Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |           present need, but will be stated accurately in the sequel.~
 2      I, 1 |         which, certain things being stated, something other than what
 3      I, 1 |        something other than what is stated follows of necessity from
 4      I, 1 |            other than what has been stated to make plain what necessarily
 5      I, 1 |             have not been expressly stated as premisses.~That one term
 6      I, 3 |        reason which we have already stated.~In respect of possible
 7      I, 4 |      follows (this has already been stated) it is clear that this arrangement
 8      I, 4 |          must be related as we have stated: if they are related otherwise,
 9      I, 5 |         terms must be related as we stated at the outset: for if they
10      I, 5 |             the particular, we have stated when a syllogism will be
11      I, 5 |              for the reason already stated: the point must be proved
12      I, 5 |           to one another in the way stated, a syllogism results of
13      I, 6 |    syllogism possible when both are stated in the negative, but one
14      I, 6 |            that if the terms are as stated, a syllogism results of
15      I, 7 |              and if the negative is stated universally, a syllogism
16      I, 7 |          belong to no C: but (as we stated) it belongs to all C. Similarly
17      I, 7 |           the first figure.~We have stated then how syllogisms which
18      I, 11|    premisses are universal, we have stated when the conclusion will
19      I, 13|        either of that of which B is stated or of that of which B may
20      I, 13|             which B may possibly be stated. It makes no difference
21      I, 14|             to all C. This has been stated above. Consequently if B
22      I, 14|            for the necessary (as we stated) is not possible.~It is
23      I, 15|           are related in the manner stated to be that of the syllogism.
24      I, 15|             of one premiss. We have stated when each of these happens
25      I, 19|           the premisses as they are stated, a conclusion can be drawn
26      I, 20|        follow from them as they are stated, but if the premisses are
27      I, 23|             to B. For in general we stated that no syllogism can establish
28      I, 23| hypothetically, and we have already stated that ostensive syllogisms
29      I, 27|            things are naturally not stated of anything: for as a rule
30      I, 27|           in both ways: they may be stated of others, and others stated
31      I, 27|        stated of others, and others stated of them. And as a rule arguments
32      I, 30|             of syllogisms have been stated in general terms, both how
33      I, 30|           be definite. We have also stated how we must select with
34      I, 32|             premisses have not been stated, we must ourselves assume
35      I, 32|             term as middle which is stated in both the remisses: for
36      I, 32|             if the same term is not stated more than once in the course
37      I, 33|            our notice. E.g. if A is stated of B, and B of C: it would
38      I, 33|            the premiss AB should be stated universally. But this is
39      I, 34|             was said before: for we stated that when several things
40      I, 36|    sometimes that the first term is stated of the middle, but the middle
41      I, 36|       middle, but the middle is not stated of the third term, e.g.
42      I, 36|        Sometimes the middle term is stated of the third, but the first
43      I, 36|         third, but the first is not stated of the middle, e.g. if there
44      I, 36|           neither the first term is stated of the middle, nor the middle
45      I, 36|        while the first is sometimes stated of the third, and sometimes
46      I, 36|          premisses one thing is not stated of another.~The same holds
47      I, 36|            terms ought always to be stated in the nominative, e.g.
48      I, 38|           take the terms in the way stated.~
49      I, 41|      everything of which B is truly stated, it will follow that A can
50     II, 1 |             negative yield only the stated conclusion. For all propositions
51     II, 3 |           then if the premisses are stated contrariwise and it is assumed
52     II, 3 |         white things. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and
53     II, 3 |         white things. If then it is stated that A belongs to all B
54     II, 3 |      lifeless things. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and
55     II, 3 |             if the premiss which is stated universally is affirmative.
56     II, 4 |     beautiful things. If then it is stated that A and B belong to all
57     II, 4 |      Similarly if the premiss AC is stated as negative. For nothing
58     II, 8 |          and let it be converted as stated. Then if A belongs not to
59     II, 11|     contradictory of the conclusion stated and another premiss is assumed;
60     II, 15|             is always that which is stated negatively of one extreme,
61     II, 19|              and that term which is stated more than once is the middle.
62     II, 21|              Similarly in the cases stated above. The error in respect
63     II, 27|           if the one proposition is stated, we have only a sign, but
64     II, 27|           sign, but if the other is stated as well, a syllogism, e.g. "
65     II, 27|             the differences we have stated.~We must either divide signs
66     II, 27|             divide signs in the way stated, and among them designate
67     II, 27|         sign is proper in the sense stated, because the affection is