Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |          and dialectical premisses, may be taken as sufficiently
  2      I, 2 |             either is or must be or may be the attribute of something
  3      I, 3 |             possible. At present we may take this much as clear
  4      I, 4 |             between the extremes we may take the terms animal, man,
  5      I, 4 |        horse, raven. The same terms may be taken also if the premiss
  6      I, 4 |            is B. For the major term may be predicable both of all
  7      I, 4 |            premiss. A similar proof may also be given if the universal
  8      I, 5 |       anyhow in this figure, but it may be valid whether the terms
  9      I, 6 |          this figure either, but it may be valid whether the terms
 10      I, 6 |          not belong to some R. This may be demonstrated in the same
 11      I, 6 |         must belong to some R. This may be demonstrated in the same
 12      I, 6 |             some" is indefinite, it may be used truly of that also
 13      I, 7 |            and these (we have seen) may be reduced to the universal
 14      I, 7 |      syllogisms in the third figure may be so reduced. It is clear
 15      I, 7 |            then that all syllogisms may be reduced to the universal
 16      I, 8 |             necessarily belongs, or may belong to something else (
 17      I, 9 |            But this is false; for B may be such that it is possible
 18      I, 11|       necessary. Further, the point may be made clear by considering
 19      I, 13|           it is possible to belong" may be converted into "it is
 20      I, 13|         that which is not necessary may possibly not belong, it
 21      I, 13|             this to belong to that" may be understood in two senses: "
 22      I, 13|    understood in two senses: "that" may mean either that to which "
 23      I, 13|         belongs or that to which it may belong; for the expression "
 24      I, 13|        stated or of that of which B may possibly be stated. It makes
 25      I, 13|         then that the expression "A may possibly belong to all B"
 26      I, 14|                       14~Whenever A may possibly belong to all B,
 27      I, 14|           syllogism to prove that A may possibly belong to all C.
 28      I, 14|           belong to that of which B may be true means (as we saw)
 29      I, 14|             account. But whenever A may belong to all B, and B may
 30      I, 14|          may belong to all B, and B may belong to no C, then indeed
 31      I, 14|             is possible": e.g. if A may belong to none of the Bs,
 32      I, 14|          being possible. Again if A may belong to no B, and B may
 33      I, 14|           may belong to no B, and B may belong to some of the Cs,
 34      I, 14|              it is necessary that A may possibly not belong to some
 35      I, 14|            is possible for all B, B may possibly not belong to some
 36      I, 14|           laid down that B possibly may belong to some C, we shall
 37      I, 15|            for all C: for every man may possibly be intelligent.
 38      I, 15|            premiss indicates that B may possibly belong to no C.
 39      I, 15|            A belongs to no B, and B may possibly belong to no C.
 40      I, 15|            and positive relation we may take the terms white-animal-snow:
 41      I, 15|             all B or to no B, and B may possibly not belong to some
 42      I, 15|            the positive relation we may take the terms white-animal-snow;
 43      I, 15|            and positive relation we may take the terms animal-white-man;
 44      I, 16|           syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C. That it
 45      I, 16|           syllogism to prove that A may belong to all C, not that
 46      I, 16|       should belong to any B, but B may belong to some of the Cs,
 47      I, 16|             it was laid down that B may belong to some C. But when
 48      I, 16|            universal is negative we may take the terms animal-white-raven
 49      I, 16|         universal is affirmative we may take the terms animal-white-swan
 50      I, 16|           problematic: so the terms may be used for all cases.~Clearly
 51      I, 17|          not convertible, e.g. if A may belong to no B, it does
 52      I, 17|           it does not follow that B may belong to no A. For suppose
 53      I, 17|            follow and assume that B may belong to no A. Since then
 54      I, 17|        contradictories, and since B may belong to no A, it is clear
 55      I, 17|            no A, it is clear that B may belong to all A. But this
 56      I, 17|            are not incompatible, "A may belong to no B", "B necessarily
 57      I, 17|            since it is false that B may belong to no A, it is true
 58      I, 17|            belong to some of the As may possibly not belong to any
 59      I, 17|       necessarily belongs to some A may possibly belong to all A.
 60      I, 17|       opposed to the proposition "A may belong to no B". It is clear
