Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |            made the subject of their premiss, viz. not merely every triangle
 2      I,  1 |          without reservation. For no premiss is ever couched in the form "
 3      I,  2 |               for I identify primary premiss and basic truth. A "basic
 4      I,  6 |              demonstration is that a premiss of it is not a necessary
 5      I,  6 |            even from a non-necessary premiss, just as you can infer the
 6      I,  8 |           demonstration is made, one premiss must be perishable and not
 7      I,  8 |       definition is either a primary premiss or a conclusion of a demonstration,
 8      I,  11|         proof lays down as its major premiss that the major is truly
 9      I,  12|            this is so, but the minor premiss "Are epics circles?" is
10      I,  12|         proof has an inductive minor premiss, one should not bring an "
11      I,  12|          against it. For since every premiss must be applicable to a
12      I,  12|             could take the form of a premiss, either demonstrative or
13      I,  15|            will have a genus-for the premiss containing it must be affirmative:
14      I,  15|              contained in a negative premiss, but not if both premisses
15      I,  16|           both premisses, or (b) one premiss only, may be false. (a)
16      I,  16|               B having no genus, the premiss C-B will always be false,
17      I,  16|            false. This may be either premiss indifferently. A-C may be
18      I,  16|            for if C-B were true, the premiss A-C would no longer be true,
19      I,  16|            the other, so that if the premiss takes the form No C is A,
20      I,  16|         instead of the minor. Or one premiss may be wholly false, and
21      I,  16|          attribute of no B, then the premiss C-B is true but the major
22      I,  16|           major is made the negative premiss. For in fact what is an
23      I,  16|        universal attribute of B, the premiss C-A is true but the minor
24      I,  17|             produce a conclusion the premiss C-B must be taken affirmatively,
25      I,  17| affirmatively, it is clear that this premiss must always be true, for
26      I,  17|        predicable of all B. Then the premiss D-B must remain unchanged,
27      I,  17|            as was stated before. One premiss, however, may be false,
28      I,  21|              the case with the minor premiss—since B-C is affirmative.
29      I,  21|    affirmative. As regards the other premiss it is plain that if the
30      I,  21|      Therefore some A is not C. This premiss, i.e. C-B, will be proved
31      I,  21|            some E is not C, and this premiss again will be proved by
32      I,  23|            We have our unit when the premiss becomes immediate, since
33      I,  23|       immediate, since the immediate premiss alone is a single premiss
34      I,  23|            premiss alone is a single premiss in the unqualified sense
35      I,  23|             the unit is an immediate premiss, and in the knowledge that
36      I,  24|             so near as the immediate premiss which is itself the basic
37      I,  25|      operating through more kinds of premiss is inferior.~(2) It has
38      I,  25|            be more than one negative premiss in each complete proof.
39      I,  25|              to be a single negative premiss, A-D. In the further prosyllogisms
40      I,  25|              to be a single negative premiss, the other premisses being
41      I,  25|              the universal immediate premiss, and the universal premiss
42      I,  25|           premiss, and the universal premiss asserts in affirmative demonstration
43      I,  25|            It follows that the basic premiss of affirmative demonstration
44      I,  26|           impossible; when the major premiss of the syllogism is the
45      I,  32|          addition of a new immediate premiss: but if it be admitted that
46      I,  33|            grasping of the immediate premiss. Since then rational intuition,
47      I,  33|            in fact is the grasp of a premiss which is immediate but not
48     II,  4 |        predicated of all B. But this premiss will be mediated by a fresh
49     II,  6 |           more assumed in this minor premiss too?~Further, just as in
50     II,  6 |       definable form is assumed as a premiss, and as a premiss which
51     II,  6 |       assumed as a premiss, and as a premiss which is to prove definable
52     II,  6 |    predicable of "that"; but in this premiss the term we assert of the
53     II,  11|            does not hold if only one premiss is assumed-two is the minimum-still
54     II,  12|         terms must form an immediate premiss; e.g. we argue that, since
55     II,  12|            terminate in an immediate premiss, or since, as we said, no
56     II,  12|             yet we must start from a premiss consisting of a middle and
57     II,  12|          here too an immediate basic premiss must be assumed. And in
58     II,  17|              next the subject, and a premiss asserting it of the whole
59     II,  19|            grasps the original basic premiss, while science as a whole