Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |           a premiss, a term, and a syllogism, and the nature of a perfect
  2      I, 1 |        perfect and of an imperfect syllogism; and after that, the inclusion
  3      I, 1 |  difference to the production of a syllogism in either case; for both
  4      I, 1 |          removed, or vice versa.~A syllogism is discourse in which, certain
  5      I, 1 |   necessary.~I call that a perfect syllogism which needs nothing other
  6      I, 1 |        what necessarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect, if it needs
  7      I, 4 |         means, when, and how every syllogism is produced; subsequently
  8      I, 4 |            speak of demonstration. Syllogism should be discussed before
  9      I, 4 |       before demonstration because syllogism is the general: the demonstration
 10      I, 4 |         demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but not every syllogism
 11      I, 4 |           syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration.~Whenever
 12      I, 4 |            be related by a perfect syllogism. I call that term middle
 13      I, 4 |        last term, there will be no syllogism in respect of the extremes;
 14      I, 4 |     consequence, there cannot be a syllogism by means of these premisses.
 15      I, 4 |          man, stone. Nor again can syllogism be formed when neither the
 16      I, 4 |        clear in this figure when a syllogism will be possible and when
 17      I, 4 |            when not, and that if a syllogism is possible the terms must
 18      I, 4 |            related there will be a syllogism.~But if one term is related
 19      I, 4 |            there must be a perfect syllogism whenever universality is
 20      I, 4 |        related in any other way, a syllogism is impossible. I call that
 21      I, 4 |            there will be a perfect syllogism. This holds good also if
 22      I, 4 |         for we shall have the same syllogism whether the premiss is indefinite
 23      I, 4 |     affirmatively or negatively, a syllogism will not be possible, whether
 24      I, 4 |            is A, there cannot be a syllogism. Take the terms white, horse,
 25      I, 4 |         particular, can there be a syllogism, whether the minor premiss
 26      I, 4 |     Consequently there cannot be a syllogism. Again let no B be A, but
 27      I, 4 |            such that no C is B, no syllogism follows (this has already
 28      I, 4 |            terms will not afford a syllogism: otherwise one would have
 29      I, 4 |          can there in any way be a syllogism if both the relations of
 30      I, 4 |            said that if there is a syllogism in this figure with a particular
 31      I, 4 |          are related otherwise, no syllogism is possible anyhow. It is
 32      I, 5 |            is first in position. A syllogism cannot be perfect anyhow
 33      I, 5 |          are related universally a syllogism will be possible, whenever
 34      I, 5 |           Thus it will be the same syllogism that proves both conclusions.~
 35      I, 5 |            It is clear then that a syllogism is formed when the terms
 36      I, 5 |         related, but not a perfect syllogism; for necessity is not perfectly
 37      I, 5 |           and O, there cannot be a syllogism. Terms to illustrate a positive
 38      I, 5 |          the middle term.~Nor is a syllogism possible when M is predicated
 39      I, 5 |            is clear then that if a syllogism is formed when the terms
 40      I, 5 |    extremes, a particular negative syllogism must result whenever the
 41      I, 5 |            all N, there will be no syllogism. Take the terms animal,
 42      I, 5 |  particular, we have stated when a syllogism will be possible and when
 43      I, 5 |    negative or both affirmative, a syllogism will not be possible anyhow.
 44      I, 5 |            if it belongs to no O a syllogism is (as we have seen) not
 45      I, 5 |            the other particular, a syllogism can, not be formed anyhow.
 46      I, 5 |       another in the way stated, a syllogism results of necessity; and
 47      I, 5 |       necessity; and if there is a syllogism, the terms must be so related.
 48      I, 6 |         and is last in position. A syllogism cannot be perfect in this
 49      I, 6 |            belong to some R: for a syllogism in the first figure is produced.
 50      I, 6 |           to no S, there will be a syllogism to prove that P will necessarily
 51      I, 6 |            all S, there will be no syllogism. Terms for the positive
 52      I, 6 |            man.~Nor can there be a syllogism when both terms are asserted
 53      I, 6 |            this figure also when a syllogism will be possible and when
 54      I, 6 |       affirmative, there will be a syllogism to prove that one extreme
 55      I, 6 |         when they are negative, no syllogism will be possible. But when
 56      I, 6 |       affirmative, there will be a syllogism to prove that the one extreme
 57      I, 6 |           relation is reversed, no syllogism will be possible. If one
