Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |               proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. This becomes evident upon
  2      I,  1 |             these latter make use of old knowledge to impart new, the syllogism
  3      I,  1 |              syllogism.~The pre-existent knowledge required is of two kinds.
  4      I,  1 |                 as factors both previous knowledge and also knowledge acquired
  5      I,  1 |              previous knowledge and also knowledge acquired simultaneously
  6      I,  2 |           possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to
  7      I,  2 |                of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot
  8      I,  2 |                 productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the
  9      I,  2 |                 of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis
 10      I,  2 |                premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate,
 11      I,  2 |                 productive of scientific knowledge, will not be demonstration.
 12      I,  2 |                  be known, since to have knowledge, if it be not accidental
 13      I,  2 |                  if it be not accidental knowledge, of things which are demonstrable,
 14      I,  2 |              since we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we
 15      I,  2 |      antecedently known, this antecedent knowledge being not our mere understanding
 16      I,  2 |        understanding of the meaning, but knowledge of the fact as well. Now "
 17      I,  2 |                premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be primary, I mean
 18      I,  2 |                 precisely because of our knowledge of the latter is the effect
 19      I,  2 |              latter is the effect of our knowledge of the premisses. Now a
 20      I,  2 |              unless he has either actual knowledge of it or something better
 21      I,  2 |             something better than actual knowledge. But we are faced with this
 22      I,  2 |              demonstration has not prior knowledge; a man must believe in some,
 23      I,  2 |                to acquire the scientific knowledge that comes through demonstration,
 24      I,  2 |              must not only have a better knowledge of the basic truths and
 25      I,  3 |                   there is no scientific knowledge. Others think there is,
 26      I,  3 |                 them is the only form of knowledge. And since thus one cannot
 27      I,  3 |              know the primary premisses, knowledge of the conclusions which
 28      I,  3 |              them is not pure scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at
 29      I,  3 |                 doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the
 30      I,  3 |          demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premisses
 31      I,  3 |                  that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative
 32      I,  3 |                 which induction produces knowledge. But if we accept this extension
 33      I,  3 |                definition of unqualified knowledge will prove faulty; for there
 34      I,  4 |                object of pure scientific knowledge cannot be other than it
 35      I,  4 |                obtained by demonstrative knowledge will be necessary. And since
 36      I,  4 |                  And since demonstrative knowledge is only present when we
 37      I,  5 |         triangles".~When, then, does our knowledge fail of commensurate universality,
 38      I,  5 |               and when it is unqualified knowledge? If triangle be identical
 39      I,  5 |              clearly we have unqualified knowledge: if on the other hand it
 40      I,  5 |       equilateral qua triangle; then our knowledge fails of commensurate universality. "
 41      I,  6 |                          6~Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessary basic
 42      I,  6 |                 the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it
 43      I,  6 |                is the same as to possess knowledge. For (1) popular acceptance
 44      I,  6 |                  cause has no scientific knowledge. If, then, we suppose a
 45      I,  6 |              argues thus has no reasoned knowledge of the conclusion, since
 46      I,  6 |               again, if a man is without knowledge now, though he still retains
 47      I,  6 |                part; then neither had he knowledge previously. But the mediating
 48      I,  6 |                 argument, yet he has not knowledge, and therefore had not knowledge
 49      I,  6 |         knowledge, and therefore had not knowledge before. Even if the link
 50      I,  6 |               such a condition cannot be knowledge.~When the conclusion is
 51      I,  6 |                  up, then: demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary
 52      I,  6 |          demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexus, and
 53      I,  6 |                there is no demonstrative knowledge; for since an accident,
 54      I,  6 |                 which produce scientific knowledge are essential. For accidents
 55      I,  6 |                necessarily have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion drawn from
 56      I,  6 |            reason); but to have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion is to know
 57      I,  8 |             known by strictly scientific knowledge to inhere in perishable
 58      I,  9 |            premisses does not constitute knowledge. Such proofs are like Bryson’
 59      I,  9 |              kind. They therefore afford knowledge of an attribute only as
 60      I,  9 |         applicable to another genus.~Our knowledge of any attribute’s connexion
 61      I,  9 |            because he knows better whose knowledge is deduced from higher causes,
 62      I,  9 |              from higher causes, for his knowledge is from prior premisses
 63      I,  9 |               others or best of all, his knowledge would be science in a higher
 64      I,  9 |                 to be sure whether one’s knowledge is based on the basic truths
 65      I,  9 |        attribute-the differentia of true knowledge. We think we have scientific
 66      I,  9 |                 think we have scientific knowledge if we have reasoned from
 67      I,  13|                                       13~Knowledge of the fact differs from
 68      I,  13|                 of the fact differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact. To
 69      I,  13|            them-a necessary condition of knowledge of the reasoned fact): (
 70      I,  13|              theory of the rainbow. Here knowledge of the fact is within the
 71      I,  13|                 the natural philosopher, knowledge of the reasoned fact within
 72      I,  14|                 the primary condition of knowledge. Thirdly, the first is the
 73      I,  14|               which enables us to pursue knowledge of the essence of a thing.
 74      I,  14|              conclusion is possible, and knowledge of a thing’s essence must
 75      I,  14|                 the primary condition of knowledge.~
