Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |             which it is predicated, "being" being added and "not being"
 2      I, 1 |            it is predicated, "being" being added and "not being" removed,
 3      I, 1 |          being" being added and "not being" removed, or vice versa.~
 4      I, 1 |             in which, certain things being stated, something other
 5      I, 1 |              of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase
 6      I, 4 |     necessary follows from the terms being so related; for it is possible
 7      I, 5 |             animal, number-substance being the middle term.~Nor is
 8      I, 6 |           horse, inanimate-inanimate being the middle term.~It is clear
 9      I, 6 |              wild-the middle in both being the term wild.~Nor is a
10      I, 8 |           cases, the only difference being the addition of the expression "
11      I, 10|           nothing prevents such an A being taken that it is possible
12      I, 11|               animal" - "man", "man" being middle, and when the affirmative
13      I, 11|             the negative proposition being particular is necessary,
14      I, 11|          moving", "animal", "animal" being middle.~
15      I, 13|          which is not necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing
16      I, 14|         clear from the definition of being possible. Again if A may
17      I, 14|         affirmative, the major still being universal and the minor
18      I, 15|            we must state that if B’s being follows necessarily from
19      I, 15|         follows necessarily from A’s being, B’s possibility will follow
20      I, 15|      possibility. Suppose, the terms being so related, that A is possible,
21      I, 15|    understand the statement that B’s being depends on A’s being, not
22      I, 15|             B’s being depends on A’s being, not as meaning that if
23      I, 15|        follows of necessity from the being of some one thing, but from
24      I, 15|              been proved that if B’s being is the consequence of A’
25      I, 15|            is the consequence of A’s being, then B’s possibility will
26      I, 15|            all C. These propositions being laid down, it is necessary
27      I, 17|             is not convertible.~This being proved, suppose it possible
28      I, 18|          premisses are negative, one being assertoric, the other problematic,
29      I, 19|        prevents C falling under B, A being possible for all B, and
30      I, 20|          terms horse-man-white—white being the middle term.~
31      I, 22|            negative, the affirmative being necessary: i.e. suppose
32      I, 22|              affirmative, the latter being necessary. But when the
33      I, 23|         nothing prevents a syllogism being formed, but it will not
34      I, 23|             on, no connexion however being made with B, will a syllogism
35      I, 24|       conclusion. I mean not only in being affirmative or negative,
36      I, 24|             or negative, but also in being necessary, pure, problematic.
37      I, 25|           For nothing prevents there being several middles for the
38      I, 25|       through three terms only.~This being evident, it is clear that
39      I, 27|          from the genus; for species being distinct there must be attributes
40      I, 28|            subjects of that which is being established (the subjects
41      I, 32|        destroyed: these propositions being laid down, it is necessary
42      I, 33|            Let A represent the term "being eternal", B "Aristomenes
43      I, 34|              is not true to say that being healthy cannot belong to
44      I, 36|               Let A stand for "there being a single science", and B
45      I, 36|     contraries are the fact of there being a single science of them,
46      I, 38|              special nature. But if "being" were taken as middle and "
47      I, 38|            were taken as middle and "being" simply were joined to the
48      I, 38|          joined to the extreme, not "being something", we should not
49      I, 38|          knowledge that it is, B for being, C for good. Clearly then
50     II, 2 |             is posited as one thing, being two premisses taken together.
51     II, 2 |          belongs to no C, e.g. these being species of the same genus
52     II, 4 |        should be necessitated by the being and by the not-being of
53     II, 5 |             has been assumed without being demonstrated: the other
54     II, 5 | demonstration the very thing that is being proved: for C is proved
55     II, 6 |              not belong to some C, B being middle. But if the universal
56     II, 7 |           should belong to some C, B being middle. And whenever one
57     II, 7 |              not belong to some C, B being middle. But when the negative
58     II, 10|          that A belongs to some B, C being taken as middle, and the
59     II, 10|            middle, and the premisses being universal. If then it is
60     II, 10|             not belong to some B, BC being affirmative, AC being negative:
61     II, 10|             BC being affirmative, AC being negative: for it was thus
62     II, 11|             if A belongs to all B, C being middle, then if it is supposed
63     II, 16|            that B belongs to C, this being as uncertain as the question
64     II, 16|           through which it is proved being equally uncertain, either
65     II, 17|            the proposition which was being proved by the reduction.
66     II, 17|             B, E to A and F to E, it being false that F belongs to
67     II, 19|            true of F, B, C, D, and E being middle terms. One ought
68     II, 20|              alternate (one, I mean, being affirmative, the other negative).
69     II, 21|             But nothing prevents his being ignorant that C exists;
70     II, 21|            along with the process of being led to see the general principle
71     II, 21|      prevents a man both knowing and being mistaken about the same
72     II, 22|            represented by D) without being such as to grant it (represented
73     II, 22|              B), it is clear that A (being of such a nature) is preferable
74     II, 23|        conversion, and in respect of being in a higher degree objects
75     II, 25|            we have taken a new term, being so far without knowledge
76     II, 26|          example let stand for there being a single science, B for
77     II, 27|             or when it has come into being the other has come into
78     II, 27|              the other has come into being before or after, is a sign
79     II, 27|             is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.
80     II, 27|            being or having come into being. Now an enthymeme is a syllogism
81     II, 27|            stand for paleness, B for being with child, C for woman.