 58      I, 6 |        affirmative there must be a syllogism, no matter which of the
 59      I, 6 |        affirmative is universal, a syllogism will be possible whenever
 60      I, 6 |           major is affirmative, no syllogism will be possible, e.g. if
 61      I, 6 |           if R belongs to no S, no syllogism is possible, as has been
 62      I, 6 |        been shown. Clearly then no syllogism will be possible here.~But
 63      I, 6 |        affirmative there will be a syllogism. For if P belongs to no
 64      I, 6 |         negative, there will be no syllogism. Terms for the positive
 65      I, 6 |            the term wild.~Nor is a syllogism possible when both are stated
 66      I, 6 |     particular statement.~Nor is a syllogism possible anyhow, if each
 67      I, 6 |            this figure also when a syllogism will be possible, and when
 68      I, 6 |         the terms are as stated, a syllogism results of necessity, and
 69      I, 6 |       necessity, and if there is a syllogism, the terms must be so related.
 70      I, 7 |         figures, whenever a proper syllogism does not result, if both
 71      I, 7 |           is stated universally, a syllogism always results relating
 72      I, 7 |            in the other figures: a syllogism always results by means
 73      I, 7 |   affirmative will effect the same syllogism in all the figures.~It is
 74      I, 7 |            the false statement the syllogism comes about by means of
 75      I, 8 |     differently related terms, one syllogism concluding from what is
 76      I, 8 |       belong) to something else, a syllogism will or will not result
 77      I, 8 |            not belong, to make the syllogism in reference to this: with
 78      I, 9 |           B. Similarly also if the syllogism should be negative: for
 79      I, 13|          Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with things
 80      I, 13|            moods and nature of the syllogism made from possible premisses.
 81      I, 13|         and characteristics of the syllogism which arises if B is possible
 82      I, 14|            there will be a perfect syllogism to prove that A may possibly
 83      I, 14|            to no C, then indeed no syllogism results from the premisses
 84      I, 14| problematic propositions, the same syllogism results as before. For since
 85      I, 14|       possible for all B, the same syllogism again results. Similarly
 86      I, 14|            B to none of the Cs. No syllogism results from the assumed
 87      I, 14|   converted we shall have the same syllogism as before. It is clear then
 88      I, 14|            are negative, either no syllogism results, or if one it is
 89      I, 14|            there will be a perfect syllogism. For if A is possible for
 90      I, 14|            to some C, then a clear syllogism does not result from the
 91      I, 14|       particular, in no way will a syllogism be possible. For nothing
 92      I, 14|         related in this manner, no syllogism results. For every syllogism
 93      I, 14|       syllogism results. For every syllogism proves that something belongs
 94      I, 14|     Consequently there cannot be a syllogism to prove the possibility;
 95      I, 14|            in possible premisses a syllogism always results in the first
 96      I, 14|           negative, only a perfect syllogism results in the first case,
 97      I, 15|           all C also. So a perfect syllogism results. Likewise if the
 98      I, 15|      simple attribution, a perfect syllogism results proving that A possibly
 99      I, 15|           stated to be that of the syllogism. For if C is predicated
100      I, 15|          possible for all B: for a syllogism is formed in the third degree.
101      I, 15|          moment, there cannot be a syllogism. For nothing perhaps prevents "
102      I, 15|           to some B: for we have a syllogism in the third figure: but
103      I, 15|            an impossible one. This syllogism then does not establish
104      I, 15|         belongs to some C, but the syllogism per impossibile establishes
105      I, 15|    premisses taken there can be no syllogism, but if the problematic
106      I, 15|            premiss is converted, a syllogism will be possible, as before.
107      I, 15|           is possible for all C, a syllogism results as before: for the
108      I, 15|         converted, we shall have a syllogism. Suppose that A belongs
109      I, 15|          shall again have the same syllogism. But if it be assumed that
110      I, 15|       belonging, there cannot be a syllogism anyhow, whether the premiss
111      I, 15|           premiss is problematic a syllogism always results, only sometimes
112      I, 15|            there will be a perfect syllogism, just as when the terms
113      I, 15|         there will be an imperfect syllogism. Only some of them will
114      I, 15|            been shown above. And a syllogism will be possible by means
115      I, 15|          respect of possibility, a syllogism results. But whenever the
116      I, 15|        negative, there cannot be a syllogism. As instances of the positive
