Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 15|           For if C is predicated of D, and D of F, then C is necessarily
  2      I, 15|             is predicated of D, and D of F, then C is necessarily
  3      I, 17|     possible for C to belong to all D, it necessarily does not
  4      I, 17|             does not belong to some D, he would make a false assumption:
  5      I, 17|           for it does belong to all D, but because in some cases
  6      I, 24|             C is equal to the angle D, without the additional
  7      I, 25|      through the propositions C and D, or through the propositions
  8      I, 25|         inference, e.g. by means of D and E, and again B by means
  9      I, 25|          the premisses A, B, C, and D. It is necessary then that
 10      I, 25|            or one or other of C and D, or something other than
 11      I, 25|             premisses. But if C and D are so related that one
 12      I, 25|           if C is not so related to D as to make a syllogism,
 13      I, 25|       conclusion, and if from C and D either A or B follows or
 14      I, 25|       conclusion follows from C and D, it turns out that these
 15      I, 25|           of the middle terms C and D, the number of the terms
 16      I, 25|             e.g. if to ABC the term D is added, two conclusions
 17      I, 28|             possibly belong to A by D. Suppose again that the
 18      I, 28|             follows all G. If F and D are identical, A will belong
 19      I, 28|             and F is identical with D, A will belong to none of
 20      I, 28|      belonged to none of the Es. If D and G are identical, A will
 21      I, 28|       because it does not belong to D: but G falls under E: consequently
 22      I, 28|           will belong to no E, when D and F are identical. Thus
 23      I, 28|           the middle figure because D belongs to no A, and to
 24      I, 28|          belong to some E, whenever D and G are identical. This
 25      I, 31|             be got, be signified by D. The man who divides assumes
 26      I, 31|          animal, so he assumes A of D as belonging to it. Now
 27      I, 31|            conclusion is that every D is either B or C, consequently
 28      I, 31|          footed, C as footless, and D as man, he assumes in the
 29      I, 31|      footless), and he assumes A of D (for he assumed man, as
 30      I, 46|             placed under B, and let D stand for not to be not-good’
 31      I, 46|         same thing; and either C or D will belong to everything,
 32      I, 46|           either. On the other hand D belongs to everything to
 33      I, 46|            belongs. For either C or D belongs to everything to
 34      I, 46| simultaneously not-white and white, D must belong to everything
 35      I, 46|            But A is not true of all D. For of that which is not
 36      I, 46|             white log. Consequently D is true, but A is not true,
 37      I, 46|          same thing, and that B and D may possibly belong to the
 38      I, 46|            equal", C for "unequal", D for "not unequal".~In many
 39      I, 46|         everything, and again C and D are related in the same
 40      I, 46|            cannot be reversed, then D must follow B and the relation
 41      I, 46|       cannot be reversed. And A and D may belong to the same thing,
 42      I, 46|        following consideration that D follows B. For since either
 43      I, 46|            B. For since either C or D necessarily belongs to everything;
 44      I, 46|             thing; it is clear that D must follow B. Again since
 45      I, 46|    reciprocate with but A, but C or D belongs to everything, it
 46      I, 46|           it is possible that A and D should belong to the same
 47      I, 46|           does not reciprocate with D either, since it is possible
 48      I, 46|           since it is possible that D and A should belong at the
 49      I, 46|          belong to: and again C and D are related in the same
 50      I, 46|  necessarily to everything to which D belongs": but this is false. "
 51      I, 46|           for the negation of C and D. It is necessary then that
 52      I, 46|           and similarly either H or D, and since H follows F,
 53      I, 46|            follows F, B must follow D: for we know this. If then
 54      I, 46|            follows C, B must follow D". But this is false: for
 55      I, 46|           Similarly also with C and D. For two negations have
 56     II, 1 |             the predicate A: for if D is included in B as in a
 57     II, 1 |            B is included in A, then D will be included in A. Again
 58     II, 1 |            belongs to no C. If then D is subordinate to C, clearly
 59     II, 11|            or that B belongs to all D; thus we get the first figure.
 60     II, 11|             B, and B belongs to all D, A belongs to no D. Let
 61     II, 11|           to all D, A belongs to no D. Let this be impossible:
 62     II, 17|      belongs to B, B to C, and C to D, and it should be false
 63     II, 17|             false that B belongs to D: for if we eliminated A
 64     II, 17|             B belongs to C and C to D, the false conclusion would
 65     II, 17|             that A should belong to D, the false conclusion will
 66     II, 17|             K belongs to C and C to D, the impossible conclusion
 67     II, 18|            and B, and these through D, E, F, and G, one of these
 68     II, 18|            are inferred by means of D, E, F, and G. Therefore
 69     II, 19|     inferred to be true of F, B, C, D, and E being middle terms.
 70     II, 19|      belongs to B, and next whether D belongs to E, instead of
 71     II, 21|          that B and C belong to all D in the same way. If then
 72     II, 21|          belongs to all B, and B to D, but A to no C, and C to
 73     II, 21|             A to no C, and C to all D, he will both know and not
 74     II, 21|      belongs to B, B to C, and C to D, but some one thinks that
 75     II, 21|         both know that A belongs to D, and think that it does
 76     II, 21|          both B and C belong to all D. For it turns out that the
 77     II, 21|             knows that B belongs to D, then he knows that A belongs
 78     II, 21|             knows that A belongs to D. Consequently if again he
 79     II, 21|          belongs to all B, and B to D, and again A belongs to
 80     II, 22|    convertible, and similarly C and D, and if A or C must belong
 81     II, 22|       anything whatever, then B and D will be such that one or
 82     II, 22|             to which A belongs, and D belongs to that to which
 83     II, 22|     together, it is clear that B or D belongs to everything, but
 84     II, 22|           to everything and if C or D belongs to everything, but
 85     II, 22|             C are convertible B and D are convertible. For if
 86     II, 22|        belong to something to which D belongs, it is clear that
 87     II, 22|        convertible. Therefore C and D belong together. But this
 88     II, 22|      preferable to B, and similarly D is preferable to C, then
 89     II, 22|             are preferable to B and D together, A must be preferable
 90     II, 22|             A must be preferable to D. For A is an object of desire
 91     II, 22|             is similarly related to D, since they also are opposites.
 92     II, 22|        desire to the same extent as D, B is an object of aversion
 93     II, 22|           and C together, and B and D together, will be equally
 94     II, 22|             are preferable to B and D, A cannot be equally desirable
 95     II, 22|           be equally desirable with D; for then B along with D
 96     II, 22|            D; for then B along with D would be equally desirable
 97     II, 22|         with A along with C. But if D is preferable to A, then
 98     II, 22|             A then is preferable to D, and C consequently is less
 99     II, 22|          the favour (represented by D) without being such as to
100     II, 24|          Athenians against Thebans, D Thebans against Phocians.
101     II, 24|          that B belongs to C and to D (for both are cases of making
102     II, 24|   neighbours) and that A belongs to D (for the war against the
103     II, 24|            B will be proved through D. Similarly if the belief
104     II, 25|          knowledge. For example let D stand for squaring, E for