 61      I, 17|          suppose it possible that A may belong to no B and to all
 62      I, 17|          consequence results: for A may belong both to all C and
 63      I, 18|             the first figure that B may belong to no C. Similarly
 64      I, 18|           is formed to prove that B may belong to no C, as before:
 65      I, 19|    necessarily belongs to no B, but may belong to all C. If the
 66      I, 19|             the first figure that B may belong to no C. But at the
 67      I, 19|             Cs: but ex hypothesi it may belong to all. A similar
 68      I, 19|    problematic; i.e. suppose that A may belong to no B, but necessarily
 69      I, 19|    necessarily belongs to swan, but may belong to no man; and man
 70      I, 19|           belong to B, and possibly may not belong to C: if the
 71      I, 19|            B belongs to no A, and A may possibly belong to all C:
 72      I, 19|          are affirmative: this also may be proved as above. But
 73      I, 20|           suppose that both A and B may possibly belong to every
 74      I, 20|            into a particular, and B may possibly belong to every
 75      I, 20|          every C, it follows that C may possibly belong to some
 76      I, 20|          the first figure. And A if may possibly belong to no C,
 77      I, 20|      possibly belong to no C, but B may possibly belong to all C,
 78      I, 20|            all C, it follows that A may possibly not belong to some
 79      I, 20|           as before. For if A and B may possibly not belong to C,
 80      I, 20|       possibly not belong to C, if "may possibly belong" is substituted
 81      I, 20|        propositions. Suppose that A may possibly belong to all C,
 82      I, 21|             belongs to all C, and B may possibly belong to all C.
 83      I, 21|           and the conclusion that A may possibly belong to some
 84      I, 21|             belongs to all C, and A may possibly not belong to some
 85      I, 21|             some C: it follows that may possibly not belong to some
 86      I, 21|        assumed at the outset that A may possibly not belong to some
 87      I, 22|             belongs to all C, and B may possibly belong to all C.
 88      I, 22|         must belong to all C, and C may belong to some B, it follows
 89      I, 22|           some B, it follows that A may (not does) belong to some
 90      I, 22|             figure. A similar proof may be given if the proposition
 91      I, 22|           necessary: i.e. suppose A may possibly belong to no C,
 92      I, 22|             will be not only that A may possibly not belong to some
 93      I, 22|         does not belong to C, but B may belong to all C. If the
 94      I, 22|       universal; and the same terms may be used.~It is clear then
 95      I, 24|        possible that the conclusion may not be universal. And it
 96      I, 25| propositions; e.g. the conclusion E may be established through the
 97      I, 25|            means of F and G. Or one may be obtained by syllogistic,
 98      I, 25|           many, the same conclusion may be reached by more than
 99      I, 27|            We must now state how we may ourselves always have a
100      I, 27|        proposed and by what road we may reach the principles relative
101      I, 27|          sensible, but other things may be predicated of them (for
102      I, 27|        matter of opinion, but these may be predicated of other things.
103      I, 27|        spoken of in both ways: they may be stated of others, and
104      I, 28|           it does not follow KF, it may yet follow F. Similarly
105      I, 28|           not follow the former, it may yet follow the latter.~It
106      I, 29|          what is proved ostensively may also be concluded syllogistically
107      I, 29|           is proved per impossibile may also be proved ostensively,
108      I, 29|           belongs to none. Again we may prove that A belongs to
109      I, 29|   establishing the false conclusion may relate, so that if this
110      I, 31|     whatever the subject of inquiry may be: for they pursue the
111      I, 34|           no man. Again the fallacy may occur in a similar way in
112      I, 34|          and in general contraries, may possibly belong to the same
113      I, 36|         assertion that a thing "is" may be said to be true. Take
114      I, 36|            a becoming." Or again it may be said that there is a
115      I, 41|           of that of all of which B may be said, nothing prevents
116      I, 45|    syllogisms, and that the figures may be resolved into one another.~
117      I, 46|         then every single statement may truly be said to be either
118      I, 46|             thing, and that B and D may possibly belong to the same
119      I, 46|             to others, the negation may be true in a similar way,
120      I, 46|           an animal is not white or may not be white, and that it
121      I, 46|             it is not-white. But we may prove that it is true to
