Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |             contradictories, when a man is proceeding by question,
  2      I, 2 |           for if some animal is not man, it does not follow that
  3      I, 2 |           does not follow that some man is not animal.~First then
  4      I, 2 |          stand for animal and A for man. Not every animal is a man;
  5      I, 2 |          man. Not every animal is a man; but every man is an animal.~
  6      I, 2 |          animal is a man; but every man is an animal.~
  7      I, 3 |            say, it is possible that man is not horse, or that no
  8      I, 3 |            if it is possible for no man to be a horse, it is also
  9      I, 3 |     admissible for no horse to be a man; and if it is admissible
 10      I, 4 |          may take the terms animal, man, horse; of a universal negative
 11      I, 4 |         relation, the terms animal, man, stone. Nor again can syllogism
 12      I, 4 |       Suppose the terms are animal, man, white: next take some of
 13      I, 4 |           the white things of which man is not predicated-swan and
 14      I, 4 |           Take the terms inanimate, man, white: then take some white
 15      I, 4 |          some white things of which man is not predicated-swan and
 16      I, 5 |     extremes are substance, animal, man; a negative relation, substance,
 17      I, 5 |          relation are line, animal, man: a negative relation, line,
 18      I, 5 |            above are white, animal, man: white, animal, inanimate.
 19      I, 6 |         relation are animal, horse, man: for the negative relation
 20      I, 6 |         relation animal, inanimate, man.~Nor can there be a syllogism
 21      I, 6 |           for the negative relation man, horse, inanimate-inanimate
 22      I, 6 |   affirmative relation are animate, man, animal. For the universal
 23      I, 6 |       positive relation are animal, man, wild: for the negative
 24      I, 6 |              science, wild; animal, man, wild. When the major is
 25      I, 6 |           terms for all are animal, man, white: animal, inanimate,
 26      I, 9 |          were movement, B animal, C man: man is an animal necessarily,
 27      I, 9 |          movement, B animal, C man: man is an animal necessarily,
 28      I, 9 |          move necessarily, nor does man. Similarly also if the major
 29      I, 10|          example let A be animal, B man, C white, and let the premisses
 30      I, 10|            belong to nothing white. Man then will not belong to
 31      I, 10|              for it is possible for man to be born white, not however
 32      I, 11|        terms "waking" - "animal" - "man", "man" being middle, and
 33      I, 11|        waking" - "animal" - "man", "man" being middle, and when
 34      I, 13|            short of necessity, e.g. man’s turning grey or growing
 35      I, 13|           necessity unbroken, since man’s existence is not continuous
 36      I, 13|             for ever, although if a man does exist, it comes about
 37      I, 13|         sense it is possible that a man should not grow grey) and
 38      I, 14| consideration "animal" - "white" - "man", where the major belongs
 39      I, 15|           nothing perhaps prevents "man" belonging at a particular
 40      I, 15|      possible for every horse; yet "man" is possible for no horse.
 41      I, 15|             moving", the the minor "man". The premisses then will
 42      I, 15|        necessary, not possible. For man is necessarily animal. It
 43      I, 15|             B "intelligent", and C "man". A then belongs to no B:
 44      I, 15|       possible for all C: for every man may possibly be intelligent.
 45      I, 15|            moving", B "science", C "man". A then will belong to
 46      I, 15|            is not necessary that no man should move; rather it is
 47      I, 15|           is not necessary that any man should move. Clearly then
 48      I, 17|         e.g. it is possible that no man should be white (for it
 49      I, 17|            also possible that every man should be white), but it
 50      I, 17|             white thing should be a man: for many white things are
 51      I, 17|        necessary. Let A be white, B man, C horse. It is possible
 52      I, 17|            clear. For no horse is a man. Neither is it possible
 53      I, 17|           that no horse should be a man, but the necessary we found
 54      I, 18|      positive, e.g. health, animal, man, and when it is negative,
 55      I, 18|       negative, e.g. health, horse, man.~The same will hold good
 56      I, 19|             to C. Let A be white, B man, C swan. White then necessarily
 57      I, 19|          swan, but may belong to no man; and man necessarily belongs
 58      I, 19|           may belong to no man; and man necessarily belongs to no
 59      I, 19|          that A is white, B swan, C man. Nor can the opposite affirmations
 60      I, 27|           for each of these is both man and animal); and some things
 61      I, 27|            yet others of them, e.g. man of Callias and animal of
 62      I, 27|            of Callias and animal of man. It is clear then that some
 63      I, 27|             The larger the supply a man has of these, the more quickly
 64      I, 27|           what follows a particular man but what follows every man:
 65      I, 27|          man but what follows every man: for the syllogism proceeds
 66      I, 27|           that every animal follows man or every science music,
 67      I, 27|         impossible, e.g. that every man is every animal or justice
 68      I, 27|         follows animal also follows man, and what does not belong
 69      I, 27|           animal does not belong to man); but we must choose those
 70      I, 27|          subjects of the predicate "man". It is necessary indeed,
 71      I, 27|           indeed, if animal follows man, that it should follow all
 72      I, 27|             choice of what concerns man. One must apprehend also
 73      I, 31|          and immortal by C, and let man, whose definition is to
 74      I, 31|              be signified by D. The man who divides assumes that
