Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 30|     that is, e.g. about good or knowledge. But in each science the
 2      I, 34|       For health and diseae and knowledge and ignorance, and in general
 3      I, 36|         term, e.g. if wisdom is knowledge, and wisdom is of the good,
 4      I, 36|     conclusion is that there is knowledge of the good. The good then
 5      I, 36|      good. The good then is not knowledge, though wisdom is knowledge.
 6      I, 36|     knowledge, though wisdom is knowledge. Sometimes the middle term
 7      I, 38|      made proving that there is knowledge of justice, that it is good,
 8      I, 38|    first term. Let A stand for "knowledge that it is good", B for
 9      I, 38|        For of the good there is knowledge that it is good. Also it
10      I, 38|         healthy is an object of knowledge qua good, of goat-stag an
11      I, 38|       of goat-stag an object of knowledge qua not existing, or man
12      I, 38|       proved to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved to
13      I, 38|       proved to be an object of knowledge that it is good. If it has
14      I, 38|       proved to be an object of knowledge without qualification, we
15      I, 38|    something". Let A stand for "knowledge that it is something", B
16      I, 38|        of C: there will then be knowledge of the good, that it is
17      I, 38| syllogism proving that there is knowledge of the good, that it is
18      I, 38|        is; e.g. let A stand for knowledge that it is, B for being,
19      I, 46|   not-walk, and is possessed of knowledge of what is good and of what
20     II, 21|  ambiguous, meaning to have the knowledge either of the universal
21     II, 21|         two right angles with a knowledge of the universal, but not
22     II, 21|       universal, but not with a knowledge of the particulars; consequently
23     II, 21|   particulars; consequently his knowledge will not be contrary to
24     II, 21|         principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars, by an
25     II, 21|        in all other cases.~By a knowledge of the universal then we
26     II, 21|        know them by the kind of knowledge which is proper to them;
27     II, 21|         that we should have the knowledge and error that are contrary
28     II, 21|     another: rather we have the knowledge of the universal but make
29     II, 21|     term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism,
30     II, 21|         this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge
31     II, 21|   knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular. For we
32     II, 21|       and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular,
33     II, 21|         actual exercise of that knowledge. For to know is used in
34     II, 21|         may mean either to have knowledge of the universal or to have
35     II, 21|        the universal or to have knowledge proper to the matter in
36     II, 21|        hand or to exercise such knowledge: consequently three kinds
37     II, 21|        thing, provided that his knowledge and his error are not contrary.
38     II, 21|   happens also to the man whose knowledge is limited to each of the
39     II, 21|        with foal he has not the knowledge in the sense of its actual
40     II, 21|        an error contrary to his knowledge: for the error contrary
41     II, 21|       the error contrary to the knowledge of the universal would be
42     II, 25|         approach more nearly to knowledge. For example let A stand
43     II, 25|       what can be taught, B for knowledge, C for justice. Now it is
44     II, 25|   justice. Now it is clear that knowledge can be taught: but it is
45     II, 25|     uncertain whether virtue is knowledge. If now the statement BC
46     II, 25| reduction: for we are nearer to knowledge, since we have taken a new
47     II, 25|      term, being so far without knowledge that A belongs to C. Or
48     II, 25|      for thus too we are nearer knowledge. For example let D stand
49     II, 25|  lunules), we should be near to knowledge. But when BC is not more
50     II, 25|         for such a statement is knowledge.~