Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 3 |            no A is B. For if it is possible that some A is B, it would
  2      I, 3 |           some A is B, it would be possible also that some B is A. If
  3      I, 3 |      already stated.~In respect of possible premisses, since possibility
  4      I, 3 |           and what is potential is possible), affirmative statements
  5      I, 3 |            described. For if it is possible that all or some B is A,
  6      I, 3 |            some B is A, it will be possible that some A is B. For if
  7      I, 3 |            B. For if that were not possible, then no B could possibly
  8      I, 3 |             Whatever is said to be possible, either because B necessarily
  9      I, 3 |           if one should say, it is possible that man is not horse, or
 10      I, 3 |           statements. For if it is possible for no man to be a horse,
 11      I, 3 |          if anything is said to be possible because it is the general
 12      I, 3 |          in this way we define the possible), the negative premisses
 13      I, 3 |            when we speak about the possible. At present we may take
 14      I, 3 |           the statement that it is possible that no B is A or some B
 15      I, 3 |             for the expression "is possible" ranks along with "is",
 16      I, 4 |        being so related; for it is possible that the first should belong
 17      I, 4 |           when a syllogism will be possible and when not, and that if
 18      I, 4 |         and that if a syllogism is possible the terms must be related
 19      I, 4 |            a syllogism will not be possible, whether the major premiss
 20      I, 4 |      otherwise one would have been possible with a universal negative
 21      I, 4 |         otherwise, no syllogism is possible anyhow. It is evident also
 22      I, 5 |    universally a syllogism will be possible, whenever the middle belongs
 23      I, 5 |            both conclusions.~It is possible to prove these results also
 24      I, 5 |           term.~Nor is a syllogism possible when M is predicated neither
 25      I, 5 |           when a syllogism will be possible and when not: but if the
 26      I, 5 |            a syllogism will not be possible anyhow. First let them be
 27      I, 5 |           and not to some O. It is possible then for N to belong either
 28      I, 5 |        snow, animal. But it is not possible to find terms of which the
 29      I, 5 |           is (as we have seen) not possible, clearly it will not be
 30      I, 5 |             clearly it will not be possible now either.~Again let the
 31      I, 5 |         all N and to some O. It is possible then for N to belong to
 32      I, 5 |         swan, stone. But it is not possible to take terms to illustrate
 33      I, 5 |           and not to some N, it is possible for N to belong either to
 34      I, 5 |          formed anyhow. Nor is one possible if the middle term belongs
 35      I, 6 |          figure is produced. It is possible to demonstrate this also
 36      I, 6 |           when a syllogism will be possible and when not, if the terms
 37      I, 6 |     negative, no syllogism will be possible. But when one is negative,
 38      I, 6 |     reversed, no syllogism will be possible. If one term is related
 39      I, 6 |           the preceding. And it is possible to demonstrate it also per
 40      I, 6 |     universal, a syllogism will be possible whenever the minor term
 41      I, 6 |          that it did not. Proof is possible also without reduction ad
 42      I, 6 |  affirmative, no syllogism will be possible, e.g. if P belongs to all
 43      I, 6 |        negative relation it is not possible to get terms, if R belongs
 44      I, 6 |           to no S, no syllogism is possible, as has been shown. Clearly
 45      I, 6 |          then no syllogism will be possible here.~But if the negative
 46      I, 6 |           wild.~Nor is a syllogism possible when both are stated in
 47      I, 6 |      statement.~Nor is a syllogism possible anyhow, if each of the extremes
 48      I, 6 |           when a syllogism will be possible, and when not; and that
 49      I, 6 |            and that it will not be possible to reach a universal conclusion
 50      I, 7 |          also with the rest.~It is possible also to reduce all syllogisms
 51      I, 7 |           by themselves, but it is possible also to prove them by means
 52      I, 7 |         also demonstration will be possible in the case of the negative.
 53      I, 8 |           indeed at all, but it is possible for them to belong), it
 54      I, 8 |           is, a third from what is possible.~There is hardly any difference
 55      I, 9 |           B may be such that it is possible that A should belong to
 56      I, 10|    negative be necessary; let A be possible of no B, and simply belong
