Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |           audience that accepts its premisses, induction exhibiting the
  2      I,  2 |             knowing is correct, the premisses of demonstrated knowledge
  3      I,  2 |           not be demonstration. The premisses must be true: for that which
  4      I,  2 |     commensurate with its side. The premisses must be primary and indemonstrable;
  5      I,  2 |          demonstration of them. The premisses must be the causes of the
  6      I,  2 |         another. In saying that the premisses of demonstrated knowledge
  7      I,  2 |          the facts constituting its premisses, we must not only know the
  8      I,  2 |          love. So since the primary premisses are the cause of our knowledge-i.
  9      I,  2 |             of our knowledge of the premisses. Now a man cannot believe
 10      I,  2 |       contradicting the fundamental premisses which lead to the opposed
 11      I,  3 |    necessity of knowing the primary premisses, there is no scientific
 12      I,  3 |        necessary deduction from the premisses. The first school, assuming
 13      I,  3 |    terminates and there are primary premisses, yet these are unknowable
 14      I,  3 |             cannot know the primary premisses, knowledge of the conclusions
 15      I,  3 |           mere supposition that the premisses are true. The other party
 16      I,  3 |          knowledge of the immediate premisses is independent of demonstration. (
 17      I,  3 |        since we must know the prior premisses from which the demonstration
 18      I,  3 |      demonstration must be based on premisses prior to and better known
 19      I,  3 |           necessary consequent: two premisses constitute the first and
 20      I,  3 |            proves both the original premisses. Propositions the terms
 21      I,  4 |            inference from necessary premisses. So we must consider what
 22      I,  4 |          must consider what are the premisses of demonstration-i.e. what
 23      I,  6 |           It follows from this that premisses of the demonstrative syllogism
 24      I,  6 |            developed from necessary premisses. For though you may reason
 25      I,  6 |            you may reason from true premisses without demonstrating, yet
 26      I,  6 |          demonstrating, yet if your premisses are necessary you will assuredly
 27      I,  6 |             proceeds from necessary premisses is also indicated by the
 28      I,  6 |            development of necessary premisses is as follows. Where demonstration
 29      I,  6 |             necessary; just as true premisses always give a true conclusion.
 30      I,  6 |             fact and from immediate premisses.~Of accidents that are not
 31      I,  6 |           such and such determinate premisses should be proposed in order
 32      I,  6 |             the conclusions and the premisses of demonstrations which
 33      I,  6 |           so even if the accidental premisses are invariable but not essential,
 34      I,  7 |       axioms, i.e. axioms which are premisses of demonstration; (3) the
 35      I,  7 | demonstration. The axioms which are premisses of demonstration may be
 36      I,  8 |           is also clear that if the premisses from which the syllogism
 37      I,  9 |       indemonstrable, and immediate premisses does not constitute knowledge.
 38      I,  9 |             an inference from basic premisses essential and "appropriate"
 39      I,  9 |          and as inferred from basic premisses essential and "appropriate"
 40      I,  9 |             knowledge is from prior premisses when it derives from causes
 41      I,  9 |      reasoned from true and primary premisses. But that is not so: the
 42      I,  10|             previous conclusions as premisses. Astronomy too proceeds
 43      I,  10|           axioms, which are primary premisses of its demonstration; (3)
 44      I,  10|           attributes, and the basic premisses.~That which expresses necessary
 45      I,  10|        hypotheses: but it is in the premisses of a science that its hypotheses
 46      I,  11|            axioms which are used as premisses of demonstration, not the
 47      I,  12|           interrogative form of the premisses from which the "appropriate"
 48      I,  12|           be geometrical which form premisses for the proof of the theorems
 49      I,  12|           anything from geometrical premisses, he is clearly to be applauded;
 50      I,  12|     conclusion one constructed from premisses opposite to the true premisses,
 51      I,  12|      premisses opposite to the true premisses, or is it formal fallacy
 52      I,  12|       though drawn from geometrical premisses? Or, perhaps, the erroneous
 53      I,  12|            is due to the drawing of premisses from another science; e.g.
 54      I,  12|          error, i.e. error based on premisses of this kind-"of" the science
 55      I,  12|            of an "objection"; since premisses and "objections" are so
 56      I,  12|           impossible to reason from premisses predicating mere attributes:
 57      I,  12|             is overlooked. If false premisses could never give true conclusions "
 58      I,  12|      resolution" would be easy, for premisses and conclusion would in
 59      I,  12|            from B.~Reciprocation of premisses and conclusion is more frequent
 60      I,  13|           in two ways: (1) when the premisses of the syllogism are not
 61      I,  13|        reasoned fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate, but instead
 62      I,  14|         closepacked until immediate premisses are reached.~Clearly, therefore,
 63      I,  15|            premiss, but not if both premisses are negative.~Hence it is
 64      I,  16|           possible. Either (a) both premisses, or (b) one premiss only,
 65      I,  16|         posited in both cases, both premisses will be false. (C may quite
 66      I,  16|           things. Consequently both premisses may be false.) On the other
 67      I,  16|          other hand, (b) one of the premisses may be true, though not
 68      I,  16|            and the character of the premisses in each case.~(c) It may
 69      I,  16|              It may occur when both premisses are false; e.g. supposing
 70      I,  16|             is and all B is C, both premisses are false.~(d) It is also
 71      I,  16|           true, and besides if both premisses were true, the conclusion
 72      I,  16|         that whether either or both premisses are false, the conclusion
 73      I,  16|            In the second figure the premisses cannot both be wholly false;
 74      I,  16|            denied of the other: but premisses in which the middle is affirmed
 75      I,  16|             nothing to prevent both premisses being partially false; e.g.
 76      I,  16|            is C and no B is C, both premisses are false, yet partially,
