Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  2 |   opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist
 2      I,  2 |        knowledge, if it be not accidental knowledge, of things which
 3      I,  4 | predicated of a subject I call accidental or "coincidental".~In another
 4      I,  6 |  inhere essentially or else be accidental, and accidental attributes
 5      I,  6 |        else be accidental, and accidental attributes are not necessary
 6      I,  6 |         this is so even if the accidental premisses are invariable
 7      I,  8 |  things. The proof can only be accidental, because the attribute’s
 8      I,  9 |    connexion with a subject is accidental unless we know that connexion
 9      I,  19|        two different modes, by accidental predication in one relation
10      I,  22|      at all, or not strict but accidental predication. "White" and "
11      I,  22|      species of themselves are accidental or coincidental; e.g. white
12      I,  22|   another such term, except by accidental predication; for all such
13     II,  8 |     thing. As often as we have accidental knowledge that the thing
14     II,  17|   effect and its subject as an accidental conjunction, though such