 57      I, 10|     statement is convertible, B is possible of no A. But A belongs to
 58      I, 10|           all C; consequently B is possible of no C. For C falls under
 59      I, 10|         were negative: for if A is possible be of no C, C is possible
 60      I, 10|          possible be of no C, C is possible of no A: but A belongs to
 61      I, 10|           all B, consequently C is possible of none of the Bs: for again
 62      I, 10|          figure. Neither then is B possible of C: for conversion is
 63      I, 10|            of C: for conversion is possible without modifying the relation.~
 64      I, 10|           A being taken that it is possible for C to belong to all of
 65      I, 10|          what we had before: it is possible that animal should belong
 66      I, 10|         not necessarily: for it is possible for man to be born white,
 67      I, 10|           and necessary: let it be possible for no B that A should belong
 68      I, 10|            convertible, it will be possible for no A that B should belong
 69      I, 11|           term C be "horse". It is possible then that the term good
 70      I, 11|           not be good, since it is possible for every animal to be good.
 71      I, 11|            good. Or if that is not possible, take as the term "awake"
 72      I, 11|          some B: for conversion is possible. Similarly also if AC should
 73      I, 11|        belong to some C, but it is possible for A to belong to C, and
 74      I, 11|        necessary. For if it is not possible that A should belong to
 75      I, 11|        some white thing, but it is possible that waking should belong
 76      I, 12|            necessary conclusion is possible although one only of the
 77      I, 13|           to discuss that which is possible, when and how and by what
 78      I, 13|             I use the terms "to be possible" and "the possible" of that
 79      I, 13|           to be possible" and "the possible" of that which is not necessary
 80      I, 13|           the necessary that it is possible. But that my definition
 81      I, 13|          that my definition of the possible is correct is clear from
 82      I, 13|         the expressions "it is not possible to belong", "it is impossible
 83      I, 13|       their opposites also, "it is possible to belong", "it is not impossible
 84      I, 13|          holds good. That which is possible then will be not necessary
 85      I, 13|           is not necessary will be possible. It results that all premisses
 86      I, 13|            opposition, e.g. "it is possible to belong" may be converted
 87      I, 13|           be converted into "it is possible not to belong", and "it
 88      I, 13|         not to belong", and "it is possible for A to belong to all B"
 89      I, 13|       belong to all B" into "it is possible for A to belong to no B"
 90      I, 13|          not to all B", and "it is possible for A to belong to some
 91      I, 13|      belong to some B" into "it is possible for A not to belong to some
 92      I, 13|            For since that which is possible is not necessary, and that
 93      I, 13|          it is clear that if it is possible that A should belong to
 94      I, 13|          should belong to B, it is possible also that it should not
 95      I, 13|          belong to B: and if it is possible that it should belong to
 96      I, 13|          belong to all, it is also possible that it should not belong
 97      I, 13|           not negative; for "to be possible" is in the same rank as "
 98      I, 13|         that the expression "to be possible" is used in two ways. In
 99      I, 13|            opposite.~That which is possible in each of its two senses
100      I, 13|            for in this sense it is possible that a man should not grow
101      I, 13|        made about things which are possible in this sense. Syllogisms
102      I, 13|            the syllogism made from possible premisses. The expression "
103      I, 13|   premisses. The expression "it is possible for this to belong to that"
104      I, 13|           for the expression "A is possible of the subject of B" means
105      I, 13|     subject of B" means that it is possible either of that of which
106      I, 13|    difference whether we say, A is possible of the subject of B, or
107      I, 13|     syllogism which arises if B is possible of the subject of C, and
108      I, 13|         the subject of C, and A is possible of the subject of B. For
109      I, 13|     possibility; but whenever A is possible of that of which B is true,
110      I, 14|           that we explained "to be possible for one term to belong to
111      I, 14|       another". Similarly if it is possible for A to belong no B, and
112      I, 14|        belong to all C, then it is possible for A to belong to no C.
