Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  2 |   knowledge, of things which are demonstrable, means precisely to have
 2      I,  3 |          but that all truths are demonstrable. Neither doctrine is either
 3      I,  9 |  theorems in harmonics which are demonstrable by arithmetic. Such theorems
 4      I,  9 |         no attribute is strictly demonstrable except from its "appropriate"
 5      I,  10|          of the pupil’s opinion, demonstrable, but assumed and used without
 6      I,  17|         both of immediate and of demonstrable truths.~
 7      I,  19|     infinity, i.e. is everything demonstrable? Or do ultimate subject
 8      I,  22| predicable of those subjects are demonstrable; but of demonstrable propositions
 9      I,  22|         are demonstrable; but of demonstrable propositions one cannot
10      I,  22|          then every predicate is demonstrable. Consequently, since these
11      I,  22|        Consequently, since these demonstrable predicates are infinite
12      I,  22|       outset-that all truths are demonstrable is mistaken. For if there
13      I,  22|            a) not all truths are demonstrable, and (b) an infinite regress
14      I,  24|         that universals are more demonstrable: but since relative and
15      I,  24|       concomitantly, of the more demonstrable there will be fuller demonstration.
16      I,  30|          necessary, they are not demonstrable.~
17      I,  31|         that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot be acquired by perception,
18     II,  3 |      scientific knowledge of the demonstrable is identical with possessing
19     II,  3 |        then, that not everything demonstrable can be defined. What then?
20     II,  3 |         Hence, since to know the demonstrable scientifically is to possess
21     II,  3 |       will give knowledge of the demonstrable.~Moreover, the basic premisses
22     II,  3 |          basic premisses will be demonstrable and will depend on prior
23     II,  3 |         if the definable and the demonstrable are not wholly the same,
24     II,  3 |         not all the definable is demonstrable nor all the demonstrable
25     II,  3 |         demonstrable nor all the demonstrable definable; and we may draw
26     II,  8 | essential nature is in any sense demonstrable and definable or in none.~
27     II,  8 |    nature of the thing is either demonstrable or indemonstrable. Consequently,
28     II,  10|          the essential nature is demonstrable, and in what sense and of
29     II,  10|      thing is both definable and demonstrable and how far it is not.~
30     II,  13|         in which it is or is not demonstrable or definable; so let us