Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 2 |       negative premiss should be convertible, e.g. if no pleasure is
 2      I, 2 |          the affirmative must be convertible, not however, universally,
 3      I, 5 |         the negative relation is convertible, N will belong to no M:
 4      I, 5 |         the negative relation is convertible, N will belong to no O.
 5      I, 5 |        the negative statement is convertible, N will belong to no M:
 6      I, 6 |         affirmative statement is convertible, S will belong to some R:
 7      I, 6 |         affirmative statement is convertible S will belong to some P:
 8      I, 8 |        the negative statement is convertible alike in both cases, and
 9      I, 10|        the negative statement is convertible, B is possible of no A.
10      I, 10|        the negative statement is convertible, it will be possible for
11      I, 11|         because the universal is convertible into the particular: consequently
12      I, 11|        BC is necessary. For C is convertible with some A: consequently
13      I, 11|       necessary. Since then C is convertible with some B, but A necessarily
14      I, 11|          then the affirmative is convertible, C also will belong to some
15      I, 11|   particular affirmative also is convertible. If then it is necessary
16      I, 13|          mode of possibility are convertible into one another. I mean
17      I, 13|         that the affirmative are convertible into the negative, but that
18      I, 13|        each of its two senses is convertible into its opposite, not however
19      I, 13|           but what is natural is convertible because it does not necessarily
20      I, 13|        and what is indefinite is convertible because it inclines this
21      I, 14|          mode of possibility are convertible and it is possible for B
22      I, 16|          negative proposition is convertible, B is not possible for any
23      I, 17|   problematic proposition is not convertible, e.g. if A may belong to
24      I, 17|     problematic affirmations are convertible with negations, whether
25      I, 17|      negative proposition is not convertible. Further, these propositions
26      I, 17|      negative proposition is not convertible.~This being proved, suppose
27      I, 17|         as has been said, is not convertible. Nor can a proof be obtained
28      I, 20|       affirmative proposition is convertible into a particular, and B
29      I, 27|       statement implied above is convertible. Of the attributes which
30      I, 28|          negative proposition is convertible, and F is identical with
31      I, 28|        the negative statement is convertible, and F belongs to all E:
32      I, 45|        the negative statement is convertible.~But if the syllogism is
33      I, 45|        particular affirmative is convertible, C will belong to some B:
34      I, 45|        particular affirmative is convertible: therefore A will belong
35      I, 45|   argument is the same: for B is convertible in reference to C. But if
36      I, 45|          particular statement is convertible, A will belong to some B.
37      I, 45|           both B and C alike are convertible in relation to A, so that
38     II, 1 |         For all propositions are convertible save only the particular
39     II, 5 |  different. If the terms are not convertible, one of the premisses from
40     II, 5 |          first. If the terms are convertible, it is possible to demonstrate
41     II, 5 |        e.g. if A and B and C are convertible with one another. Suppose
42     II, 5 |       that only if the terms are convertible is circular and reciprocal
43     II, 5 |   possible (if the terms are not convertible, the matter stands as we
44     II, 16|           or if they are plainly convertible, or the one belongs to the
45     II, 16|          those terms if they are convertible. But if they are not convertible,
46     II, 16| convertible. But if they are not convertible, it is the fact that they
47     II, 16|          either because they are convertible or because A follows B,
48     II, 16|      negative syllogisms are not convertible. In scientific demonstrations
49     II, 22|        Whenever the extremes are convertible it is necessary that the
50     II, 22|        that the middle should be convertible with both. For if A belongs
51     II, 22|   through B, then if A and C are convertible and C belongs everything
52     II, 22|         to which A belongs, B is convertible with A, and B belongs to
53     II, 22|    through C as middle, and C is convertible with B through A as middle.
54     II, 22|        belong to C. If then B is convertible with A, C will be convertible
55     II, 22|    convertible with A, C will be convertible with A. Suppose B does not
56     II, 22|   belonged to all C. And if C is convertible with B, B is convertible
57     II, 22|         convertible with B, B is convertible also with A, for C is said
58     II, 22|     which B is said. And if C is convertible in relation to A and to
59     II, 22|         to A and to B, B also is convertible in relation to A. For C
60     II, 22|  syllogism. Again if A and B are convertible, and similarly C and D,
61     II, 22|  together, then when A and C are convertible B and D are convertible.
62     II, 22|          convertible B and D are convertible. For if B does not belong
63     II, 22|        if A then C: for they are convertible. Therefore C and D belong
64     II, 22| necessary that A and B should be convertible: for since A is said of
65     II, 22|         the whole of C, and C is convertible with B, it is necessary
66     II, 23|   belongs to all C. If then C is convertible with B, and the middle term
67     II, 23|        thing, and the extreme is convertible with one of them, then the
68     II, 27|     figure if the middle term is convertible with the first extreme,
69     II, 27|      than the third term and not convertible with it: e.g. let A stand
70     II, 27|          nothing besides, but is convertible with B: otherwise, there