113      I, 14|           the statement that it is possible for A not to belong to that
114      I, 14|            before. For since it is possible that B should belong to
115      I, 14|       should belong to no C, it is possible also that it should belong
116      I, 14|        above. Consequently if B is possible for all C, and A is possible
117      I, 14|       possible for all C, and A is possible for all B, the same syllogism
118      I, 14|     negative is joined with "it is possible": e.g. if A may belong to
119      I, 14|     perfect syllogism. For if A is possible for all B, and B for some
120      I, 14|            B for some C, then A is possible for some C. This is clear
121      I, 14|            the definition of being possible. Again if A may belong to
122      I, 14|        minor particular, e.g. A is possible for all B, B may possibly
123      I, 14|            way will a syllogism be possible. For nothing prevents B
124      I, 14|           beyond A. To C it is not possible that A should belong-either
125      I, 14|          are convertible and it is possible for B to belong to more
126      I, 14|             the major term is both possible for none of the minor and
127      I, 14|          garment", where it is not possible that the major should belong
128      I, 14|           to all the minor and not possible that it should belong to
129      I, 14|    necessary (as we stated) is not possible.~It is clear that if the
130      I, 14|         the terms are universal in possible premisses a syllogism always
131      I, 15|           this is so, we say it is possible that it should belong to
132      I, 15|            or not to all. Let A be possible for all B, and let B belong
133      I, 15|            falls under B, and A is possible for all B, clearly it is
134      I, 15|           for all B, clearly it is possible for all C also. So a perfect
135      I, 15|    affirmative, the former stating possible, the latter simple attribution,
136      I, 15|        being so related, that A is possible, and B is impossible. If
137      I, 15|  impossible. If then that which is possible, when it is possible for
138      I, 15|            is possible, when it is possible for it to be, might happen,
139      I, 15|           if at the same time A is possible and B impossible, it would
140      I, 15|            impossible, it would be possible for A to happen without
141      I, 15|        take the impossible and the possible not only in the sphere of
142      I, 15|           in which we speak of the possible: for it will be alike in
143      I, 15|    predicated of F. And if each is possible, the conclusion also is
144      I, 15|             the conclusion also is possible. If then, for example, one
145      I, 15|   necessary, but also that if A is possible, B is possible.~Since this
146      I, 15|        that if A is possible, B is possible.~Since this is proved it
147      I, 15|             and A is assumed to be possible), consequently B will be
148      I, 15|             consequently B will be possible: for if it were impossible,
149      I, 15|          would at the same time be possible and impossible.~Since we
150      I, 15|          belong to all B, and B be possible for all C: it is necessary
151      I, 15|    necessary then that should be a possible attribute for all C. Suppose
152      I, 15|             Suppose that it is not possible, but assume that B belongs
153      I, 15|       impossible. If then A is not possible for C but B belongs to all
154      I, 15|            to all C, then A is not possible for all B: for a syllogism
155      I, 15|            was assumed that A is a possible attribute for all B. It
156      I, 15|           necessary then that A is possible for all C. For though the
157      I, 15|    conclusion is impossible. It is possible also in the first figure
158      I, 15|         belongs to all C, and A is possible for all B, then A would
159      I, 15|         for all B, then A would be possible for all C. But the assumption
160      I, 15|  assumption was made that A is not possible for all C.~We must understand "
161      I, 15|            moving: but "moving" is possible for every horse; yet "man"
162      I, 15|          every horse; yet "man" is possible for no horse. Further let
163      I, 15|          conclusion necessary, not possible. For man is necessarily
164      I, 15|        impossible. Thus it will be possible for A to belong to no C;
165      I, 15|            establish that which is possible according to the definition,
166      I, 15|         thing is a raven. But B is possible for all C: for every man
167      I, 15|           belong to no B; but B is possible for all C. And the conclusion
168      I, 15|     converted, a syllogism will be possible, as before. Let A belong
