Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  2 |           knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known
 2      I,  2 |       side. The premisses must be primary and indemonstrable; otherwise
 3      I,  2 |    demonstrated knowledge must be primary, I mean that they must be
 4      I,  2 |      basic truths, for I identify primary premiss and basic truth.
 5      I,  2 |         we must not only know the primary premisses-some if not all
 6      I,  2 |         of our love. So since the primary premisses are the cause
 7      I,  3 |          necessity of knowing the primary premisses, there is no scientific
 8      I,  3 |        behind the prior stands no primary, we could not know the posterior
 9      I,  3 |          terminates and there are primary premisses, yet these are
10      I,  3 |          thus one cannot know the primary premisses, knowledge of
11      I,  4 |     isosceles triangle is not the primary subject of this attribute
12      I,  5 |         conclusion is not in fact primary and commensurately universal
13      I,  5 |            to which it belongs is primary? (i.e. to what subject can
14      I,  6 |      truth, which can only be the primary law of the genus constituting
15      I,  8 |          a definition is either a primary premiss or a conclusion
16      I,  9 |       have reasoned from true and primary premisses. But that is not
17      I,  10|     proved. As regards both these primary truths and the attributes
18      I,  10|          existence as regards the primary truths must be assumed;
19      I,  10|       so-called axioms, which are primary premisses of its demonstration; (
20      I,  14|        reasoned conclusion is the primary condition of knowledge.
21      I,  14|           the first figure is the primary condition of knowledge.~
22      I,  15|      their disconnexion cannot be primary. Thus: let C be the genus
23      I,  19|           do ultimate subject and primary attribute limit one another?~
24      I,  19|          this predication will be primary, or there will be an intermediate
25      I,  19|      convertible there is neither primary nor ultimate subject, seeing
26      I,  21|      towards an ultimate from the primary term (by "primary term"
27      I,  21|        from the primary term (by "primary term" I mean a term predicable
28      I,  23|        conclusion, we must take a primary essential predicate-suppose
29      I,  24|         commensurate universal is primary; hence the commensurate
30      I,  28|   subjects constituted out of the primary entities of the genus-i.
31      I,  31|       than intuition. (As regards primary truths there is of course
32      I,  32|         admitted that it is these primary immediate premisses which
33     II,  3 |           will be endless; or the primary truths will be indemonstrable
34     II,  4 |           which the premisses are primary and immediate-which we ought
35     II,  13|    essential nature. Thus, if the primary genus is assumed and we
36     II,  13|      differentiation belongs. The primary differentiation of animal
37     II,  13|         genus of animal; e.g. the primary differentiation of bird
38     II,  13|          right term is assumed as primary, and this will be ensured
39     II,  13|         contiguous" to it will be primary, and so on. Our procedure
40     II,  13|         or a differentia. Now the primary term is a genus, and this
41     II,  16|        more than one thing as its primary subject, let B be a primary
42     II,  16|       primary subject, let B be a primary subject in which A inheres,
43     II,  16|          A inheres, and C another primary subject of A, and D and
44     II,  16|         subject of A, and D and E primary subjects of B and C respectively.
45     II,  17|           and I call an attribute primary universal if it is commensurate,
46     II,  18|         which is proximate to the primary universal, or the middle
47     II,  19| impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses. But
48     II,  19|           we must get to know the primary premisses by induction;
49     II,  19|     scientific knowledge, whereas primary premisses are more knowable
50     II,  19|       scientific knowledge of the primary premisses, and since except
51     II,  19|     intuition that apprehends the primary premisses-a result which