  2 |             does not so assert, it is a definition. Definition is a "thesis"
 2      I,  2 |             assert, it is a definition. Definition is a "thesis" or a "laying
 3      I,  3 |           extension of its meaning, our definition of unqualified knowledge
 4      I,  6 |              essential according to our definition of essential there is no
 5      I,  8 |                 of definitions, since a definition is either a primary premiss
 6      I,  10|                or particular, whereas a definition is neither.~
 7      I,  22|              terminates, seeing that if definition is possible, or in other
 8      I,  22|             itself is an element in the definition of odd; of the former, multiplicity
 9      I,  22|               which are elements in the definition of number. In neither kind
10      I,  22|                and be an element in the definition of each of them. Hence,
11      I,  22|          contain their subject in their definition cannot inhere in a single
12      I,  22|               equally finite: otherwise definition would be impossible. Hence,
13      I,  24|    proportionate is what answers to the definition of some entity which is
14      I,  24|              and there is one identical definition of triangle-i.e. the term
15      I,  24|             there is a single identical definition i.e. if the commensurate
16     II,  3 |          reduced to demonstration; what definition is, and what things are
17     II,  3 |              the same relation, both by definition and by demonstration. It
18     II,  3 |            might, I mean, be urged that definition is held to concern essential
19     II,  3 |               between demonstration and definition is that to have scientific
20     II,  3 |            there clearly cannot also be definition of them. If there could,
21     II,  3 |        conclusion also in virtue of its definition without possessing the demonstration
22     II,  3 |               follow:-possession of its definition without its demonstration
23     II,  3 |              There can be none, because definition is of the essential nature
24     II,  3 |                 attaching to it, but in definition one thing is not predicated
25     II,  3 |                fact of a connexion. Now definition reveals essential nature,
26     II,  3 |              possible to possess both a definition and a demonstration. It
27     II,  3 |               It follows obviously that definition and demonstration are neither
28     II,  4 |               case (1) the subject, its definition, and the middle term connecting
29     II,  4 |             will be mediated by a fresh definition, which consequently will
30     II,  5 |              some truth. Yet to state a definition reached by division is not
31     II,  5 |            taken in its entirety is not definition; so that even if division
32     II,  5 |                demonstrate its formula, definition at any rate does not turn
33     II,  6 |           argument as conforming to the definition of syllogism. It is only
34     II,  6 |                 it as conforming to the definition of definable form which
35     II,  6 |               as the divisible, and the definition of a thing’s contrary-if
36     II,  6 |                 contrary of the thing’s definition; then, if good is the contrary
37     II,  6 |                 nor a term identical in definition, or convertible, with the
38     II,  7 |                           7~How then by definition shall we prove substance
39     II,  7 |            another way: how shall we by definition prove essential nature?
40     II,  7 |           goat-stag is. But further, if definition can prove what is the essential
41     II,  7 |                 the same process, since definition exhibits one single thing
42     II,  7 |                 case a man will know by definition what a thing’s nature is
43     II,  7 |          defining actually in use, that definition does not prove that the
44     II,  7 |           should the thing named in the definition exist? Why, in other words,
45     II,  7 |                equally well call it the definition of mountain copper. For
46     II,  7 |              name, we may conclude that definition, if it in no sense proves
47     II,  7 |               even the Iliad would be a definition: (3) no demonstration can
48     II,  7 |             considerations that neither definition and syllogism nor their
49     II,  7 |             identical, and further that definition neither demonstrates nor
50     II,  7 |                to be obtained either by definition or by demonstration.~
51     II,  8 |               and what is the nature of definition, and whether essential nature
52     II,  8 |                extinction? But B is the definition of the other term, viz.
53     II,  8 |                  and B is assuredly the definition of the major term A. If
54     II,  10|                                10~Since definition is said to be the statement
55     II,  10|           nature, obviously one kind of definition will be a statement of the
56     II,  10|           equivalent nominal formula. A definition in this sense tells you,
57     II,  10|             difficult thus to learn the definition of things the existence
58     II,  10|             then is one way of defining definition. Another kind of definition
59     II,  10|             definition. Another kind of definition is a formula exhibiting
60     II,  10|             demonstration, in the other definition. Again, thunder can be defined
61     II,  10|           nature. On the other hand the definition of immediates is an indemonstrable
62     II,  10|           nature.~We conclude then that definition is (a) an indemonstrable
63     II,  10|            various meanings of the term definition, and in what sense and of
64     II,  10|                 what is the relation of definition to demonstration, and how
65     II,  11|                 A, since it is what A’s definition signifies. Moreover, the
66     II,  11|                food; but B is a kind of definition of A, for A will be explained
67     II,  12|              example: assuming that the definition of ice is solidified water,
68     II,  13|            method we have described-the definition, for example, of straight
69     II,  13|              element of them all is the definition, i.e. the simple infirma
70     II,  13|                sides.~In establishing a definition by division one should keep
71     II,  13|                  since this will be the definition of the thing. But if we
72     II,  13|                of pride. Besides, every definition is always universal and
73     II,  13|              can collect separately the definition of each species through
74     II,  13|               have established e.g. the definition of similarity not unqualified
75     II,  13|             colours and to figures; the definition of acuteness, but only of
76     II,  13|            expressions are precluded in definition: otherwise dialectic would
77     II,  16|      interposition is an element in the definition of eclipse, which shows
78     II,  17| accident-because the middle is then the definition of the major term-though
79     II,  17|       reciprocates, for the middle is a definition of the major; which is incidentally
80     II,  17|           sciences are built up through definition.~We may illustrate as follows.
81     II,  17|             which is proximate, it is a definition of deciduous. I say that,
82     II,  19|        syllogism and demonstration, the definition of, and the conditions required
83     II,  19|                  and with that also the definition of, and the conditions required