Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |        before him that he came to know "this figure inscribed in
 2      I,  1 |     unqualified sense of the term know the existence of this triangle,
 3      I,  1 |       this triangle, how could he know without qualification that
 4      I,  1 |            Do you, or do you not, know that every pair is even?"
 5      I,  1 |         is even?" He says he does know it. The questioner then
 6      I,  1 |           assert that they do not know that every pair is even,
 7      I,  1 |        that everything which they know to be a pair is even: yet
 8      I,  1 |       pair is even: yet what they know to be even is that of which
 9      I,  1 |     triangle or number which they know to be such, but any and
10      I,  1 |            every number which you know to be such", or "every rectilinear
11      I,  1 |      rectilinear figure which you know to be such": the predicate
12      I,  1 |       learning, but if he were to know it in that precise sense
13      I,  2 |      knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact
14      I,  2 |          that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration
15      I,  2 |         cannot be known-we cannot know, e.g. that the diagonal
16      I,  2 |           of a thing only when we know its cause; prior, in order
17      I,  2 |          one which the pupil must know if he is to learn anything
18      I,  2 |       premisses, we must not only know the primary premisses-some
19      I,  2 |           of them-beforehand, but know them better than the conclusion:
20      I,  2 |     conviction-it follows that we know them better-that is, are
21      I,  3 |          no primary, we could not know the posterior through the
22      I,  3 |         And since thus one cannot know the primary premisses, knowledge
23      I,  3 |        obvious; for since we must know the prior premisses from
24      I,  5 |       isosceles, one does not yet know, except sophistically, that
25      I,  5 |          angles, nor does one yet know that triangle has this property
26      I,  5 |           these. For one does not know that triangle as such has
27      I,  5 |       this property, one does not know it of "all triangles".~When,
28      I,  6 |      sophists’ assumption that to know is the same as to possess
29      I,  6 |      otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the
30      I,  6 |           essential, one will not know it as essential nor know
31      I,  6 |          know it as essential nor know its reason); but to have
32      I,  6 |   knowledge of a conclusion is to know it through its cause. We
33      I,  9 |           is accidental unless we know that connexion through the
34      I,  9 |          to the subject-unless we know, e.g. the property of possessing
35      I,  13|        the empirical observers to know the fact, of the mathematicians
36      I,  13|          of the mathematicians to know the reasoned fact; for the
37      I,  13|           physician’s business to know that circular wounds heal
38      I,  13|         slowly, the geometer’s to know the reason why.~
39      I,  22|       than knowledge, nor can one know them without demonstration.
40      I,  22|       prior to it) and we neither know this antecedent nor have
41      I,  22|          through demonstration to know anything without qualification
42      I,  22|           traversed, we shall not know them by demonstration. If,
43      I,  24|     particular individual when we know it in itself than when we
44      I,  24|         it in itself than when we know it through something else;
45      I,  24|           something else; e.g. we know Coriscus the musician better
46      I,  24|           musician better when we know that Coriscus is musical
47      I,  24|           is musical than when we know only that man is musical,
48      I,  24|      ceases, and we think that we know, when the coming to be or
49      I,  24| particular demonstration does not know the universal. So that this
50      I,  24|      angles, even if one does not know that the isosceles is a
51      I,  24|     proposition is by no means to know the commensurate universal
52      I,  31|        sun’s light, we should not know the cause of the eclipse:
53      I,  33|         that one cannot opine and know the same thing simultaneously;
54     II,  1 |          kinds of things which we know. They are in fact four:-(
55     II,  1 |     indication of this; and if we know from the start that the
56     II,  1 |           the other hand, when we know the fact we ask the reason;
57     II,  1 |          as, for example, when we know that the sun is being eclipsed
58     II,  2 |          would have enabled us to know the universal too; since,
59     II,  2 |          Thus, as we maintain, to know a thing’s nature is to know
60     II,  2 |       know a thing’s nature is to know the reason why it is; and
61     II,  3 |          or not it is possible to know the same thing in the same
62     II,  3 |         If there could, one might know such a conclusion also in
63     II,  3 |        knowledge. Hence, since to know the demonstrable scientifically
64     II,  7 |         any other-nature is, must know also that man exists; for
65     II,  7 |       what does not exist-one can know the meaning of the phrase
66     II,  7 |           In that case a man will know by definition what a thing’
67     II,  8 |      definable or in none.~Now to know its essential nature is,
68     II,  8 |           we said, the same as to know the cause of a thing’s existence,
69     II,  8 |       whether it exists we cannot know its essential nature. Moreover
70     II,  8 |       premisses are immediate, we know fact and reason together;
71     II,  8 |        they are not immediate, we know the fact without the reason,
72     II,  8 |          is not yet clear, and we know that eclipse exists, but
73     II,  8 |     eclipse exists, but we do not know what its essential nature
74     II,  10|         said before, that we only know accidentally whether or
75     II,  11|      scientific knowledge when we know the cause, and there are
76     II,  13|           and divide one need not know the whole of existence.
77     II,  13|        some hold it impossible to know the differentiae distinguishing
78     II,  13|         and one cannot, they say, know each thing without knowing
79     II,  13|         instances of proud men we know of to see what, as such,
80     II,  19|         clear that we must get to know the primary premisses by