Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  3 |         doctrine is either true or a necessary deduction from the premisses.
 2      I,  3 |             premiss-never involves a necessary consequent: two premisses
 3      I,  4 |      demonstrative knowledge will be necessary. And since demonstrative
 4      I,  4 |   demonstration is an inference from necessary premisses. So we must consider
 5      I,  4 |     contained in their subjects, are necessary as well as consequentially
 6      I,  4 |         within this sphere even is a necessary consequent of not-odd. So,
 7      I,  6 | Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary basic truths; for the object
 8      I,  6 |            latter class includes are necessary because one member or the
 9      I,  6 |        accidental attributes are not necessary to their subjects.~We must
10      I,  6 |       conclusion of demonstration is necessary and that a demonstrated
11      I,  6 |    conclusion must be developed from necessary premisses. For though you
12      I,  6 |            yet if your premisses are necessary you will assuredly demonstrate-in
13      I,  6 |          demonstration proceeds from necessary premisses is also indicated
14      I,  6 |             a premiss of it is not a necessary truth-whether we think it
15      I,  6 |           must be the development of necessary premisses is as follows.
16      I,  6 |             though the conclusion is necessary, the mediating link is a
17      I,  6 |            mediating link, not being necessary, may have perished in the
18      I,  6 |               When the conclusion is necessary, the middle through which
19      I,  6 |            You can in fact infer the necessary even from a non-necessary
20      I,  6 |             hand, when the middle is necessary the conclusion must be necessary;
21      I,  6 |     necessary the conclusion must be necessary; just as true premisses
22      I,  6 |    nonnecessary the middle cannot be necessary either. Thus: let A be predicated
23      I,  6 |     necessarily of B, and let B be a necessary predicate of C; then A too
24      I,  6 |              C; then A too will be a necessary predicate of C, which by
25      I,  6 |     knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus, and therefore must
26      I,  6 |        clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term; otherwise its
27      I,  6 |             that his conclusion is a necessary connexion. Either he will
28      I,  6 |            the non-necessary for the necessary and believe the necessity
29      I,  6 |             prove its inherence as a necessary conclusion. A difficulty,
30      I,  6 |              the conclusion is not a necessary connexion, such and such
31      I,  6 |            subjects as such that are necessary it is clear that both the
32      I,  6 |     essential. For accidents are not necessary: and, further, since accidents
33      I,  6 |              since accidents are not necessary one does not necessarily
34      I,  10|      premisses.~That which expresses necessary self-grounded fact, and
35      I,  13|              not contained in them-a necessary condition of knowledge of
36      I,  13|   sense-perception. Therefore A is a necessary predicate of C; so that
37      I,  16|          denied of the other are the necessary condition if one is to get
38      I,  30|              reasoning proceeds from necessary or general premisses, the
39      I,  30|      premisses, the conclusion being necessary if the premisses are necessary
40      I,  30|       necessary if the premisses are necessary and general if the premisses
41      I,  30|              are neither general nor necessary, they are not demonstrable.~
42      I,  32|              of the basic truths are necessary, others variable.~Looking
43      I,  33|            universal and proceeds by necessary connexions, and that which
44      I,  33|        connexions, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise. So
45      I,  33|           which is immediate but not necessary. This view also fits the
46      I,  33|         object of opinion, while the necessary is the object of knowledge.~
47     II,  11|         inference from antecedent to necessary consequent does not hold
48     II,  13|             the essential nature are necessary and that universals are
49     II,  13|              and that universals are necessary, and since the attributes