122      I, 46|            be reversed. And A and D may belong to the same thing,
123      I, 46|       belong to everything, e.g. we may reason that "if A and B
124     II, 1 |            belong to some A: for it may possibly belong to all A.~
125     II, 1 |           term or to the conclusion may be proved by the same syllogism,
126     II, 1 |      subordinate to the middle term may be inferred, not however
127     II, 2 |   conclusion, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses,
128     II, 2 |             false a true conclusion may be drawn, whether both the
129     II, 2 |           true. (2) A similar proof may be given if each premiss
130     II, 2 |              even so the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents
131     II, 2 |             in part, the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents
132     II, 2 |            is false, the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents
133     II, 2 |           false too, the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents
134     II, 2 |            are false the conclusion may be true. For it is possible
135     II, 2 |           For it is possible that A may belong to no B and to some
136     II, 3 |     partially false, the conclusion may be true. For it is possible
137     II, 3 |            premisses are false they may yield a true conclusion,
138     II, 4 |            figure a true conclusion may come through what is false,
139     II, 4 |        partly false, the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents
140     II, 4 |             AC true, the conclusion may be true. The same terms
141     II, 4 |         affirmative, the conclusion may be true. For nothing prevents
142     II, 4 |        partly false, the conclusion may be true. For it is possible
143     II, 4 |     transposed. Also the conclusion may be true if one premiss is
144     II, 4 |   syllogisms that a true conclusion may come through what is false,
145     II, 4 |           true, that the conclusion may none the less be true; but
146     II, 5 |          But the particular premiss may be proved. Suppose that
147     II, 6 |          but a negative proposition may be proved. An affirmative
148     II, 8 |       contradictory, both premisses may be refuted, but when it
149     II, 9 |        conversion of the conclusion may take. For the conclusion
150     II, 10|       contradictory, both premisses may be refuted and in all the
151     II, 11|          that A belongs to no B. We may proceed in the same way
152     II, 14|         first, whatever the problem may be. Whenever the syllogism
153     II, 14|            not belong to some B, we may infer in the same way. The
154     II, 15|       possible that contradictories may lead to a conclusion, though
155     II, 15|            that opposite statements may be assumed as premisses
156     II, 15|           premisses in six ways; we may have either universal affirmative
157     II, 15|         relations between the terms may be reversed; e.g. A may
158     II, 15|             may be reversed; e.g. A may belong to all B and to no
159     II, 15|          relation between the terms may be reversed. Similarly in
160     II, 16|         happens in many ways. A man may not reason syllogistically
161     II, 16|       syllogistically at all, or he may argue from premisses which
162     II, 16|           or equally unknown, or he may establish the antecedent
163     II, 16|             original question. This may be done by assuming what
164     II, 16|             identical, the question may be begged in the middle
165     II, 16|            similar way the question may be begged in the middle
166     II, 17|            not result from it. This may happen whether one traces
167     II, 17|   assumption. Or perhaps even so it may sometimes be independent.
168     II, 19|         belongs to C; after that he may ask whether B belongs to
169     II, 21|  arrangement of the terms, so error may arise in our thought about
170     II, 21|     although knowing the one, a man may forget the other and think
171     II, 21|            learning is recollection may be criticized in a similar
172     II, 21| consequently it is possible that we may make mistakes about them,
173     II, 21|            used in three senses: it may mean either to have knowledge
174     II, 23|           of persuasion, however it may be presented. For every
175     II, 26|          from a premiss, because it may be particular, but a premiss
176     II, 26|       single science, the objection may be either that opposites
177     II, 27|  probabilities or signs, and a sign may be taken in three ways,
178     II, 27|         term in the figures. For it may be taken as in the first
179     II, 27|           be with child. Truth then may be found in signs whatever
180     II, 27|             large extremities: this may belong to other kinds also
181     II, 27|            in another kind, and man may be brave, and some other