Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |          stated to make plain what necessarily follows; a syllogism is
  2      I, 3 |          would some of the Bs be A necessarily. But the particular negative
  3      I, 3 |         possible, either because B necessarily is A, or because B is not
  4      I, 3 |          is A, or because B is not necessarily A, admits of conversion
  5      I, 3 |           former case the one term necessarily does not belong to the other;
  6      I, 3 |             then some garment will necessarily be white. This has been
  7      I, 6 |             it follows that P will necessarily belong to some R. For, since
  8      I, 6 |     syllogism to prove that P will necessarily not belong to some R. This
  9      I, 8 |    according as something belongs, necessarily belongs, or may belong to
 10      I, 8 |      things belong indeed, but not necessarily, others neither necessarily
 11      I, 8 |        necessarily, others neither necessarily nor indeed at all, but it
 12      I, 8 |       whether something belongs or necessarily belongs (or does not belong)
 13      I, 8 |        addition of the expression "necessarily" to the terms. For the negative
 14      I, 8 |         chosen the conclusion will necessarily follow. But if the relation
 15      I, 9 |          is, e.g. if A is taken as necessarily belonging or not belonging
 16      I, 9 |          taken in this way, A will necessarily belong or not belong to
 17      I, 9 |         not belong to C. For since necessarily belongs, or does not belong,
 18      I, 9 |            relation to A will hold necessarily. But if the major premiss
 19      I, 9 |           the third that A belongs necessarily to some B. But this is false;
 20      I, 9 |            C man: man is an animal necessarily, but an animal does not
 21      I, 9 |            an animal does not move necessarily, nor does man. Similarly
 22      I, 9 |          and let A belong to all B necessarily, but let B simply belong
 23      I, 9 |           that A belongs to some C necessarily: for C falls under B, and
 24      I, 9 |            A was assumed to belong necessarily to all B. Similarly also
 25      I, 10|   necessary. Let A belong to all B necessarily, but to no C simply. If
 26      I, 10|       necessary, it follows that C necessarily does not belong to some
 27      I, 10|         belong to some A. For if B necessarily belongs to no C, C will
 28      I, 10|            belongs to no C, C will necessarily belong to no B. But B at
 29      I, 10|             as was assumed) that A necessarily belongs to all B. Consequently
 30      I, 10|            anything white, but not necessarily: for it is possible for
 31      I, 10|          to some C; consequently B necessarily does not belong to some
 32      I, 10|          be affirmative. If then A necessarily belongs to all B, but does
 33      I, 10|          belong to some C, but not necessarily. For the same terms can
 34      I, 11|          consequently if A belongs necessarily to all C, and C belongs
 35      I, 11|          consequently if B belongs necessarily to all C, it will belong
 36      I, 11|           to all C, it will belong necessarily also to some A.~Again let
 37      I, 11|     convertible with some B, but A necessarily belongs to no C, A will
 38      I, 11|            belongs to no C, A will necessarily not belong to some B either:
 39      I, 11|         also will belong to some B necessarily: consequently if A belongs
 40      I, 11|       belong to all C, not however necessarily. If the proposition BC is
 41      I, 13|       exist, it comes about either necessarily or generally). In another
 42      I, 13|    convertible because it does not necessarily belong (for in this sense
 43      I, 14|            where the major belongs necessarily to the minor; "animal"- "
 44      I, 14|           belongs either simply or necessarily or possibly. It is clear
 45      I, 15|            that the major does not necessarily belong to any, or to all,
 46      I, 15|          that if B’s being follows necessarily from A’s being, B’s possibility
 47      I, 15|            possibility will follow necessarily from A’s possibility. Suppose,
 48      I, 15|           D, and D of F, then C is necessarily predicated of F. And if
 49      I, 15|           not possible. For man is necessarily animal. It is clear then
 50      I, 15|            but that which does not necessarily belong to any part of the
 51      I, 15|         for it was supposed that A necessarily belongs to some C, but the
 52      I, 15|     possibly be intelligent. But A necessarily belongs to no C: so the
 53      I, 15| establishes that one term does not necessarily belong to any instance of
