Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  3 |       unqualified knowledge will prove faulty; for there seem to
 2      I,  3 |    writings on the syllogism, to prove all the assumptions on which
 3      I,  5 |       sense in which we think we prove it so. We make this mistake (
 4      I,  5 |  universally. Hence, even if one prove of each kind of triangle
 5      I,  6 |      inhere, it is impossible to prove its inherence as a necessary
 6      I,  7 |         We cannot, for instance, prove geometrical truths by arithmetic.
 7      I,  7 |            Geometry again cannot prove of lines any property which
 8      I,  11|        use the opposite facts to prove the same nexus. This was
 9      I,  13|           Thus (2) (a) you might prove as follows that the planets
10      I,  19|      kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing
11      I,  23|       deny being.~When we are to prove a conclusion, we must take
12      I,  23|          syllogisms, then, which prove the inherence of an attribute,
13      I,  23|          is in question; e.g. to prove through a middle C that
14      I,  24|          x—e.g. in attempting to prove that isosceles is x, it
15      I,  26|     follows. Supposing we are to prove that does not inhere in
16      I,  29|         C, D, and F severally to prove A-B—but also by taking a
17      I,  32|          if middles are taken to prove these premisses, they will
18      I,  32|        premisses are required to prove special conclusions. But
19     II,  3 |          figure plane. Again, to prove essential nature is not
20     II,  3 |     nature is not the same as to prove the fact of a connexion.
21     II,  4 | supposing that it is possible to prove the essential nature of
22     II,  4 |  argument assumes what it has to prove, since B too is the essential
23     II,  4 |        discussion.~Thus they who prove the essential nature of
24     II,  6 |         as a premiss which is to prove definable form. "But not
25     II,  7 |      then by definition shall we prove substance or essential nature?
26     II,  7 |      since presumably one cannot prove essential nature by an appeal
27     II,  7 |       how shall we by definition prove essential nature? He who
28     II,  7 |       further, if definition can prove what is the essential nature
29     II,  7 |          of a thing, can it also prove that it exists? And how
30     II,  7 |          exists? And how will it prove them both by the same process,
31     II,  7 |          it, then, that we shall prove in defining essential nature?
32     II,  7 |         that definition does not prove that the thing defined exists:
33     II,  7 |       therefore, to define is to prove either a thing’s essential
34     II,  7 |          3) no demonstration can prove that any particular name
35     II,  8 |    single thing this method will prove one and not the other.~Now
36     II,  14|        the connexions we wish to prove we have to select our analyses