 77      I,  16|         possible not only when both premisses are false but also when
 78      I,  17|         only the major and not both premisses can be false. By "appropriate
 79      I,  17|            predicable of no B, both premisses must be false, because if
 80      I,  17|            no B is D; then if these premisses are changed in quality,
 81      I,  17|          follow and both of the new premisses will be false. When, however, (
 82      I,  17|             the second figure, both premisses cannot be entirely false;
 83      I,  17|           and through what kinds of premisses error will result in cases
 84      I,  17|             term. In this case both premisses cannot be false since, as
 85      I,  17|            the major, not only both premisses but either singly may be
 86      I,  17|           and through what kinds of premisses they occur, in the case
 87      I,  19|             negative and one of its premisses asserts one term of another,
 88      I,  19|           our inference is based on premisses as credible as possible:
 89      I,  19|            negative conclusions and premisses: viz. if A is attributable
 90      I,  21|            figure, we shall take as premisses, all E is B, some E is not
 91      I,  22|         through an antecedent (viz. premisses prior to it) and we neither
 92      I,  23|             same group of immediate premisses; for we have seen that processes
 93      I,  23|           such a conclusion are the premisses containing the middle in
 94      I,  23|            terms that are the basic premisses on which the demonstration
 95      I,  23|            does not inhere in B the premisses required are, all B is C,
 96      I,  23|            is not D by means of the premisses, all D is C; no E, or not
 97      I,  25|      hypotheses-in short from fewer premisses; for, given that all these
 98      I,  25|        Hence demonstration by fewer premisses is ceteris paribus superior.
 99      I,  25|         through three terms and two premisses, but whereas the former
100      I,  25|          conclusion follows if both premisses are negative, but that one
101      I,  25|            expands, the affirmative premisses must increase in number,
102      I,  25|            C is B. Then if both the premisses are to be again expanded,
103      I,  25|         negative premiss, the other premisses being affirmative. If, then,
104      I,  25|           which uses superior basic premisses is superior.~(4) Affirmative
105      I,  26|            that no C is A. If these premisses are assumed, therefore,
106      I,  26|            that denying A of C; for premisses are prior to the conclusion
107      I,  26|               no B is A" one of its premisses. For the destructive result
108      I,  26|          are its antecedents proper premisses. On the contrary: the constituents
109      I,  26|       constituents of syllogism are premisses related to one another as
110      I,  26|          part to whole, whereas the premisses A-C and A-B are not thus
111      I,  26|         from better known and prior premisses, and while both these forms
112      I,  28|            reach the indemonstrable premisses of a science, for they must
113      I,  30|           from necessary or general premisses, the conclusion being necessary
114      I,  30|   conclusion being necessary if the premisses are necessary and general
115      I,  30|        necessary and general if the premisses are general. Consequently,
116      I,  32|    inference is possible from false premisses, yet this occurs once only-I
117      I,  32|            are taken to prove these premisses, they will be false because
118      I,  32|            is a falsehood has false premisses, while true conclusions
119      I,  32|          true conclusions have true premisses, and false and true differ
120      I,  32|            excluded middle-serve as premisses for the proof of all conclusions.
121      I,  32|            the basic truths are the premisses, and the premisses are formed
122      I,  32|          are the premisses, and the premisses are formed by the apposition
123      I,  32|            the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be drawn.
124      I,  32|           since it is the immediate premisses which are the basic truths,
125      I,  32|             these primary immediate premisses which are basic truths,
126      I,  32|            the mass of all possible premisses any conclusion may be proved,
127      I,  32|           within one genus, special premisses are required to prove special
128      I,  32|          two kinds, those which are premisses of demonstration and the
129      I,  33|           terms until the immediate premisses are reached; because it
130      I,  33|          obtained through immediate premisses, will be both of the fact
131     II,  3 |   demonstrable.~Moreover, the basic premisses of demonstrations are definitions,
132     II,  3 |    indemonstrable; either the basic premisses will be demonstrable and
133     II,  3 |            and will depend on prior premisses, and the regress will be
134     II,  4 |             to its essence. So both premisses will predicate essence,
135     II,  4 |              Since, therefore, both premisses do predicate essence-i.e.
136     II,  4 |         premisses-i.e. in which the premisses are primary and immediate-which
137     II,  4 |           unless one takes both the premisses as predicating essence,
138     II,  5 |         follow necessarily from its premisses, even if the respondent
139     II,  5 |         follow necessarily from the premisses: this too is an assumption,
140     II,  5 |          inference follows from the premisses is open to a question as
141     II,  6 |             inference is (since the premisses from which we conclude must
142     II,  6 |    syllogism but remain outside the premisses posited. It is only against
143     II,  7 |    following from the assumption of premisses admitted to be facts-the
144     II,  8 |            found the answer, if the premisses are immediate, we know fact
145     II,  9 |        immediate, that is are basic premisses; and of these not only that
146     II,  12|         derive from immediate basic premisses.~
147     II,  18|                     18~If immediate premisses are not reached at once,
148     II,  19|      demonstration. As to the basic premisses, how they become known and
149     II,  19|         knows the primary immediate premisses. But there are questions
150     II,  19|     apprehension of these immediate premisses: one might not only ask
151     II,  19|             get to know the primary premisses by induction; for the method
152     II,  19|          knowledge, whereas primary premisses are more knowable than demonstrations,
153     II,  19|            knowledge of the primary premisses, and since except intuition