169      I, 15|            it is assumed that B is possible for all C, a syllogism results
170      I, 15|          But if B is assumed to be possible for all C (and this is true)
171      I, 15|            And a syllogism will be possible by means of conversion when
172      I, 15|   assertoric, nohow is a syllogism possible. Nor is a syllogism possible
173      I, 15|       possible. Nor is a syllogism possible when the premisses are particular
174      I, 16|     belongs to all B, and let B be possible for all C. We shall have
175      I, 16|          as above. Again, let A be possible for all B, and let B necessarily
176      I, 16|           let necessarily A not be possible for any B, but let B be
177      I, 16|            for any B, but let B be possible for all C. It is necessary
178      I, 16|           we assumed that A is not possible for any B. Since then the
179      I, 16|           is convertible, B is not possible for any A. But A is supposed
180      I, 16|         Consequently B will not be possible for any C or for all C.
181      I, 16|     originally laid down that B is possible for all C. And it is clear
182      I, 16| problematic, and further it is not possible to prove the assertoric
183      I, 16|         problematic a syllogism is possible by conversion, as above;
184      I, 16|      assertoric: e.g. if it is not possible that A should belong to
185      I, 16|         Premisses of this kind are possible both where the relation
186      I, 16|           Nor again is a syllogism possible when the premisses are indefinite,
187      I, 17|       problematic, no syllogism is possible, whether the premisses are
188      I, 17|         assertoric no syllogism is possible, but if the universal negative
189      I, 17|          must understand the term "possible" in the conclusion, in the
190      I, 17|        some of the As"; e.g. it is possible that no man should be white (
191      I, 17|           be white (for it is also possible that every man should be
192      I, 17|         not true to say that it is possible that no white thing should
193      I, 17|          as we saw) other than the possible.~Moreover it is not possible
194      I, 17|       possible.~Moreover it is not possible to prove the convertibility
195      I, 17|        necessarily B, if it is not possible that no A should be B. For
196      I, 17|       claim that because it is not possible for C to belong to all D,
197      I, 17|    therefore we say that it is not possible for it to belong to all.
198      I, 17|        that in relation to what is possible and not possible, in the
199      I, 17|           what is possible and not possible, in the sense originally
200      I, 17|           being proved, suppose it possible that A may belong to no
201      I, 17|           negative. But neither is possible. Suppose the conclusion
202      I, 17|       white, B man, C horse. It is possible then for A to belong to
203      I, 17|           the other. But it is not possible for B to belong nor not
204      I, 17|        belong to C. That it is not possible for it to belong, is clear.
205      I, 17|            is a man. Neither is it possible for it not to belong. For
206      I, 17|           to be different from the possible. No syllogism then results.
207      I, 18|   problematic no syllogism will be possible, whether the premisses are
208      I, 18|  affirmative, no syllogism will be possible. This arrangement of terms
209      I, 18|            arrangement of terms is possible both when the relation is
210      I, 18|        particular, no syllogism is possible (this is proved similarly
211      I, 18|        particular, no syllogism is possible, whether the other premiss
212      I, 19|        necessary, no conclusion is possible. Suppose that A necessarily
213      I, 19|          this way, no syllogism is possible. For (1) it sometimes turns
214      I, 19|        distinct from that which is possible. (2) Nor again can we draw
215      I, 19|         premiss. (3) Further it is possible also, when the terms are
216      I, 19|           falling under B, A being possible for all B, and necessarily
217      I, 19|           to what is awake, and is possible for every animal: and everything
218      I, 19|       consequently no syllogism is possible. A similar proof is possible
219      I, 19|       possible. A similar proof is possible if the major premiss is
220      I, 19|            A syllogism then is not possible at all.~Similar relations
221      I, 19|           syllogism will always be possible to prove both a problematic
222      I, 19|           a syllogistic conclusion possible when both premisses are
223      I, 19|   necessary, a syllogism is always possible, proving not merely a negative
224      I, 19|            too that a syllogism is possible or not under the same conditions