 54      I, 15|         are arranged thus, nothing necessarily follows: but if the proposition
 55      I, 16|     negative proposition: for "not necessarily to belong" is different
 56      I, 16|         belong" is different from "necessarily not to belong".~If the premisses
 57      I, 16|           not necessary. Suppose A necessarily belongs to all B, and let
 58      I, 16|      possible for all B, and let B necessarily belong to all C. We shall
 59      I, 16|      premiss is necessary, and let necessarily A not be possible for any
 60      I, 16|         belong to any B, and let B necessarily belong to all C. The syllogism
 61      I, 17|            may belong to no B", "B necessarily does not belong to some
 62      I, 17|          for many white things are necessarily not men, and the necessary (
 63      I, 17|           is so, it is true that B necessarily belongs to some of the As:
 64      I, 17|          of the As: consequently A necessarily belongs to some of the Bs.
 65      I, 17|          not follow that some A is necessarily B, if it is not possible
 66      I, 17|           senses, one if A some is necessarily B, another if some A is
 67      I, 17|            B, another if some A is necessarily not B. For it is not true
 68      I, 17|        true to say that that which necessarily does not belong to some
 69      I, 17|          not true to say that what necessarily belongs to some A may possibly
 70      I, 17|           C to belong to all D, it necessarily does not belong to some
 71      I, 17|           in some cases it belongs necessarily, therefore we say that it
 72      I, 17|           both the propositions "A necessarily belongs to some B" and "
 73      I, 17|          belongs to some B" and "A necessarily does not belong to some
 74      I, 17|            must assume, not that A necessarily belongs to some B, but that
 75      I, 17|      belongs to some B, but that A necessarily does not belong to some
 76      I, 18|       problematic, nothing follows necessarily from these premisses as
 77      I, 19|           possible. Suppose that A necessarily belongs to no B, but may
 78      I, 19|            may belong to no B, but necessarily belongs to all C. When the
 79      I, 19|         sometimes turns out that B necessarily does not belong to C. Let
 80      I, 19|            man, C swan. White then necessarily belongs to swan, but may
 81      I, 19|          belong to no man; and man necessarily belongs to no swan; Clearly
 82      I, 19|            possible for all B, and necessarily belonging to C; e.g. if
 83      I, 19|           for "motion". For motion necessarily belongs to what is awake,
 84      I, 19|   affirmative as before. Suppose A necessarily does not belong to B, and
 85      I, 19|         there are cases in which B necessarily will not belong to C; e.g.
 86      I, 19|            shown a case in which B necessarily does not belong to C. A
 87      I, 19|             though nothing follows necessarily from the premisses as they
 88      I, 21|         belong to some B. For if A necessarily belongs to all B, and B (
 89      I, 21|           belongs to all C, A will necessarily belong to all C: for this
 90      I, 22|           affirmative, i.e. that A necessarily belongs to all C, and B
 91      I, 22|     possibly belong to no C, but B necessarily belongs to all C. We shall
 92      I, 22|         some B. For suppose that A necessarily does not belong to C, but
 93      I, 22|            formed. For A sometimes necessarily belongs to all B, and sometimes
 94      I, 23|           be possible. For nothing necessarily follows from the assertion
 95      I, 46|          thing, and one of the two necessarily belongs to everything, and
 96      I, 46|            For since either C or D necessarily belongs to everything; and
 97      I, 46|         will result that B belongs necessarily to everything to which D
 98     II, 2 |            is either true or false necessarily. From true premisses it
 99     II, 2 |       given, that something should necessarily result. For that is not
100     II, 2 |         possible. For what results necessarily is the conclusion, and the
101     II, 4 |           if the one is, the other necessarily is, then if the latter is
102     II, 4 |           impossible that B should necessarily be great since A is white
103     II, 4 |            white and that B should necessarily be great since A is not
104     II, 4 |         that B should be great, it necessarily results that if B is not
105     II, 4 |          if B is not great, A will necessarily not be white. If then when
106     II, 11|       universal affirmative is not necessarily true if the universal negative