Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |         This is either universal or particular or indefinite. By universal
  2      I, 1 |          none of something else; by particular that it belongs to some
  3      I, 1 |          whether it is universal or particular, e.g. "contraries are subjects
  4      I, 2 |     premisses are universal, others particular, others indefinite. It is
  5      I, 2 |          good must be pleasure; the particular affirmative must convert
  6      I, 2 |          will be pleasure); but the particular negative need not convert,
  7      I, 2 |    Similarly too, if the premiss is particular. For if some B is A, then
  8      I, 3 |        affirmatives converts into a particular. If it is necessary that
  9      I, 3 |           be A necessarily. But the particular negative does not convert,
 10      I, 3 |            been already proved. The particular negative also must be treated
 11      I, 3 |           does not convert, and the particular does. This will be plain
 12      I, 4 |             last, so that neither a particular nor a universal conclusion
 13      I, 4 |            premiss is indefinite or particular.~But if the universality
 14      I, 4 |             negative, indefinite or particular: e.g. if some B is or is
 15      I, 4 |             premiss is negative and particular, can there be a syllogism,
 16      I, 4 |            premiss be indefinite or particular: e.g. if all B is A and
 17      I, 4 |           subject and predicate are particular, either positively or negatively,
 18      I, 4 |     syllogism in this figure with a particular conclusion, the terms must
 19      I, 4 |          figure, viz. universal and particular, affirmative and negative.
 20      I, 5 |           to one of the extremes, a particular negative syllogism must
 21      I, 5 |          statement is negative, the particular is affirmative: if the universal
 22      I, 5 |       universal is affirmative, the particular is negative. For if M belongs
 23      I, 5 |         statement is opposed to the particular, we have stated when a syllogism
 24      I, 5 |            indefinite nature of the particular statement. For since it
 25      I, 5 |            indefinite nature of the particular statement. But if the minor
 26      I, 5 |             is universal, the other particular, a syllogism can, not be
 27      I, 5 |      negative, whether universal or particular.~
 28      I, 6 |             is universal, the other particular. When the minor is related
 29      I, 6 |            indefinite nature of the particular statement.~Nor is a syllogism
 30      I, 7 | substitution of an indefinite for a particular affirmative will effect
 31      I, 7 |       negative premiss, each of the particular syllogisms by reductio ad
 32      I, 7 |    impossibile. In the first figure particular syllogisms are indeed made
 33      I, 7 |             first figure, and since particular syllogisms in the first
 34      I, 7 |            figure, it is clear that particular syllogisms can be reduced
 35      I, 7 |             one of the premisses is particular, by means of the particular
 36      I, 7 |         particular, by means of the particular syllogisms in the first
 37      I, 7 |       figure: consequently also the particular syllogisms in the third
 38      I, 8 |             is affirmative, and the particular negative, and again in the
 39      I, 8 |    universal is affirmative and the particular negative, the demonstration
 40      I, 8 |          part of the subject of the particular negative proposition, to
 41      I, 9 |           the proof is the same.~In particular syllogisms, if the universal
 42      I, 9 |            be necessary; but if the particular, the conclusion will not
 43      I, 9 |             be the same. But if the particular premiss is necessary, the
 44      I, 10|         results will obtain also in particular syllogisms. For whenever
 45      I, 10|             universal, the negative particular, the conclusion will not
 46      I, 10|          statement is necessary but particular, will the conclusion be
 47      I, 11|             is convertible into the particular: consequently if A belongs
 48      I, 11|             is universal, the other particular, and if both are affirmative,
 49      I, 11|             same as before; for the particular affirmative also is convertible.
 50      I, 11|           falls under C. But if the particular premiss is necessary, the
 51      I, 11|          Let the premiss BC be both particular and necessary, and let A
 52      I, 11|           is not necessary, but the particular is necessary. But when the
 53      I, 11|          the proposition AC be both particular and necessary.~But if one
 54      I, 11|     necessary, whether universal or particular, or the negative is particular,
 55      I, 11|      particular, or the negative is particular, the conclusion will not
 56      I, 11|             when the affirmative is particular and necessary, take the
 57      I, 11|          negative proposition being particular is necessary, take the terms "
 58      I, 13|           holds good in the case of particular affirmations: for the proof
 59      I, 14|             is universal, the other particular, when the major premiss
 60      I, 14|           same as above. But if the particular premiss is negative, and
 61      I, 14|             universal and the minor particular, e.g. A is possible for
 62      I, 14|       assumed premisses, but if the particular premiss is converted and
 63      I, 14|           if both are indefinite or particular, in no way will a syllogism
 64      I, 15|         e.g. to the present or to a particular period, but simply without
 65      I, 15|       prevents "man" belonging at a particular time to everything that
