Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |          the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (
 2      I, 1 |       adversary’s choice between two contradictories. But this
 3      I, 1 |       giving of a choice between two contradictories, when a
 4      I, 11|       affirmative, if one of the two is necessary, then the conclusion
 5      I, 13|          be possible" is used in two ways. In one it means to
 6      I, 13|          possible in each of its two senses is convertible into
 7      I, 13|       that" may be understood in two senses: "that" may mean
 8      I, 13|          all B" might be used in two senses. First then we must
 9      I, 15|         some one thing, but from two at least, i.e. when the
10      I, 17|     latter expression is used in two senses, one if A some is
11      I, 19|      that definitely disconnects two terms is universal and necessary,
12      I, 21|           no matter which of the two is pure; in both cases the
13      I, 23|     something midway between the two, which will connect the
14      I, 24|    statement is proved both from two universal premisses and
15      I, 25|          conclusion follows from two premisses and not from more
16      I, 25| premisses and not from more than two. For the three terms make
17      I, 25|         For the three terms make two premisses, unless a new
18      I, 25|         ABC the term D is added, two conclusions are thereby
19      I, 26|      mood, through the second in two. The particular affirmative
20      I, 26|        but once in the first, in two moods in the second, in
21      I, 26|        the universal negative in two. Similarly with universal
22      I, 26|        this we found possible in two figures. But particular
23      I, 28|          If any members of these two groups are identical, it
24      I, 28|          the three terms and the two premisses, and that all
25      I, 32|       must attempt to select the two premisses of the syllogism (
26      I, 32|        until we have reached the two premisses: for unless we
27      I, 32|         but must first state the two premisses, then divide them
28      I, 35|         no mean. Let A stand for two right angles, B for triangle,
29      I, 35|          its own nature contains two right angles, consequently
30      I, 41|         them. For in general, if two things are not related as
31      I, 45|       first, but only one of the two particular syllogisms. Let
32      I, 46|        not to be good". For when two pairs correspond, if the
33      I, 46|       same thing, and one of the two necessarily belongs to everything,
34      I, 46| Similarly also with C and D. For two negations have been assumed
35     II, 2 |       the least three terms, and two relations of subject and
36     II, 2 |      posited as one thing, being two premisses taken together.
37     II, 2 |          not matter which of the two is false. (1) Let A belong
38     II, 3 |          not matter which of the two premisses is false); if
39     II, 4 |          The reason is that when two things are so related to
40     II, 4 |          necessary, since one of two things is, that the other
41     II, 11|       everything one or other of two contradictory statements
42     II, 14|    positions. Both, indeed, take two premisses that are admitted,
43     II, 15|            or we must argue from two syllogisms. In no other
44     II, 17|      triangle contains more than two right angles.~
45     II, 18|         syllogism is made out of two or more premisses. If then
46     II, 18|         conclusion is drawn from two premisses, one or both of
47     II, 18|   syllogism cannot be drawn from two premisses. But if the premisses
48     II, 18|          premisses are more than two, e.g. if C is established
49     II, 21|         reference to each of the two middle terms: e.g. that
50     II, 21|          premisses of one of the two syllogisms: e.g. A belongs
51     II, 21|     exists; e.g. let A stand for two right angles, B for triangle,
52     II, 21|          every triangle contains two right angles; consequently
53     II, 21|          has its angles equal to two right angles" is ambiguous,
54     II, 21|         he knows that C contains two right angles with a knowledge
55     II, 21|          the angles are equal to two right angles, if we know
56     II, 21|          unless he considers the two propositions together. So
57     II, 22|    should have been created. For two syllogisms have been put
58     II, 22|        belong to all B.~When, of two opposites A and B, A is
59     II, 23|      already been proved that if two things belong to the same
60     II, 26|          objection is brought in two ways and through two figures;
61     II, 26|          in two ways and through two figures; in two ways because
62     II, 26|          through two figures; in two ways because every objection
63     II, 26|      universal or particular, by two figures because objections
64     II, 27|          the kind as a whole has two properties, e.g. if the
65     II, 27|  generous, but possesses, of the two signs, large extremities,