 75      I, 31|      dividing, he lays it down that man is an animal, so he assumes
 76      I, 31|         either B or C, consequently man must be either mortal or
 77      I, 31|            it is not necessary that man should be a mortal animal-this
 78      I, 31|             C as footless, and D as man, he assumes in the same
 79      I, 31|      assumes A of D (for he assumed man, as we saw, to be a mortal
 80      I, 31|   consequently it is necessary that man should be either a footed
 81      I, 31|            it is not necessary that man should be footed: this he
 82      I, 31|             necessary, that this is man or whatever the subject
 83      I, 32|             animal should exist, if man does, and that substance
 84      I, 32|           substance should exist if man does: but as yet the conclusion
 85      I, 34|             be health, B disease, C man. It is true to say that
 86      I, 34|       belongs to every C (for every man is capable of disease).
 87      I, 34|         health cannot belong to any man. The reason for this is
 88      I, 34|          health should belong to no man. Again the fallacy may occur
 89      I, 34|       health should belong to every man, consequently it is not
 90      I, 34|        disease should belong to any man". In the third figure the
 91      I, 36|             in the nominative, e.g. man, good, contraries, not in
 92      I, 36|           in oblique cases, e.g. of man, of a good, of contraries,
 93      I, 36|            or the nominative, e.g. "man is an animal", or in whatever
 94      I, 38|      knowledge qua not existing, or man perishable qua an object
 95      I, 43|       length of the term: e.g. if a man proves that water is a drinkable
 96      I, 44|        agreement. For instance if a man should suppose that unless
 97      I, 46|           same person (for the same man can both walk and not-walk,
 98      I, 46|           to say that whatever is a man is musical or is not-musical,
 99      I, 46|            made. That whatever is a man is not musical is proved
100     II, 2 |             stone, nor stone to any man. If then A is taken to belong
101     II, 2 |       conclusion is true: for every man is an animal. Similarly
102     II, 2 |            same terms are taken and man is put as middle: for neither
103     II, 2 |              for neither animal nor man belongs to any stone, but
104     II, 2 |             animal belongs to every man. Consequently if one term
105     II, 2 |        belongs both to horse and to man, but horse to no man. If
106     II, 2 |             to man, but horse to no man. If then it is assumed that
107     II, 2 |             animal belongs to every man and to every footed thing,
108     II, 2 |             every footed thing, and man to some footed things though
109     II, 2 |             animal belongs to every man, but does not follow some
110     II, 2 |          not follow some white, but man belongs to some white; consequently
111     II, 2 |         some white; consequently if man be taken as middle term
112     II, 3 |          belongs to every horse and man, and no man is a horse.
113     II, 3 |         every horse and man, and no man is a horse. If then it is
114     II, 3 |             C, e.g. animal to every man and to some white things,
115     II, 3 |           some white things, though man will not belong to some
116     II, 3 |            for animal follows every man and footed things as a whole,
117     II, 3 |       footed things as a whole, but man does not follow every footed
118     II, 3 |        follows no science but every man, though science does not
119     II, 3 |       science does not follow every man. If then A is assumed to
120     II, 4 |             to some B, e.g. neither man nor footed follows anything
121     II, 4 |           anything lifeless, though man belongs to some footed things.
122     II, 4 |         e.g. biped belongs to every man, beautiful not to every
123     II, 4 |              beautiful not to every man, and beautiful to some bipeds.
124     II, 15|             white", and we proceed "man is an animal". Either we
125     II, 16|             happens in many ways. A man may not reason syllogistically
126     II, 16|         something else), whenever a man tries to prove what is not
127     II, 17|             reduction. For unless a man has contradicted this proposition
128     II, 17|             is just this: e.g. if a man, wishing to prove that the
129     II, 21|         although knowing the one, a man may forget the other and
130     II, 21|             the same way. If then a man thinks that A belongs to
131     II, 21|          the same thing. Again if a man were to make a mistake about
132     II, 21|              but nothing prevents a man thinking one premiss of
133     II, 21|          belong to all C. If then a man knows that A belongs to
134     II, 21|            diagram of a triangle. A man might think that C did not
135     II, 21|             it never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge
136     II, 21|           other. Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs
137     II, 21|             Nothing then prevents a man both knowing and being mistaken
138     II, 21|            this happens also to the man whose knowledge is limited
139     II, 21|         then this is necessary if a man will grant the first point.
140     II, 23|            long-lived animals, e.g. man, horse, mule. A then belongs
141     II, 26|             and third figures. If a man maintains a universal affirmative,
142     II, 26|              B for contraries. If a man premises that contraries
143     II, 26|            to is negative. For if a man maintains that contraries
144     II, 26|             figure.~In general if a man urges a universal objection
145     II, 26|             his opponent, e.g. if a man maintains that contraries
146     II, 27|         perhaps by learning music a man has made some change in
147     II, 27|          found in another kind, and man may be brave, and some other
148     II, 27|            not the other: e.g. if a man is brave but not generous,