Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |         affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either
 2      I, 3 |        garment. For if any white thing must be a garment, then
 3      I, 5 |              5~Whenever the same thing belongs to all of one subject,
 4      I, 11|      should belong to some white thing, but it is possible that
 5      I, 13|      what naturally belongs to a thing (for this has not its necessity
 6      I, 15|      meaning that if some single thing A is, B will be: for nothing
 7      I, 15|       from the being of some one thing, but from two at least,
 8      I, 15|        were impossible, the same thing would at the same time be
 9      I, 15|         no B: for no intelligent thing is a raven. But B is possible
10      I, 17|        is possible that no white thing should be a man: for many
11      I, 23|        the assertion of some one thing concerning some other single
12      I, 23|     concerning some other single thing. Thus we must take another
13      I, 23| establish the attribution of one thing to another, unless some
14      I, 24|       are equal, he will beg the thing to be proved, unless he
15      I, 25|       than one, or (ii) the same thing happens to be inferred by
16      I, 27|          as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be
17      I, 27|        and the properties of the thing; next we must lay down those
18      I, 27|      attributes which follow the thing, and again those which the
19      I, 27|        and again those which the thing follows, and those which
20      I, 27|       but those which follow the thing as a whole, e.g. not what
21      I, 28|        cannot belong to the same thing, all arguments can be reduced
22      I, 28|        cannot belong to the same thing. For if these are taken,
23      I, 28|        cannot belong to the same thing, it follows that A will
24      I, 28|        cannot belong to the same thing differs in no way from the
25      I, 30|         if the attributes of the thing are apprehended, our business
26      I, 31|        accident or property of a thing, nor about its genus, nor
27      I, 32|          elements out of which a thing is made are annihilated,
28      I, 34|      possibly belong to the same thing, but cannot belong to one
29      I, 34|         could belong to the same thing, they could belong to one
30      I, 35|      assumed to be an individual thing, but sometimes a complex
31      I, 36|       which the assertion that a thing "is" may be said to be true.
32      I, 36|         but in the premisses one thing is not stated of another.~
33      I, 38|         something" indicates the thing’s special nature. But if "
34      I, 41|     existence of this particular thing, but imitate the geometrician
35      I, 44|          is sickly: for the same thing will then be at the same
36      I, 46|        they do not mean the same thing, nor is "to be not-white"
37      I, 46|        the same time to the same thing. As then "not to know what
38      I, 46|         never belong to the same thing; and either C or D will
39      I, 46|         never belong to the same thing. And B must belong to everything
40      I, 46|          it is impossible that a thing should simultaneously be
41      I, 46|     which A belongs. But since a thing cannot be simultaneously
42      I, 46|      together belong to the same thing, and that B and D may possibly
43      I, 46|      possibly belong to the same thing.~Privative terms are similarly
44      I, 46|        the same time to the same thing, and one of the two necessarily
45      I, 46|         D may belong to the same thing, but B and C cannot. First
46      I, 46|        cannot belong to the same thing; it is clear that D must
47      I, 46|        should belong to the same thing. But B and C cannot belong
48      I, 46|        cannot belong to the same thing, because A follows C; and
49      I, 46|        the same time to the same thing.~It results sometimes even
50      I, 46|        the same time to the same thing, but it is necessary that
51      I, 46|       belongs to everything ever thing to which C belongs. Therefore
52     II, 1 |   conclusion states one definite thing about another definite thing.
53     II, 1 |     thing about another definite thing. Consequently all syllogisms
54     II, 2 |      will turn out that the same thing both is and is not at the
55     II, 2 |         false: for then the same thing will belong and not belong
56     II, 2 |           So A is posited as one thing, being two premisses taken
57     II, 2 |     every swan and to some white thing, and white to every swan,
58     II, 2 |        e.g. animal to some white thing, but to no snow, and white
59     II, 2 |          man and to every footed thing, and man to some footed
60     II, 2 |          snow, but to some white thing, and snow to some white
61     II, 2 |           and snow to some white thing. If then snow is taken as
62     II, 2 |         swan belongs to no black thing. Consequently if it should
63     II, 2 |        white belongs to no black thing. If then it is assumed that
64     II, 3 |          not follow every footed thing. Consequently if it is assumed
65     II, 4 |         impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by
66     II, 4 |        the not-being of the same thing. I mean, for example, that
67     II, 5 |       the demonstration the very thing that is being proved: for
68     II, 15|        of both extremes, but one thing is denied of it, and it
69     II, 15|  contrary to the fact, e.g. if a thing is good, it is proved that
70     II, 16|          merely say a particular thing is, if it is: in this way
71     II, 21|       know and not know the same thing in respect of the same thing.
72     II, 21|     thing in respect of the same thing. Again if a man were to
73     II, 21|       know and not know the same thing at the same time. For the
74     II, 21|          For we know no sensible thing, once it has passed beyond
75     II, 21|          mistaken about the same thing, provided that his knowledge
76     II, 21|          bad will think the same thing to be the essence of good
77     II, 23|        things belong to the same thing, and the extreme is convertible
78     II, 27|          that when it is another thing is, or when it has come
79     II, 27|     manner of speaking. The same thing then will be found in another