Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |       right angles? No: clearly he knows not without qualification
 2      I,  1 |          only in the sense that he knows universally. If this distinction
 3      I,  1 |         nothing or what he already knows; for we cannot accept the
 4      I,  2 |           way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know
 5      I,  2 |         more than in the things he knows, unless he has either actual
 6      I,  9 | sovereignty. This is so because he knows better whose knowledge is
 7      I,  9 |  themselves uncaused: hence, if he knows better than others or best
 8      I,  9 |        hard to be sure whether one knows or not; for it is hard to
 9      I,  24|           but qua triangle, he who knows that isosceles possesses
10      I,  24|           possesses that attribute knows the subject as qua itself
11      I,  24|            less degree than he who knows that triangle has that attribute.
12      I,  24|       greater knowledge is his who knows the subject as possessing
13      I,  24|             It follows that he who knows a connexion universally
14      I,  24|          it in fact is than he who knows the particular; and the
15      I,  24|            universal demonstration knows the particular as well,
16      I,  24|          well. For example, if one knows that the angles of all triangles
17      I,  24|           to two right angles, one knows in a sense-potentially-that
18      I,  33|           he always thinks that he knows it, never that he opines
19      I,  33|          maintain that all that he knows he can also opine, why should
20      I,  33|          be knowledge? For he that knows and he that opines will
21      I,  33|          so that, since the former knows, he that opines also has
22     II,  7 |           essential nature? He who knows what human-or any other-nature
23     II,  7 |        that man exists; for no one knows the nature of what does
24     II,  13|          matter whether or not one knows all the other subjects of
25     II,  16|          of the bare fact, one who knows it through the eclipse knows
26     II,  16|       knows it through the eclipse knows the fact of the earth’s
27     II,  19|            impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses.