Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  3 |            imply one another, viz. "peculiar" properties.~Now, it has
 2      I,  7 |         fundamental truths of their peculiar genus: it cannot show, for
 3      I,  7 |            lines in virtue of their peculiar genus, but through some
 4      I,  9 |            no less evident that the peculiar basic truths of each inhering
 5      I,  10|     demonstrative sciences some are peculiar to each science, and some
 6      I,  10|            the science in question.~Peculiar truths are, e.g. the definitions
 7      I,  10| arithmetician only to numbers. Also peculiar to a science are the subjects
 8      I,  12|             if each science has its peculiar propositions from which
 9      I,  12|         propositions from which its peculiar conclusion is developed,
10      I,  32|         instance, and magnitude-are peculiar.~
11     II,  4 |           definable nature is both "peculiar" to a subject and predicated
12     II,  4 |            is to C, obviously A is "peculiar" to B and B to C-in fact
13     II,  4 |           fact all three terms are "peculiar" to one another: and further (
14     II,  6 |         form is constituted by the "peculiar" attributes of its essential
15     II,  6 |       complete synthesis of them is peculiar to the thing; and thus-since
16     II,  8 |         essential nature just as a "peculiar" property must be inferred
17     II,  8 |        through a middle which is a "peculiar" property; so that of the
18     II,  13|             examine the properties "peculiar" to the species, working