Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  2 |          are satisfied, the basic truths will not be "appropriate"
 2      I,  2 |           the "appropriate" basic truths, for I identify primary
 3      I,  2 |      axiom because there are such truths and we give them the name
 4      I,  2 |          not in all, of the basic truths more than in the conclusion.
 5      I,  2 |     better knowledge of the basic truths and a firmer conviction
 6      I,  2 |           to him than these basic truths in their character as contradicting
 7      I,  3 |      think there is, but that all truths are demonstrable. Neither
 8      I,  3 |    difficulty in holding that all truths are demonstrated, on the
 9      I,  3 |     regress must end in immediate truths, those truths must be indemonstrable.)
10      I,  3 |           immediate truths, those truths must be indemonstrable.)
11      I,  3 |          on a distinction between truths prior to us and truths without
12      I,  3 |    between truths prior to us and truths without qualification prior,
13      I,  3 |          that which proceeds from truths better known to us, is not
14      I,  6 |           rest on necessary basic truths; for the object of scientific
15      I,  6 |         is to suppose one’s basic truths rightly chosen if one starts
16      I,  7 |       instance, prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. For there
17      I,  7 |         virtue of the fundamental truths of their peculiar genus:
18      I,  9 |           its "appropriate" basic truths. Consequently a proof even
19      I,  9 |           its "appropriate" basic truths, which, however, in the
20      I,  9 |           that the peculiar basic truths of each inhering attribute
21      I,  9 |         indemonstrable; for basic truths from which they might be
22      I,  9 |         be deduced would be basic truths of all that is, and the
23      I,  9 |   knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute-the
24      I,  10|               10~I call the basic truths of every genus those clements
25      I,  10|        regards both these primary truths and the attributes dependent
26      I,  10|  existence as regards the primary truths must be assumed; but it
27      I,  10|         is required.~Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative
28      I,  10|     science in question.~Peculiar truths are, e.g. the definitions
29      I,  10|         line and straight; common truths are such as "take equals
30      I,  10|           so much of these common truths is required as falls within
31      I,  12|         which uses the same basic truths as geometry. Of the other
32      I,  12|          account, using the basic truths of geometry in conjunction
33      I,  12|         conclusions; of the basic truths the geometer, as such, is
34      I,  17|     immediate and of demonstrable truths.~
35      I,  22|         necessarily involve basic truths, and that the contention
36      I,  22|         to at the outset-that all truths are demonstrable is mistaken.
37      I,  22|            For if there are basic truths, (a) not all truths are
38      I,  22|         basic truths, (a) not all truths are demonstrable, and (b)
39      I,  23|           on the way to the basic truths. Similarly if A does not
40      I,  23|         some indemonstrable basic truths asserting that "this is
41      I,  23|          that"-in fact some basic truths will affirm and some will
42      I,  28|          another when their basic truths have neither a common source
43      I,  31|    intuition. (As regards primary truths there is of course a different
44      I,  32|        cannot have the same basic truths. This may be shown first
45      I,  32|      inferred from the same basic truths; many of them in fact have
46      I,  32|           them in fact have basic truths which differ generically
47      I,  32|           not true that the basic truths are much fewer than the
48      I,  32|        conclusions, for the basic truths are the premisses, and the
49      I,  32|          lastly some of the basic truths are necessary, others variable.~
50      I,  32|          is indefinite, the basic truths cannot be identical or limited
51      I,  32|         other are the fundamental truths of geometry, these the fundamentals
52      I,  32|           the sciences have basic truths? To call them identical
53      I,  32|   conclusions have the same basic truths mean that from the mass
54      I,  32|     premisses which are the basic truths, and a fresh conclusion
55      I,  32|         premisses which are basic truths, each subject-genus will
56      I,  32|           yet admitted that basic truths differ so as to be generically
57      I,  32| possibility that, while the basic truths of all knowledge are within
58      I,  32|          our proof that the basic truths of things generically different
59      I,  32|      generically. For fundamental truths are of two kinds, those
60      I,  33|    perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot be other than
61     II,  3 |           endless; or the primary truths will be indemonstrable definitions.~
62     II,  5 |           who proceed by it, even truths that can be inferred actually