Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |        prevent a man in one sense knowing what he is learning, in
 2      I,  1 |          learning, in another not knowing it. The strange thing would
 3      I,  2 |         of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way
 4      I,  2 |           is. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort
 5      I,  2 |          may be another manner of knowing as well-that will be discussed
 6      I,  2 |          the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premisses
 7      I,  3 |         owing to the necessity of knowing the primary premisses, there
 8      I,  3 |           that there is no way of knowing other than by demonstration,
 9      I,  3 | scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at all, but rests on the
10      I,  3 |        agree with them as regards knowing, holding that it is only
11      I,  6 |         of the conclusion without knowing it, or else he will not
12      I,  31|    because in seeing we should be knowing, but because we should have
13     II,  7 |         thing’s nature is without knowing whether it exists. But that
14     II,  13|         to omit something without knowing it.~To define and divide
15     II,  13|        single other thing without knowing every single other thing;
16     II,  13|           know each thing without knowing its differentiae, since
17     II,  19|   calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always
18     II,  19|        thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative