Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |        conclusion, we should perhaps say that in a manner he knew,
 2      I,  3 |          frivolous and impossible to say that demonstration is reciprocal
 3      I,  4 |           man, then if it be true to say "this is a man", "this is
 4      I,  4 |           walking; it was, we should say, a coincidence. If, on the
 5      I,  10|             illegitimate postulate-I say "must believe", because
 6      I,  11|             it will still be true to say that Callias—even if it
 7      I,  11|           even if it be also true to say that not-Callias—is animal
 8      I,  19|             in the sense in which we say "That white (thing) is a
 9      I,  19|            of predication as when we say "The man is white": the
10      I,  19|           not attributable-G, let us say, which is attributable to
11      I,  19|              same questions arise, I say, because in these cases
12      I,  19|              one another, whether we say that the subject has an
13      I,  31| demonstration-we should not (as some say) possess knowledge of it;
14     II,  3 |            beginning what we have to say with a point most intimately
15     II,  4 |        merely be what it was true to say of C. Even if A is predicated
16     II,  5 |             is asked "Why?", he will say, and, as he thinks, proves
17     II,  11|        designed, as the Pythagoreans say, for a threat to terrify
18     II,  12|           that because it is true to say that A occurred, therefore
19     II,  12|              therefore it is true to say that B, the subsequent event,
20     II,  12|               since if it is true to say that D will exist, it must
21     II,  12|             must be a prior truth to say that A will exist, and the
22     II,  13|     difference—it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped, or biped-animal-tame.
23     II,  13|          thing; and one cannot, they say, know each thing without
24     II,  14|         clearly at once enable us to say in virtue of what character
25     II,  16|              of broad leaves, let us say, in the latter case, in
26     II,  17|           definition of deciduous. I say that, because you will first
27     II,  17|              how shall we be able to say that A is predicable of