225      I, 20|         last figure a syllogism is possible whether both or only one
226      I, 20|         understand the expression "possible" in the conclusion in the
227      I, 20|      belong to some B. So, if A is possible for every C, and C is possible
228      I, 20|     possible for every C, and C is possible for some of the Bs, then
229      I, 20|          some of the Bs, then A is possible for some of the Bs. For
230      I, 20|    particular, a syllogism will be possible, or not, under the arrangement
231      I, 20|          is converted. For if A is possible for all C, and C for some
232      I, 20|          some of the Bs, then A is possible for some of the Bs. Similarly
233      I, 21|            and a syllogism will be possible under the same arrangement
234      I, 21|   particular, no syllogism will be possible. The demonstration is the
235      I, 22|            negative conclusion are possible. But a necessary negative
236      I, 22|    negative conclusion will not be possible, any more than in the other
237      I, 22|       necessary a syllogism is not possible. The proof will follow the
238      I, 23|            A, no syllogism will be possible. For nothing necessarily
239      I, 23|        with B, will a syllogism be possible concerning A in its relation
240      I, 23|      relation to both, and this is possible in three ways (either by
241      I, 24|            a syllogism will not be possible, or it will not refer to
242      I, 24|         all", no syllogism will be possible; if one should claim that
243      I, 24|      premisses are universal it is possible that the conclusion may
244      I, 25|           sense which we saw to be possible. But if (iii) the conclusion
245      I, 26|            some: and this we found possible in two figures. But particular
246      I, 26|            establish: for proof is possible in more figures and through
247      I, 26|         must not forget that it is possible to refute statements by
248      I, 26|           universal: but it is not possible to establish universal statements
249      I, 26|           particular, though it is possible to establish particular
250      I, 27|      ultimate predicates it is not possible to demonstrate another predicate,
251      I, 28|            to some E because it is possible to convert the universal
252      I, 28|          For (as we saw) it is not possible at all to establish a proposition
253      I, 28|         consequents, and it is not possible to refute by means of a
254      I, 28|        figure. But no syllogism is possible in this way.~It is evident
255      I, 29|        hypothetical syllogisms are possible.~Each of the problems then
256      I, 29|        manner described; but it is possible to establish some of them
257      I, 29|           relation is necessary or possible. For the inquiry will be
258      I, 29|           the same order whether a possible or a pure proposition is
259      I, 29|           must find in the case of possible relations, as well as terms
260      I, 29|      syllogism which establishes a possible relation proceeds through
261      I, 30|           with as many of these as possible, and consider them by means
262      I, 31|           persuade men that it was possible to make a demonstration
263      I, 31|          not understand what it is possible to prove syllogistically
264      I, 31|        they understand that it was possible to prove syllogistically
265      I, 31|           clear that it is neither possible to refute a statement by
266      I, 31|           method, but proof is not possible by this method. Let A stand
267      I, 33|           seem that a syllogism is possible since the terms stand thus:
268      I, 33|    syllogism (as we have shown) is possible.~This deception then arises
269      I, 34|          not impossible: for it is possible that health should belong
270      I, 34|          middle figure: "it is not possible that health should belong
271      I, 34|          to any disease, but it is possible that health should belong
272      I, 34|             consequently it is not possible that disease should belong
273      I, 44|          given premisses it is not possible to reduce them. For they
274      I, 44|           be clear, that it is not possible to resolve such arguments
275      I, 45|           the first figure will be possible, e.g. if A belongs to no
276      I, 45|     extreme, no resolution will be possible, e.g. if A belongs to all
277      I, 45|  particular, no resolution will be possible, e.g. if B belongs to all
278      I, 45|            negative, resolution is possible. For if A belongs to no
279      I, 45|             resolution will not be possible: for neither of the premisses
280      I, 45|  particular, no resolution will be possible: for the particular negative
