Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  6 |       the same if one asked any questions whatever and then merely
 2      I,  6 |    solution is that determinate questions have to be put, not because
 3      I,  12|       other science: only those questions will be geometrical which
 4      I,  12|      the like is true. Of these questions the geometer is bound to
 5      I,  12|        is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put to each
 6      I,  12|         there are "geometrical" questions, does it follow that there
 7      I,  12|   distinctively "ungeometrical" questions? Further, in each special
 8      I,  12|    error is it that may vitiate questions, and yet not exclude them
 9      I,  19|     much difference between the questions: the first is, is it possible
10      I,  19|   another?~I hold that the same questions arise with regard to negative
11      I,  19| attributable to all G. The same questions arise, I say, because in
12      I,  19|         One cannot ask the same questions in the case of reciprocating
13      I,  19|       infinite in number. These questions then cannot be asked-unless,
14     II,  1 |         then, those are the two questions we ask; but for some objects
15     II,  2 |         in the answers to these questions that our knowledge consists.~
16     II,  2 |      what we are asking in such questions is whether a thing is this
17     II,  3 |        is clear, then, that all questions are a search for a "middle".
18     II,  3 |        difficulties which these questions raise, beginning what we
19     II,  12|  infinity of past events. These questions, however, must receive a
20     II,  15|       may be exemplified by the questions as to the causes respectively
21     II,  15|        to be proved which these questions embody are identical generically,
22     II,  19|        premisses. But there are questions which might be raised in