 66      I, 15|             is universal, the other particular, then whenever the major
 67      I, 15|    affirmative or negative, and the particular is affirmative and assertoric,
 68      I, 15|       problematic, and the minor is particular and problematic, whether
 69      I, 15|             negative, and the minor particular, negative, and problematic,
 70      I, 15|           results. But whenever the particular premiss is assertoric and
 71      I, 15|            indefinite nature of the particular premiss. But if the minor
 72      I, 15|            universal, and the major particular, whether either premiss
 73      I, 15|     possible when the premisses are particular or indefinite, whether problematic
 74      I, 16|             relation will obtain in particular syllogisms. Whenever the
 75      I, 16|             to some C. But when the particular affirmative in the negative
 76      I, 16|            and the major premiss is particular and necessary, there cannot
 77      I, 16|         universal is necessary, the particular problematic, if the universal
 78      I, 16|             are indefinite, or both particular. Terms applicable in either
 79      I, 17|           or negative, universal or particular. But when one premiss is
 80      I, 17|             is universal, the other particular, or both are particular
 81      I, 17|             particular, or both are particular or indefinite, or in whatever
 82      I, 18|          premisses are universal or particular. The proof is the same as
 83      I, 18|          good if the syllogisms are particular. Whenever the affirmative
 84      I, 18|    assertoric, whether universal or particular, no syllogism is possible (
 85      I, 18|      proposition is assertoric, but particular, no syllogism is possible,
 86      I, 18|         affirmative or negative, or particular. The proof is the same and
 87      I, 19|            relations will obtain in particular syllogisms. For whenever
 88      I, 19|           if both are indefinite or particular, no syllogism can be formed.
 89      I, 20|   proposition is convertible into a particular, and B may possibly belong
 90      I, 20|             is universal, the other particular, a syllogism will be possible,
 91      I, 20|           first figure again if the particular premiss is converted. For
 92      I, 20|         premisses are indefinite or particular, no syllogism can be formed:
 93      I, 21|             is universal, the other particular, then when both are affirmative,
 94      I, 21|          universal is negative, the particular affirmative, we shall have
 95      I, 21|             universal, the negative particular, the proof will proceed
 96      I, 21|         premisses are indefinite or particular, no syllogism will be possible.
 97      I, 24|    premisses are universal, while a particular statement is proved both
 98      I, 26|      through the second in two. The particular affirmative is proved through
 99      I, 26|         moods through the last. The particular negative is proved in all
100      I, 26|         they are destroyed: and the particular negative is proved in all
101      I, 26|        possible in two figures. But particular statements can be refuted
102      I, 26|       either to all or to none. But particular statements are easier to
103      I, 26|    universal statements by means of particular, and particular statements
104      I, 26|            means of particular, and particular statements by means of universal:
105      I, 26|    universal statements by means of particular, though it is possible to
106      I, 26|            is possible to establish particular statements by means of universal.
107      I, 27|             those which follow some particular but those which follow the
108      I, 27|             e.g. not what follows a particular man but what follows every
109      I, 28|     establish not a universal but a particular proposition, they must look
110      I, 28|            object is to establish a particular negative proposition, we
111      I, 28|          universal statement into a particular.~It is clear then that in
112      I, 29|         inquiry which leads up to a particular conclusion, with the addition
113      I, 32|             are universal and which particular, and if both premisses have
114      I, 32|         universal, in what sort the particular is described, clearly we
115      I, 36|          the genus is asserted in a particular way, in relation to the
116      I, 39|             is not identical with a particular kind of supposable (for
117      I, 41|           use the existence of this particular thing, but imitate the geometrician
118      I, 45|      syllogism is not universal but particular, e.g. if A belongs to no
119      I, 45|             but only one of the two particular syllogisms. Let A belong
120      I, 45|             But if the syllogism is particular, whenever the negative statement
121      I, 45|          and B to some C. Since the particular affirmative is convertible,
122      I, 45|      syllogism is negative: for the particular affirmative is convertible:
123      I, 45|            to some A. But since the particular statement is convertible,
124      I, 45|          universal, the affirmative particular: for A will belong to no
125      I, 45|           the negative statement is particular, no resolution will be possible,
126      I, 45|          and both premisses will be particular.~It is clear that in order
127      I, 45|           the negative statement is particular, no resolution will be possible:
128      I, 45|           will be possible: for the particular negative does not admit
129     II, 1 |    syllogisms are universal, others particular, all the universal syllogisms
130     II, 1 |             than one result, and of particular syllogisms the affirmative
