Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |     dialectical premisses, may be taken as sufficiently defined
 2      I, 4 |      raven. The same terms may be taken also if the premiss BA is
 3      I, 4 |          the premisses originally taken) and that all conclusions
 4      I, 6 |         one of the Ss, e.g. N, be taken, both P and R will belong
 5      I, 6 |  impossibile, if one of the Ss be taken to which P does not belong.~
 6      I, 8 |  necessary in respect of the part taken, it must hold of some of
 7      I, 8 |         is included: for the part taken is just some of that. And
 8      I, 9 |        the major is, e.g. if A is taken as necessarily belonging
 9      I, 9 |          belonging to B, but B is taken as simply belonging to C:
10      I, 9 |          for if the premisses are taken in this way, A will necessarily
11      I, 10|          prevents such an A being taken that it is possible for
12      I, 15|         from the actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism,
13      I, 15|    Through the premisses actually taken nothing necessary results
14      I, 15|       from the premisses that are taken, sometimes it requires the
15      I, 23|           B through the premisses taken. Nor when C belongs to something
16      I, 23|        unless some middle term is taken, which is somehow related
17      I, 24|        that when equal angles are taken from the whole angles, which
18      I, 24|       states that when equals are taken from equals the remainders
19      I, 25|            If then syllogisms are taken with respect to their main
20      I, 27|        these attributes have been taken in dealing with the superior
21      I, 28|           thing. For if these are taken, a syllogism will be formed
22      I, 28|        however from the premisses taken but in the aforesaid mood.
23      I, 28|           that from the inquiries taken by themselves no syllogism
24      I, 32|          middle term has not been taken. Since we know what sort
25      I, 34| substituted for the condition and taken as the term.~
26      I, 37|          these categories must be taken either with or without qualification,
27      I, 38|       nature. But if "being" were taken as middle and "being" simply
28     II, 2 |        thing, being two premisses taken together. The same holds
29     II, 2 |           indifferently, if it is taken as wholly false: but if
30     II, 2 |         but if the premiss is not taken as wholly false, it does
31     II, 2 |          to any man. If then A is taken to belong to all B and B
32     II, 2 |        e.g. if the same terms are taken and man is put as middle:
33     II, 2 |       Consequently if one term is taken to belong to none of that
34     II, 2 |     belong, and the other term is taken to belong to all of that
35     II, 2 |      white thing. If then snow is taken as middle, and animal as
36     II, 2 |            consequently if man be taken as middle term and it is
37     II, 2 |          white. If then number is taken as middle, and it is assumed
38     II, 4 |        For the same terms must be taken as have been taken when
39     II, 4 |        must be taken as have been taken when the premisses are universal,
40     II, 5 |      possible. If another term is taken as middle, the proof is
41     II, 5 |          of the accepted terms is taken as middle, only one of the
42     II, 5 |           for if both of them are taken the same conclusion as before
43     II, 7 |           when both premisses are taken universally, it is not possible
44     II, 9 |          neither of the premisses taken is universal. Consequently
45     II, 10|        belongs to some B, C being taken as middle, and the premisses
46     II, 11|           the premisses have been taken, but a reduction to the
47     II, 11|         the premisses of both are taken in the same way. For example
48     II, 11|           proposition CA has been taken as negative. But if the
49     II, 11|    Similarly if the other premiss taken concerns B; we shall have
50     II, 14|         the terms which have been taken, whenever the contradictory
51     II, 14|        the ostensive syllogism is taken as a premiss. For the syllogisms
52     II, 15|         contrary if the terms are taken universally; if one is particular,
53     II, 25|          knowledge, since we have taken a new term, being so far
54     II, 26|        the universal of the terms taken by his opponent, e.g. if
55     II, 27|          signs, and a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding
56     II, 27|        the figures. For it may be taken as in the first figure or