 76      I,  16| Ignorance-defined not as the negation of knowledge but as a positive state
 77      I,  18|                 corresponding portion of knowledge, and that, since we learn
 78      I,  18|                or by demonstration, this knowledge cannot be acquired. Thus
 79      I,  18|                 be objects of scientific knowledge, because neither can universals
 80      I,  18|           neither can universals give us knowledge of them without induction,
 81      I,  22|               have something better than knowledge, nor can one know them without
 82      I,  22|               have something better than knowledge of it, then we shall not
 83      I,  22|                shall not have scientific knowledge of the consequent. Therefore,
 84      I,  22|                not something better than knowledge of them, we cannot through
 85      I,  23|            immediate premiss, and in the knowledge that demonstration gives
 86      I,  24|     demonstration which gives us greater knowledge (for this is the ideal of
 87      I,  24|      demonstration), and we have greater knowledge of a particular individual
 88      I,  24|                 applies that the greater knowledge is his who knows the subject
 89      I,  24|                  universally has greater knowledge of it as it in fact is than
 90      I,  24|                 as then only having full knowledge of the reason why he came.~
 91      I,  24|                this is the means to full knowledge in the case of final causes
 92      I,  24|               the other causes also full knowledge is attained when an attribute
 93      I,  24|          knowledge-but at this point our knowledge has become commensurately
 94      I,  25|              known, where they are fewer knowledge will be more speedily acquired,
 95      I,  27|                  27~The science which is knowledge at once of the fact and
 96      I,  30|                           30~There is no knowledge by demonstration of chance
 97      I,  31|                            31~Scientific knowledge is not possible through
 98      I,  31|                 cannot obtain scientific knowledge by the act of perception:
 99      I,  31|                not (as some say) possess knowledge of it; for perception must
100      I,  31|           particular, whereas scientific knowledge involves the recognition
101      I,  31|                than themselves universal knowledge is more precious than sense-perceptions
102      I,  31|                   Hence it is clear that knowledge of things demonstrable cannot
103      I,  31|                 possession of scientific knowledge through demonstration. Nevertheless
104      I,  32|                  the basic truths of all knowledge are within one genus, special
105      I,  33|                            33~Scientific knowledge and its object differ from
106      I,  33|               opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal
107      I,  33|                 be otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly does not concern
108      I,  33|          knowledge-nor of indemonstrable knowledge, which is the grasping of
109      I,  33|               necessary is the object of knowledge.~In what sense, then, can
110      I,  33|               object of both opinion and knowledge? And if any one chooses
111      I,  33|                why should not opinion be knowledge? For he that knows and he
112      I,  33|                  he that opines also has knowledge.~The truth perhaps is that
113      I,  33|                will have not opinion but knowledge: if on the other hand he
114      I,  33|                  opinion and not genuine knowledge; and his opinion, if obtained
115      I,  33|                The object of opinion and knowledge is not quite identical;
116      I,  33|               identity of the objects of knowledge and opinion is similar.
117      I,  33|                  and opinion is similar. Knowledge is the apprehension of,
118      I,  33|               essential nature of man is knowledge; the apprehension of animal
119      I,  33|              otherwise-an impossibility. Knowledge and opinion of the same
120     II,  2 |                 these questions that our knowledge consists.~Now when we ask
121     II,  3 |                  that to have scientific knowledge of the demonstrable is identical
122     II,  3 |         attribute or accident-did we get knowledge of it. Again, if to define
123     II,  3 |                  to define is to acquire knowledge of a substance, at any rate
124     II,  3 |             there is a single scientific knowledge. Hence, since to know the
125     II,  3 |                  demonstration will give knowledge of the demonstrable.~Moreover,
126     II,  5 |           involve inference; if it gives knowledge, it gives it in another
127     II,  7 |                proves anything, and that knowledge of essential nature is not
128     II,  8 |              often as we have accidental knowledge that the thing exists, we
129     II,  8 |                  we have not got genuine knowledge even of its existence, and
130     II,  8 |           follows that the degree of our knowledge of a thing’s essential nature
131     II,  11|                 think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause,
132     II,  19|                to produce, demonstrative knowledge, since it is the same as
133     II,  19|                is the developed state of knowledge of them is made clear by
134     II,  19|             already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration is
135     II,  19|                  is or is not scientific knowledge of both; or scientific knowledge
136     II,  19|         knowledge of both; or scientific knowledge of the latter, and of the
137     II,  19|               former a different kind of knowledge; and, further, whether the
138     II,  19|                  the developed states of knowledge are not innate but come
139     II,  19|                  a basis of pre-existent knowledge? For that is impossible,
140     II,  19|                  in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of
141     II,  19|                come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of
142     II,  19|                 act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no impression
143     II,  19|                 of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill
144     II,  19|            conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a
145     II,  19|              from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception.
146     II,  19|                 accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premisses
147     II,  19|       demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these
148     II,  19|              there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses,
149     II,  19|                 be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that
150     II,  19|                 consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.
151     II,  19|                  knowledge of scientific knowledge.If, therefore, it is the
152     II,  19|         originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source