131     II, 1 |           convertible save only the particular negative: and the conclusion
132     II, 1 |             all syllogisms save the particular negative yield more than
133     II, 1 |     syllogisms whether universal or particular. But it is possible to give
134     II, 1 |             not belong to E.~But in particular syllogisms there will be
135     II, 1 |         result when this premiss is particular), but whatever is subordinate
136     II, 1 |        possible also in the case of particular syllogisms.~
137     II, 2 |            ex hypothesi is true.~In particular syllogisms it is possible
138     II, 2 |          the first is true, and the particular is false; and when both
139     II, 3 |         syllogisms are universal or particular, viz. when both premisses
140     II, 3 |            that our thesis holds in particular syllogisms. For (5) nothing
141     II, 3 |        premiss is wholly false, the particular premiss is true, and the
142     II, 3 |            premiss is true, and the particular is false. For nothing prevents
143     II, 3 |     universal premiss true, but the particular false. Similarly if the
144     II, 3 |      universal premiss is true, the particular false, and the conclusion
145     II, 3 |      premiss is affirmative and the particular negative. For it is possible
146     II, 4 |           clear also in the case of particular syllogisms that a true conclusion
147     II, 5 |           the remaining premiss.~In particular syllogisms it is not possible
148     II, 5 |         other propositions, but the particular premiss can be demonstrated.
149     II, 5 |             that both premisses are particular. But the particular premiss
150     II, 5 |             are particular. But the particular premiss may be proved. Suppose
151     II, 5 |            is possible to prove the particular premiss, if the proposition
152     II, 5 |       syllogism results because the particular premiss is negative.~
153     II, 6 |           as we gave above, but the particular premiss can be proved whenever
154     II, 7 |            in this figure is always particular, so that it is clear that
155     II, 7 |             is universal, the other particular, proof of the latter will
156     II, 7 |         through the first, but when particular through the second and the
157     II, 8 |       universal. For one premiss is particular, so that the conclusion
158     II, 8 |             conclusion also will be particular. Let the syllogism be affirmative,
159     II, 8 |           will belong to some B.~In particular syllogisms when the conclusion
160     II, 9 |        quality.~If the syllogism is particular, when the conclusion is
161     II, 10|           by the conversion must be particular, or the universal premiss
162     II, 10|         negative, the other premiss particular and affirmative. If then
163     II, 11|            per impossibile.~But the particular affirmative and the universal
164     II, 11|   affirmative and the universal and particular negatives can all be proved.
165     II, 14|         demonstration establishes a particular proposition: the hypothesis
166     II, 15|            universal affirmative to particular negative, particular affirmative
167     II, 15|             to particular negative, particular affirmative to universal
168     II, 15|             universal negative, and particular affirmative to particular
169     II, 15|           particular affirmative to particular negative: but really there
170     II, 15|             are only three: for the particular affirmative is only verbally
171     II, 15|             verbally opposed to the particular negative. Of the genuine
172     II, 15|            B but to no C, so that a particular science will not be a science.
173     II, 15|          not be a science. Again, a particular science will not be a science
174     II, 15|              one has assumed that a particular science is supposition.
175     II, 15|            and C to no A, so that a particular science will not be a science.
176     II, 15|        taken universally; if one is particular, they are contradictory.~
177     II, 15|           universal affirmative and particular negative, or particular
178     II, 15|             particular negative, or particular affirmative and universal
179     II, 16|            reason thus merely say a particular thing is, if it is: in this
180     II, 21|             B for triangle, C for a particular diagram of a triangle. A
181     II, 21|         with a foreknowledge of the particular, but along with the process
182     II, 21|         mistake in apprehending the particular. Similarly in the cases
183     II, 21|       universal to knowledge of the particular. For we know no sensible
184     II, 21|    knowledge which is proper to the particular, but without the actual
185     II, 21|           previously considered the particular question. For when he thinks
186     II, 23|             bileless, and C for the particular long-lived animals, e.g.
187     II, 24|     induction starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw)
188     II, 24|         draw its proof from all the particular cases.~
189     II, 26|          premiss, because it may be particular, but a premiss either cannot
190     II, 26|            premiss either cannot be particular at all or not in universal
191     II, 26|    objection is either universal or particular, by two figures because
192     II, 26|         reply with a universal or a particular negative; the former is
193     II, 26|           term.~If the objection is particular, the objector must frame
194     II, 26|           the third figure: for the particular term assumed is middle,
195     II, 26|      opinion, and inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited
196     II, 27|       concomitants is the sign of a particular affection? Perhaps if both