Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |        dilemma in the Meno: either a man will learn nothing or what
 2      I,  1 |           which some people offer. A man is asked, "Do you, or do
 3      I,  1 |              is nothing to prevent a man in one sense knowing what
 4      I,  2 |            prior and better known to man. I mean that objects nearer
 5      I,  2 |            prior and better known to man; objects without qualification
 6      I,  2 |              of the premisses. Now a man cannot believe in anything
 7      I,  2 |           has not prior knowledge; a man must believe in some, if
 8      I,  2 |           conclusion. Moreover, if a man sets out to acquire the
 9      I,  4 |      predicable of every instance of man, then if it be true to say "
10      I,  4 |            be true to say "this is a man", "this is an animal" is
11      I,  6 |     connected with A and C, then the man who argues thus has no reasoned
12      I,  6 |      contingent fact. Or again, if a man is without knowledge now,
13      I,  11|              still grant simply that man is animal and not not-animal,
14      I,  11|             explained), to which the man of science applies his demonstrations.
15      I,  12|             which we may put to each man of science; nor is each
16      I,  12|              of science; nor is each man of science bound to answer
17      I,  14|            universal character: e.g. man is not two-footed animal
18      I,  19|              That white (thing) is a man", which is not the same
19      I,  19|      predication as when we say "The man is white": the man is white
20      I,  19|               The man is white": the man is white not because he
21      I,  19|     something else but because he is man, but the white is man because "
22      I,  19|             is man, but the white is man because "being white" coincides
23      I,  22|            the log is big", and "the man walks". But the affirmation
24      I,  22|                which would mean "the man who happens also to be a
25      I,  22|             white is a coincident of man, seeing that man is not
26      I,  22|       coincident of man, seeing that man is not identical with white
27      I,  22|            rather with animal, since man is identical with a species
28      I,  22|             e.g. neither the series, man is biped, biped is animal, &
29      I,  22|         series predicating animal of man, man of Callias, Callias
30      I,  22|           predicating animal of man, man of Callias, Callias of a
31      I,  24|          than when we know only that man is musical, and a like argument
32      I,  32|              justice is cowardice"; "man is horse", and "man is ox"; "
33      I,  32|     cowardice"; "man is horse", and "man is ox"; "the equal is greater",
34      I,  33|              object. Besides, when a man thinks a truth incapable
35      I,  33|           truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot
36      I,  33|             the doctrine that what a man opines falsely he does not
37      I,  33|              the essential nature of man is knowledge; the apprehension
38      I,  33|              animal as predicable of man but not as an element in
39      I,  33|             but not as an element in man’s essential nature is opinion:
40      I,  33|         essential nature is opinion: man is the subject in both judgements,
41      I,  33|         person. That would involve a man’s simultaneously apprehending,
42      I,  33|          apprehending, e.g. (1) that man is essentially animal-i.
43      I,  33|             than animal-and (2) that man is not essentially animal,
44      I,  34|            would be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has
45      I,  34|      somebody in conversation with a man of wealth and divined that
46     II,  1 |           then, is God?" or "what is man?".~
47     II,  4 |              the essential nature of man. Let C be man, A man’s essential
48     II,  4 |              nature of man. Let C be man, A man’s essential nature—
49     II,  4 |              of man. Let C be man, A man’s essential nature—two-footed
50     II,  4 |              the essential nature of man. Therefore the argument
51     II,  4 |              the essential nature of man. It is, however, the case
52     II,  4 |          essential nature of soul or man or anything else through
53     II,  4 |              is also true that every man is an animal-but not as
54     II,  4 |              as identical with being man.~We conclude, then, that
55     II,  5 |             it. The definer asks "Is man animal or inanimate?" and
56     II,  5 |     assumes-he has not inferred-that man is animal. Next, when presented
57     II,  5 |             aquatic, he assumes that man is terrestrial. Moreover,
58     II,  5 |          terrestrial. Moreover, that man is the complete formula,
59     II,  5 |              this formula be true of man, and yet not exhibit his
60     II,  5 |              the essential nature of man?" the divider replies "Animal,
61     II,  6 |             open to the question why man should be animal-biped-terrestrial
62     II,  6 |          when predicated of the same man.~
63     II,  7 |              is, must know also that man exists; for no one knows
64     II,  7 |          nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same
65     II,  7 |             Triangle? In that case a man will know by definition
66     II,  8 |            privation of light, or of man as some species of animal,
67     II,  11|        necessity.~Of the products of man’s intelligence some are
68     II,  12|              for instance, not every man can grow a beard, but it
69     II,  13|              the further differentia man (or whatever else is the
70     II,  19| demonstration is impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate
71     II,  19|             and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the
72     II,  19|          battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then
73     II,  19|              content is universal-is man, for example, not the man
74     II,  19|            man, for example, not the man Callias. A fresh stand is