281      I, 46|       belongs to everything, it is possible that A and D should belong
282      I, 46|         with D either, since it is possible that D and A should belong
283     II, 1 |           or particular. But it is possible to give another reason concerning
284     II, 1 |           second figure it will be possible to infer only that which
285     II, 1 |         either a conclusion is not possible in the case of universal
286     II, 1 |           syllogisms or else it is possible also in the case of particular
287     II, 2 |                            2~It is possible for the premisses of the
288     II, 2 |           true premisses it is not possible to draw a false conclusion,
289     II, 2 |          First then that it is not possible to draw a false conclusion
290     II, 2 |             be supposed that it is possible, when a single fact is given,
291     II, 2 |            result. For that is not possible. For what results necessarily
292     II, 2 |     negative syllogisms: it is not possible to prove a false conclusion
293     II, 2 |         let B belong to C. This is possible, e.g. animal belongs to
294     II, 2 |            the negative. For it is possible that neither A nor B should
295     II, 2 |            true conclusion will be possible. I mean by "wholly false"
296     II, 2 |        false, a true conclusion is possible. For if A belongs to all
297     II, 2 |          AB is negative. For it is possible that A should belong to
298     II, 2 |           a true syllogism will be possible: for nothing prevents A
299     II, 2 |          AB is negative. For it is possible that A should belong neither
300     II, 2 |          AB is negative. For it is possible that A should neither belong
301     II, 2 |        particular syllogisms it is possible when the first premiss is
302     II, 2 |          AB is negative: for it is possible that A should belong to
303     II, 2 |          AB is negative. For it is possible that A should belong to
304     II, 2 |  conclusion may be true. For it is possible that A may belong to no
305     II, 3 |            the middle figure it is possible in every way to reach a
306     II, 3 |       other wholly true. For it is possible that A should belong to
307     II, 3 |         true, a true conclusion is possible. For nothing prevents A
308     II, 3 |  conclusion may be true. For it is possible that A should belong to
309     II, 3 |          is affirmative: for it is possible that A should belong to
310     II, 3 |          Also a true conclusion is possible when the universal premiss
311     II, 3 |          is affirmative. For it is possible that should A belong both
312     II, 3 |            conclusion, since it is possible that A should belong both
313     II, 3 |     particular negative. For it is possible that A should follow no
314     II, 4 |           other way in which it is possible to alter the premisses.
315     II, 4 |       other affirmative. For it is possible that B should belong to
316     II, 4 |       other wholly true. For it is possible that both A and B should
317     II, 4 |  conclusion may be true. For it is possible that B should belong to
318     II, 4 |        false, a true conclusion is possible: this can be proved, if
319     II, 4 |       affirmative. For since it is possible that B should belong to
320     II, 4 |           C and B to some C, it is possible that A should not belong
321     II, 4 |     premiss BC partly false, it is possible that the conclusion should
322     II, 4 |            what is false, in every possible way. For the same terms
323     II, 4 |       either one or all, yet it is possible, though no part of the syllogism
324     II, 5 |            way is reciprocal proof possible. If another term is taken
325     II, 5 |      undemonstrated: for it is not possible to demonstrate through these
326     II, 5 |       terms are convertible, it is possible to demonstrate everything
327     II, 5 |           reciprocal demonstration possible (if the terms are not convertible,
328     II, 5 |    particular syllogisms it is not possible to demonstrate the universal
329     II, 5 |   syllogism is negative, it is not possible to prove the universal premiss,
330     II, 5 |      reason given above. But it is possible to prove the particular
331     II, 6 |            second figure it is not possible to prove an affirmative
332     II, 6 |      addition, a syllogism will be possible. But if the syllogism not
333     II, 6 |            a syllogism will not be possible. But the proof will proceed
334     II, 7 |       taken universally, it is not possible to prove them reciprocally:
335     II, 7 |            is clear that it is not possible at all to prove through
336     II, 7 |           latter will sometimes be possible, sometimes not. When both
