Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  2 |            indifferently; if it is demonstrative, it lays down one part to
 2      I,  3 |          that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge
 3      I,  3 |       therefore a fortiori for the demonstrative syllogism of science. If,
 4      I,  4 |          is, the truth obtained by demonstrative knowledge will be necessary.
 5      I,  4 |            be necessary. And since demonstrative knowledge is only present
 6      I,  6 |                                  6~Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary
 7      I,  6 |         this that premisses of the demonstrative syllogism must be connexions
 8      I,  6 |           is not.~To sum up, then: demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge
 9      I,  6 |           of essential there is no demonstrative knowledge; for since an
10      I,  10|           basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences some are peculiar
11      I,  10|         same way. For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: (
12      I,  12|          form of a premiss, either demonstrative or dialectical. On the other
13      I,  22| predication can be infinite in the demonstrative sciences which are the object
14      I,  25|              3) The basic truth of demonstrative syllogism is the universal
15     II,  8 |            is no syllogism-i.e. no demonstrative syllogism-of essential nature,
16     II,  8 |            through syllogism, viz. demonstrative syllogism, that essential
17     II,  19|    conditions required to produce, demonstrative knowledge, since it is the