Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |         be a triangle. For some things (viz. the singulars finally
 2      I,  2 |        accidental knowledge, of things which are demonstrable,
 3      I,  2 |       anything more than in the things he knows, unless he has
 4      I,  3 |        conclusion; and the same things cannot simultaneously be
 5      I,  4 |         something else besides. Things, then, not predicated of
 6      I,  4 |       subject I call essential; things predicated of a subject
 7      I,  8 |         to inhere in perishable things. The proof can only be accidental,
 8      I,  9 |         highest degree. But, as things are, demonstration is not
 9      I,  16|      universal attribute of all things. Consequently both premisses
10      I,  16|         not an attribute of all things, C-B false because C, which
11      I,  21|        in number, and if finite things are combined in a finite
12      I,  22|      and even if there are such things, they are not relevant to
13      I,  22|         essential attributes in things. Now attributes may be essential
14      I,  24| Demonstration which teaches two things is preferable to demonstration
15      I,  31|         clear that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot be acquired
16      I,  32|        that the basic truths of things generically different themselves
17      I,  33|  otherwise. So though there are things which are true and real
18      I,  33|        concern them: if it did, things which can be otherwise would
19      I,  33|       these terms, are the only things that can be "true", it follows
20     II,  1 |         as many as the kinds of things which we know. They are
21     II,  2 |         this is equally true of things in so far as they are said
22     II,  3 |         definition is, and what things are definable. And let us
23     II,  3 |    given subject; but different things require different demonstrations-unless
24     II,  9 |                9~Now while some things have a cause distinct from
25     II,  9 |         the essential nature of things which have a "middle", i.e.
26     II,  10|         learn the definition of things the existence of which we
27     II,  10|       in what sense and of what things the essential nature is
28     II,  10|       in what sense and of what things it is not; (2) what are
29     II,  10|       in what sense and of what things it proves the essential
30     II,  10|       in what sense and of what things it does not; (3) what is
31     II,  12|         now occurring in actual things follows upon a past event.
32     II,  13|     many differentiae inhere in things specifically identical,