Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |         other than what is stated follows of necessity from their
 2      I, 1 |       make plain what necessarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect,
 3      I, 4 |   extremes; for nothing necessary follows from the terms being so
 4      I, 4 |           no C is B, no syllogism follows (this has already been stated)
 5      I, 5 |          no necessary consequence follows.~If the middle term is related
 6      I, 6 |           P and R belong to S, it follows that P will necessarily
 7      I, 7 |        negative nothing necessary follows at all, but if one is affirmative,
 8      I, 7 |         and B belong to all C, it follows that A belongs to some B:
 9      I, 7 |        all B, and B to some C, it follows that A belongs to some C.
10      I, 10|       conclusion is necessary, it follows that C necessarily does
11      I, 15|           state that if B’s being follows necessarily from A’s being,
12      I, 15|            B will be: for nothing follows of necessity from the being
13      I, 15|         thus, nothing necessarily follows: but if the proposition
14      I, 16|      clearly the conclusion which follows is not necessary. Suppose
15      I, 16|          relation between B and C follows from these premisses. But
16      I, 18|        other problematic, nothing follows necessarily from these premisses
17      I, 18|            although no conclusion follows from the actual premisses,
18      I, 19|         necessary, though nothing follows necessarily from the premisses
19      I, 20|    possibly belong to every C, it follows that C may possibly belong
20      I, 20|      possibly belong to all C, it follows that A may possibly not
21      I, 21|          not belong to some C: it follows that may possibly not belong
22      I, 22|          may belong to some B, it follows that A may (not does) belong
23      I, 22|           C; consequently here it follows that A does not belong to
24      I, 22|            so that a result which follows in the first figure follows
25      I, 22|       follows in the first figure follows also in the third. But when
26      I, 23|           For nothing necessarily follows from the assertion of some
27      I, 25|           B. Some conclusion then follows from them. It must either
28      I, 25|        propositions A and B there follows not E but some other conclusion,
29      I, 25|        from C and D either A or B follows or something else, then
30      I, 25|           E. And if no conclusion follows from C and D, it turns out
31      I, 25|          a syllogistic conclusion follows from two premisses and not
32      I, 25|         which the main conclusion follows (for some of the preceding
33      I, 25|   inserted: but in either case it follows that the relations of predication
34      I, 27|       again those which the thing follows, and those which cannot
35      I, 27|         as a whole, e.g. not what follows a particular man but what
36      I, 27|           particular man but what follows every man: for the syllogism
37      I, 27|      attributes which the subject follows as wholes, for the reason
38      I, 27|      reason given. But that which follows one must not suppose to
39      I, 27|            e.g. that every animal follows man or every science music,
40      I, 27|           music, but only that it follows, without qualification,
41      I, 27|          But that which something follows receives the mark "every".
42      I, 27|           by something else, what follows or does not follow the highest
43      I, 27|           superior term; for what follows animal also follows man,
44      I, 27|          what follows animal also follows man, and what does not belong
45      I, 27|           which the superior term follows, those things which the
46      I, 27|           which the inferior term follows, e.g. take as subjects of
47      I, 27|       necessary indeed, if animal follows man, that it should follow
48      I, 28|          groups are identical, it follows that one of the terms in
49      I, 28|          to some of the Es: for A follows C, and E follows all G.
50      I, 28|            for A follows C, and E follows all G. If F and D are identical,
51      I, 28|           A itself: for if a term follows the primary antecedents,
52      I, 28|      belong to the same thing, it follows that A will not belong to
53      I, 29|     predicated of the Gs only, it follows that A will belong to none
54      I, 44|          e.g. the falsity of what follows from the assumption that
55      I, 46|         The reason for this is as follows. The relation of "he can
56      I, 46|   statements to one another is as follows. Let A stand for "to be
57      I, 46|    related in the same way, and A follows C but the relation cannot
58      I, 46|    following consideration that D follows B. For since either C or
59      I, 46|         the same thing, because A follows C; and so something impossible
60      I, 46|      related in the same way, and follows everything which C follows:
61      I, 46|        follows everything which C follows: it will result that B belongs
62      I, 46|        either H or D, and since H follows F, B must follow D: for
63      I, 46|           we know this. If then A follows C, B must follow D". But
64     II, 3 |        and difference: for animal follows every man and footed things
65     II, 3 |     belong to some C, e.g. animal follows no science but every man,
66     II, 4 |       e.g. neither man nor footed follows anything lifeless, though
67     II, 5 | syllogisms reciprocal proof is as follows. Let B belong to all C,
68     II, 6 |         The negative is proved as follows. Let A belong to all B,
69     II, 11|          admitted to be true), it follows that C belongs to no B or
70     II, 15|        affirmative statements, it follows that opposite statements
71     II, 16|          convertible or because A follows B, then the question is
72     II, 27|        figure: for since paleness follows women with child and is