337     II, 7 |       minor extreme, proof will be possible, but when it concerns the
338     II, 7 |            A to some C, it will be possible to prove the proposition
339     II, 7 |          Bs. In no other way is it possible by converting the universal
340     II, 7 |   syllogism is universal, proof is possible through the second figure
341     II, 8 |        figure. In a word it is not possible to refute universally by
342     II, 8 |         not yet refuted: for it is possible that B should belong to
343     II, 9 |            second figure it is not possible to refute the premiss which
344     II, 9 |            been refuted: for it is possible that A should belong to
345     II, 9 |            C, no syllogism will be possible: for neither of the premisses
346     II, 10|         all C, will a syllogism be possible about B and C. A similar
347     II, 10|         found that no syllogism is possible thus either in the first
348     II, 10|            a syllogism will not be possible. For if A belongs to some
349     II, 10|          to all C, no syllogism is possible (as we saw) about A and
350     II, 10|           to no C, was a syllogism possible concerning B and C. Therefore
351     II, 10|          all C. A similar proof is possible if the premisses are not
352     II, 11|            A, no syllogism will be possible. Nor can a conclusion be
353     II, 11|            B, no syllogism will be possible. If the contrary is supposed,
354     II, 14|           is clear then that it is possible through the same terms to
355     II, 14|         well. Similarly it will be possible if the syllogisms are ostensive
356     II, 14|         ostensively, and it is not possible to separate one method from
357     II, 15|            15~In what figure it is possible to draw a conclusion from
358     II, 15|            what figure this is not possible, will be made clear in this
359     II, 15|            kinds of opposition are possible, viz. universal affirmative
360     II, 15|           affirmative syllogism is possible because both premisses must
361     II, 15|           no negative syllogism is possible because opposites affirm
362     II, 15|          other. Consequently it is possible that contradictories may
363     II, 15|            a negative syllogism is possible whether the terms are universal
364     II, 15|          must recognize that it is possible to take opposites in the
365     II, 15|           escape notice. But it is possible to establish one part of
366     II, 15|         from false premisses it is possible to draw a true conclusion,
367     II, 15|         said before, but it is not possible if the premisses are opposed.
368     II, 15|          as was said before, is it possible that the premisses should
369     II, 16|       question at once; it is also possible to make a transition to
370     II, 17|          position; but that is not possible in ostensive proofs: since
371     II, 19|           to conceal. This will be possible first, if, instead of drawing
372     II, 19|      connected they take as far as possible those that are not connected
373     II, 20|            when refutation will be possible and when impossible. A refutation
374     II, 20|        impossible. A refutation is possible whether everything is conceded,
375     II, 20|          been shown a syllogism is possible whether the terms are related
376     II, 20|    impossible: for no syllogism is possible (as we saw) when all the
377     II, 20|         therefore no refutation is possible. For if a refutation were
378     II, 20|           For if a refutation were possible, a syllogism must be possible;
379     II, 20|      possible, a syllogism must be possible; although if a syllogism
380     II, 20|         although if a syllogism is possible it does not follow that
381     II, 20|        follow that a refutation is possible. Similarly refutation is
382     II, 20|        Similarly refutation is not possible if nothing is conceded universally:
383     II, 21|          about them, e.g. if it is possible that the same predicate
384     II, 21|         the same series, it is not possible to think both the premisses
385     II, 21|            this way then it is not possible to think; but nothing prevents
386     II, 21|           them; consequently it is possible that we may make mistakes
387     II, 21|            kinds of error also are possible. Nothing then prevents a
388     II, 21|            incidentally. For it is possible to think this in many different
389     II, 26|         Premisses from which it is possible to draw the contrary conclusion
390     II, 26|            are opposite syllogisms possible, since the second figure
391     II, 27|      accepted and most true.~It is possible to infer character from
392     II, 27|            from features, then, is possible in the first figure if the