117      I, 15|          or assertoric, nohow is a syllogism possible. Nor is a syllogism
118      I, 15|       syllogism possible. Nor is a syllogism possible when the premisses
119      I, 15|            premiss is universal, a syllogism always results, but if the
120      I, 16|       problematic, there will be a syllogism when the terms are related
121      I, 16|           as before; and a perfect syllogism when the minor premiss is
122      I, 16|            shall have an imperfect syllogism to prove that A may belong
123      I, 16|            C. We shall then have a syllogism to prove that A may belong
124      I, 16|   necessarily belong to all C. The syllogism will be perfect, but it
125      I, 16|           when it is problematic a syllogism is possible by conversion,
126      I, 16|            when it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. Nor again
127      I, 16|        affirmative in the negative syllogism, e.g. BC the minor premiss,
128      I, 16|     proposition in the affirmative syllogism, e.g. AB the major premiss,
129      I, 16|       necessary, there cannot be a syllogism. Premisses of this kind
130      I, 16|           relation. Nor again is a syllogism possible when the premisses
131      I, 16|          from what has been said a syllogism results or not from similar
132      I, 17|      premisses are problematic, no syllogism is possible, whether the
133      I, 17|       affirmative is assertoric no syllogism is possible, but if the
134      I, 17|           results: consequently no syllogism. It is clear from what has
135      I, 17|          By means of conversion no syllogism will result: for the major
136      I, 17|          In general, if there is a syllogism, it is clear that its conclusion
137      I, 17|    different from the possible. No syllogism then results. A similar
138      I, 17|      premisses are problematic, no syllogism results.~
139      I, 18|            negative problematic no syllogism will be possible, whether
140      I, 18|        assertoric, we shall have a syllogism. Suppose A belongs to no
141      I, 18|          can belong to all C: so a syllogism is made, proving by means
142      I, 18|        complementary affirmative a syllogism is formed to prove that
143      I, 18|      premisses are affirmative, no syllogism will be possible. This arrangement
144      I, 18|        universal or particular, no syllogism is possible (this is proved
145      I, 18|            the actual premisses, a syllogism can be obtained by converting
146      I, 18|     assertoric, but particular, no syllogism is possible, whether the
147      I, 19|           arranged in this way, no syllogism is possible. For (1) it
148      I, 19|       established: consequently no syllogism is possible. A similar proof
149      I, 19|           when they are negative a syllogism can always be formed by
150      I, 19|      affirmative there cannot be a syllogism. Clearly the conclusion
151      I, 19|            does not belong to C. A syllogism then is not possible at
152      I, 19|         universal and necessary, a syllogism will always be possible
153      I, 19|       indefinite or particular, no syllogism can be formed. The same
154      I, 19|            premiss is necessary, a syllogism is always possible, proving
155      I, 19|             It is clear too that a syllogism is possible or not under
156      I, 20|            20~In the last figure a syllogism is possible whether both
157      I, 20|          but if it is negative the syllogism will result in a negative
158      I, 20|       affirmatives there will be a syllogism as before. For if A and
159      I, 20|            the other particular, a syllogism will be possible, or not,
160      I, 20|       indefinite or particular, no syllogism can be formed: for A must
161      I, 21|       problematic, not pure; and a syllogism will be possible under the
162      I, 21|            if they are converted a syllogism is obtained as before.~If
163      I, 21|       indefinite or particular, no syllogism will be possible. The demonstration
164      I, 22|        problematic we shall have a syllogism by altering the premiss
165      I, 22|          but if it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. For A sometimes
166      I, 22|             if it is problematic a syllogism can be formed by means of
167      I, 22|           but if it is necessary a syllogism is not possible. The proof
168      I, 22|         figure also when and how a syllogism can be formed, and when
169      I, 23|        reduced to them. That every syllogism without qualification can
170      I, 23|         has been proved that every syllogism is formed through one or
171      I, 23|            demonstration and every syllogism should prove either that
172      I, 23|         nor anything else of A, no syllogism will be possible. For nothing
173      I, 23|           of C, nothing prevents a syllogism being formed, but it will
174      I, 23|          being made with B, will a syllogism be possible concerning A
175      I, 23|          general we stated that no syllogism can establish the attribution
