Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 2 |     however, universally, but in part, e.g. if every pleasure,
 2      I, 2 |      affirmative must convert in part (for if some pleasure is
 3      I, 4 |        universally, the other in part only, to its subject, there
 4      I, 6 |         the middle, the other in part only, when both are affirmative
 5      I, 8 |         by the "exposition" of a part of the subject of the particular
 6      I, 8 |      necessary in respect of the part taken, it must hold of some
 7      I, 8 |          that term in which this part is included: for the part
 8      I, 8 |        part is included: for the part taken is just some of that.
 9      I, 15|        necessarily belong to any part of the subject (for this
10      I, 22|         the middle, the other in part. If both premisses are affirmative,
11      I, 23|         either universally or in part, and further either ostensively
12      I, 25|   related to another as whole to part: for it has already been
13      I, 25|          one is whole, the other part, some conclusion will follow
14      I, 31|          into classes is a small part of the method we have described:
15      I, 32| aforementioned figures: for this part of the inquiry still remains.
16      I, 32|         it is necessary that any part of substance is substance;
17      I, 41|          not related as whole to part and part to whole, the prover
18      I, 41|     related as whole to part and part to whole, the prover does
19      I, 43|      been directed to prove some part of the definition, we must
20     II, 2 |          not wholly false but in part only, even so the conclusion
21     II, 2 |        first premiss is false in part, and the other true; and
22     II, 2 |       the premiss AB is false in part, the conclusion may be true.
23     II, 4 |        it is possible, though no part of the syllogism is true,
24     II, 15| identical or related as whole to part. Otherwise it is impossible:
25     II, 15|        possible to establish one part of a contradiction through
26     II, 15|          or related as whole and part. It is evident also that
27     II, 21|        to C through B, since the part is included in the whole;
28     II, 24|      neither like reasoning from part to whole, nor like reasoning
29     II, 24|          reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from
30     II, 24|        but rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars
31     II, 24|    rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars are
32     II, 27|          not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a probability,