Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |              to us. Recognition of a truth may in some cases contain
 2      I,  2 |            primary premiss and basic truth. A "basic truth" in a demonstration
 3      I,  2 |            and basic truth. A "basic truth" in a demonstration is an
 4      I,  2 |              call an immediate basic truth of syllogism a "thesis"
 5      I,  4 |             be other than it is, the truth obtained by demonstrative
 6      I,  6 |              no criterion of a basic truth, which can only be the primary
 7      I,  6 |       demonstration; and (2) not all truth is "appropriate".~A further
 8      I,  6 |        conclusion and affirm it with truth if they are true.~Since
 9      I,  10|             genus in question: for a truth of this kind will have the
10      I,  10|             is actually neither. The truth is that the geometer does
11      I,  13|            is near—we must take this truth as having been reached by
12      I,  16|              middle term can be with truth universally affirmed of
13      I,  19|            however, one is aiming at truth, one must be guided by the
14      I,  23|            demonstration and a basic truth is reached. There are, moreover,
15      I,  24|       approaches nearer to the basic truth, and nothing is so near
16      I,  24|            which is itself the basic truth. If, then, proof from the
17      I,  24|           then, proof from the basic truth is more accurate than proof
18      I,  25|           then, that through which a truth is proved is a better known
19      I,  25|        better known and more certain truth, and if the negative proposition
20      I,  25|              superior.~(3) The basic truth of demonstrative syllogism
21      I,  32| subject-genus will provide one basic truth. If, however, it is not
22      I,  33|         Besides, when a man thinks a truth incapable of being otherwise
23      I,  33|              also has knowledge.~The truth perhaps is that if a man
24     II,  5 |            it does make evident some truth. Yet to state a definition
25     II,  6 |            our conclusion? Or is the truth that, since proof must be
26     II,  12|            exist, it must be a prior truth to say that A will exist,
27     II,  17|          middles also analogous.~The truth is that cause, effect, and
28     II,  19|             states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true,