176      I, 23|            of predication. For the syllogism in general is made out of
177      I, 23|            out of premisses, and a syllogism referring to this out of
178      I, 23|          the same reference, and a syllogism relating this to that proceeds
179      I, 23|  predications, if we are to have a syllogism relating this to that. If
180      I, 23|             it is clear that every syllogism must be made in one or other
181      I, 23|        impossibile by an ostensive syllogism, and the original conclusion
182      I, 23|  syllogisms: for in every case the syllogism leads up to the proposition
183      I, 23|            demonstration and every syllogism must be formed by means
184      I, 23|       shown it is clear that every syllogism is perfected by means of
185      I, 24|                24~Further in every syllogism one of the premisses must
186      I, 24|    premisses is universal either a syllogism will not be possible, or
187      I, 24|           without adding "all", no syllogism will be possible; if one
188      I, 24|           clear then that in every syllogism there must be a universal
189      I, 24|           clear also that in every syllogism either both or one of the
190      I, 24|            It is clear also when a syllogism in general can be made and
191      I, 24|            a valid, when a perfect syllogism can be formed; and that
192      I, 24|           be formed; and that if a syllogism is formed the terms must
193      I, 25|          if this can be called one syllogism, not many, the same conclusion
194      I, 25|      already been proved that if a syllogism is formed some of its terms
195      I, 25|          these.~(1) If it is E the syllogism will have A and B for its
196      I, 25|          related to D as to make a syllogism, the propositions will have
197      I, 25|            for we assumed that the syllogism proved E. And if no conclusion
198      I, 25|     assumed to no purpose, and the syllogism does not prove the original
199      I, 25|            demonstration and every syllogism will proceed through three
200      I, 25|        their main premisses, every syllogism will consist of an even
201      I, 25|       relation to one term only, a syllogism will not be constructed.
202      I, 26|          The manner in which every syllogism is produced, the number
203      I, 27|         follows every man: for the syllogism proceeds through universal
204      I, 27|         For the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles.
205      I, 27|         upon all the terms: for no syllogism can be made out of such
206      I, 28|         the other. For sometimes a syllogism in the first figure results,
207      I, 28|        figure results, sometimes a syllogism in the second. But if the
208      I, 28|          there will be a converted syllogism: for E will belong to all
209      I, 28|          all the terms, because no syllogism is produced from them. For (
210      I, 28|           are useless to produce a syllogism, e.g. if the consequents
211      I, 28|      belong to either term: for no syllogism is produced by means of
212      I, 28|          the middle figure. But no syllogism is possible in this way.~
213      I, 28|         wherever it happens that a syllogism results from taking contraries
214      I, 28|          For if these are taken, a syllogism will be formed to prove
215      I, 28|   inquiries taken by themselves no syllogism results; but if B and F
216      I, 28|        with one of the Hs, and the syllogism results through these terms.
217      I, 29|         wishes to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility.
218      I, 29|        been proved by an ostensive syllogism that A belongs to no E,
219      I, 29|           of inquiry, to which the syllogism establishing the false conclusion
220      I, 29|        other remains as it is, the syllogism will be ostensive by means
221      I, 29|           terms. For the ostensive syllogism differs from the reductio
222      I, 29|          in this: in the ostensive syllogism both remisses are laid down
223      I, 29|           wish to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility.
224      I, 29|          will be the same, and the syllogism will proceed through terms
225      I, 29|            we have proved that the syllogism which establishes a possible
226      I, 29|            in any other. For every syllogism has been proved to be formed
227      I, 29|        middle term. Consequently a syllogism cannot be formed by means
228      I, 31|            is, so to speak, a weak syllogism; for what it ought to prove,
229      I, 31|      middle term through which the syllogism is formed must always be
230      I, 32|           the two premisses of the syllogism (for it is easier to divide
231      I, 32|         premisses of the principal syllogism, but omit those through
232      I, 32|          not however been drawn by syllogism from the propositions assumed,
233      I, 32|         what is assumed, since the syllogism also is necessary. But that
234      I, 32|        necessary is wider than the syllogism: for every syllogism is
