Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |    science", or "pleasure is not good". The demonstrative premiss
  2      I, 2 |           e.g. if no pleasure is good, then no good will be pleasure;
  3      I, 2 |        pleasure is good, then no good will be pleasure; the terms
  4      I, 2 |        e.g. if every pleasure,is good, some good must be pleasure;
  5      I, 2 |     every pleasure,is good, some good must be pleasure; the particular
  6      I, 2 |          for if some pleasure is good, then some good will be
  7      I, 2 |      pleasure is good, then some good will be pleasure); but the
  8      I, 3 |          of conversion will hold good also in respect of necessary
  9      I, 4 |    perfect syllogism. This holds good also if the premiss BC should
 10      I, 4 |          extremes take the terms good, state, wisdom: of a negative
 11      I, 4 |          of a negative relation, good, state, ignorance. Again
 12      I, 11|        terms. Let the term A be "good", let that which B signifies
 13      I, 11|      possible then that the term good should belong to no horse,
 14      I, 11|        some animal should not be good, since it is possible for
 15      I, 11|  possible for every animal to be good. Or if that is not possible,
 16      I, 13|  affirmation or the denial holds good. That which is possible
 17      I, 13|    belong to all. The same holds good in the case of particular
 18      I, 18|          man.~The same will hold good if the syllogisms are particular.
 19      I, 24|        that pleasure in music is good. If one should claim as
 20      I, 24|         premiss that pleasure is good without adding "all", no
 21      I, 24|      claim that some pleasure is good, then if it is different
 22      I, 27|         animal or justice is all good. But that which something
 23      I, 30|   everything that is, e.g. about good or knowledge. But in each
 24      I, 36|  knowledge, and wisdom is of the good, the conclusion is that
 25      I, 36|        there is knowledge of the good. The good then is not knowledge,
 26      I, 36|       knowledge of the good. The good then is not knowledge, though
 27      I, 36|        or is a contrary, and the good both is a contrary and has
 28      I, 36|        there is a science of the good, but the good is not science,
 29      I, 36|     science of the good, but the good is not science, nor is that
 30      I, 36|        is a contrary, though the good is both of these. Sometimes
 31      I, 36|        there is a science of the good, we conclude that there
 32      I, 36|          there is a genus of the good. But nothing is predicated
 33      I, 36|        there is a science of the good, we conclude that the good
 34      I, 36|       good, we conclude that the good is a genus. The first term
 35      I, 36|          another.~The same holds good where the relation is negative.
 36      I, 36|        the nominative, e.g. man, good, contraries, not in oblique
 37      I, 36|         cases, e.g. of man, of a good, of contraries, but the
 38      I, 37|         compound: the same holds good of the corresponding negative
 39      I, 38| knowledge of justice, that it is good, the expression "that it
 40      I, 38|       the expression "that it is good" (or "qua good") should
 41      I, 38|        that it is good" (or "qua good") should be joined to the
 42      I, 38|        for "knowledge that it is good", B for good, C for justice.
 43      I, 38|          that it is good", B for good, C for justice. It is true
 44      I, 38|     predicate A of B. For of the good there is knowledge that
 45      I, 38|          is knowledge that it is good. Also it is true to predicate
 46      I, 38|      justice is identical with a good. In this way an analysis
 47      I, 38|       the expression "that it is good" were added to B, the conclusion
 48      I, 38|   predicate of justice the term "good that it is good" is false
 49      I, 38|        the term "good that it is good" is false and not intelligible.
 50      I, 38|          object of knowledge qua good, of goat-stag an object
 51      I, 38|         condition, e.g. when the good is proved to be an object
 52      I, 38|          of knowledge that it is good. If it has been proved to
 53      I, 38|        qualification "that it is good", the middle term must be "
 54      I, 38|     something", and C stand for "good". It is true to predicate
 55      I, 38|         then be knowledge of the good, that it is good: for ex
 56      I, 38|          of the good, that it is good: for ex hypothesi the term "
 57      I, 38|        there is knowledge of the good, that it is good, but that
 58      I, 38|          of the good, that it is good, but that it is; e.g. let
 59      I, 38|        it is, B for being, C for good. Clearly then in syllogisms
 60      I, 40|         expressions "pleasure is good" and "pleasure is the good"
 61      I, 40|       good" and "pleasure is the good" are not identical, we must
 62      I, 40|       prove that pleasure is the good, the term must be "the good",
 63      I, 40|      good, the term must be "the good", but if the object is to
 64      I, 40|        to prove that pleasure is good, the term will be "good".
 65      I, 40|          good, the term will be "good". Similarly in all other
 66      I, 44|       hypothesis.~The same holds good of arguments which are brought
 67      I, 46|        that of "he knows what is good" to "he knows what is not-good".
 68      I, 46|    expressions "he knows what is good" and "he is knowing what
 69      I, 46|       and "he is knowing what is good", or "he can walk" and "
 70      I, 46|          of knowledge of what is good and of what is not-good),
 71      I, 46|        then "not to know what is good" is not the same as "to
 72      I, 46|          as "to know what is not good", so "to be not-good" is
 73      I, 46|       not the same as "not to be good". For when two pairs correspond,
 74      I, 46|         not the denial of "it is good". If then every single statement
 75      I, 46|           Let A stand for "to be good", B for "not to be good",
 76      I, 46|          good", B for "not to be good", let C stand for "to be
 77      I, 46|         the denial of A. For not good is the negation of good:
 78      I, 46|          good is the negation of good: and not-good is not identical
 79      I, 46|          identical with "neither good nor not-good". Similarly
 80     II, 2 |         together. The same holds good of negative syllogisms:
 81     II, 11|   contradictory statements holds good, then if it is proved that
 82     II, 15|           e.g. "every science is good", "no science is good";
 83     II, 15|         is good", "no science is good"; the others I call contradictories.~
 84     II, 15|      contraries. Let A stand for good, let B and C stand for science.
 85     II, 15|    assumes that every science is good, and no science is good,
 86     II, 15|          good, and no science is good, A belongs to all B and
 87     II, 15|         taking "every science is good" one took "the science of
 88     II, 15|       science of medicine is not good"; for A belongs to all B
 89     II, 15|       said, viz. "all science is good" and "no science is good"
 90     II, 15|         good" and "no science is good" or "some science is not
 91     II, 15|          or "some science is not good". This does not usually
 92     II, 15|         fact, e.g. if a thing is good, it is proved that it is
 93     II, 15|         is proved that it is not good, if an animal, that it is
 94     II, 15|        conclude that what is not good is good, or anything of
 95     II, 15|         that what is not good is good, or anything of that sort
 96     II, 21|        who thinks the essence of good is the essence of bad will
 97     II, 21|       thing to be the essence of good and the essence of bad.
 98     II, 21|         stand for the essence of good and B for the essence of
 99     II, 21|       again C for the essence of good. Since then he thinks B
100     II, 21|     could suppose the essence of good to be the essence of bad,
101     II, 22|        the less. But the greater good and lesser evil are preferable
102     II, 22|         preferable to the lesser good and greater evil: the whole
103     II, 27|          proof that wise men are good, since Pittacus is good,
104     II, 27|          good, since Pittacus is good, comes through the last
105     II, 27|          figure. Let A stand for good, B for wise men, C for Pittacus.
106     II, 27|           Or again "Wise men are good, since Pittacus is not only
107     II, 27|       since Pittacus is not only good but wise." In this way then
108     II, 27|           for though Pittacus is good, it is not therefore necessary
109     II, 27|         other wise men should be good. But the syllogism which