Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 2 |        else; of premisses of these three kinds some are affirmative,
 2      I, 2 |          in respect of each of the three modes of attribution; again
 3      I, 4 |            demonstration.~Whenever three terms are so related to
 4      I, 23|            and this is possible in three ways (either by predicating
 5      I, 23|          be formed by means of the three figures mentioned above.
 6      I, 25| demonstration will proceed through three terms and no more, unless
 7      I, 25|            be reached by more than three terms in this way, but it
 8      I, 25|     syllogism will proceed through three terms only.~This being evident,
 9      I, 25|        from more than two. For the three terms make two premisses,
10      I, 26|         mood through the first, in three moods through the last.
11      I, 26|            moods in the second, in three moods in the third. It is
12      I, 28|       inquiry proceeds through the three terms and the two premisses,
13      I, 30|      consider them by means of the three terms, refuting statements
14      I, 41|            at all. If then we take three terms it is clear that the
15      I, 46|        proved destructively in the three ways mentioned.~In general
16     II, 2 |       comes about are at the least three terms, and two relations
17     II, 4 |          if it were proved through three terms.~
18     II, 5 |           Consequently each of the three propositions has been made
19     II, 15|          but really there are only three: for the particular affirmative
20     II, 15|            Topics. Since there are three oppositions to affirmative
21     II, 16|            a reciprocal proof with three propositions.~Similarly
22     II, 21|             For to know is used in three senses: it may mean either
23     II, 21|            knowledge: consequently three kinds of error also are
24     II, 27|         and a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the