235      I, 32|           the syllogism: for every syllogism is necessary, but not everything
236      I, 32|            which is necessary is a syllogism. Consequently, though something
237      I, 32|           course of an argument, a syllogism cannot be made: for a middle
238      I, 33|            C: it would seem that a syllogism is possible since the terms
239      I, 33|      necessary results, nor does a syllogism. Let A represent the term "
240      I, 33|  Aristomenes is perishable. For no syllogism was made although the terms
241      I, 33|         unless this is assumed, no syllogism (as we have shown) is possible.~
242      I, 34|     conditions are substituted, no syllogism can be made, e.g. if "healthy"
243      I, 35|       search, e.g. the belief that syllogism can establish that which
244      I, 38|         mean for example that if a syllogism should be made proving that
245      I, 38|           we should not have had a syllogism proving that there is knowledge
246      I, 40|           the same way; but if the syllogism is to prove that pleasure
247      I, 41|         prove from them, and so no syllogism a is formed. We (I mean
248      I, 41|       without the premisses of the syllogism.~
249      I, 42|            forget that in the same syllogism not all conclusions are
250      I, 44|            have not been proved by syllogism, but assented to by agreement.
251      I, 44|     agreement does not come from a syllogism, but from an hypothesis.
252      I, 44|      latter argument perhaps was a syllogism: but the former was an hypothesis.~
253      I, 44|     analysed since it is proved by syllogism, though the rest of the
254      I, 45|       established in one figure by syllogism, can be reduced to another
255      I, 45|            figure, e.g. a negative syllogism in the first figure can
256      I, 45|       reduced to the second, and a syllogism in the middle figure to
257      I, 45|            all C. Similarly if the syllogism is not universal but particular,
258      I, 45|            convertible.~But if the syllogism is particular, whenever
259      I, 45|   conversion, nor would there be a syllogism if it did.~Again syllogisms
260      I, 45|           formed. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for the particular
261      I, 45|           belong to some B. If the syllogism is negative, when the terms
262     II, 1 |          premisses, when and how a syllogism is formed; further what
263     II, 1 |          may be proved by the same syllogism, if the former are placed
264     II, 1 |    included in A. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. In the second
265     II, 1 |          not clear by means of the syllogism. And yet B does not belong
266     II, 1 |            been proved through the syllogism that B belongs to no C,
267     II, 1 |        does not result through the syllogism that B does not belong to
268     II, 1 |           to the conclusion (for a syllogism does not result when this
269     II, 1 |            not however through the syllogism, e.g. if A belongs to all
270     II, 1 |          not through the preceding syllogism. Similarly in the other
271     II, 1 |       proved, only not through the syllogism, just as in the universal
272     II, 2 |           for the premisses of the syllogism to be true, or to be false,
273     II, 2 |            is wholly false, a true syllogism will be possible: for nothing
274     II, 3 |         for we shall have the same syllogism.~(2) Again if one premiss
275     II, 4 |    possible, though no part of the syllogism is true, that the conclusion
276     II, 5 |            assumed in the original syllogism: e.g. suppose it has been
277     II, 5 |     belongs to B: but in the first syllogism the converse was assumed,
278     II, 5 |            conclusion of the first syllogism, and B to belong to A but
279     II, 5 |         was assumed in the earlier syllogism, viz. that A belongs to
280     II, 5 |         the premisses of the first syllogism can be assumed in the second:
281     II, 5 |           premisses from which the syllogism results must be undemonstrated:
282     II, 5 |          to all A, we shall have a syllogism relating B to A. Again if
283     II, 5 |           other premiss. Further a syllogism cannot be made at all if
284     II, 5 |            A is middle. But if the syllogism is negative, it is not possible
285     II, 5 |      converted as in the universal syllogism, i.e "B belongs to some
286     II, 5 |          not belong": otherwise no syllogism results because the particular
287     II, 6 |          both premisses of the new syllogism are not affirmative (for
288     II, 6 |         and one premiss, we get no syllogism, but if another premiss
289     II, 6 |          is assumed in addition, a syllogism will be possible. But if
290     II, 6 |            be possible. But if the syllogism not universal, the universal
291     II, 6 |           negative; consequently a syllogism will not be possible. But
292     II, 7 |         But if this is assumed the syllogism no longer results from the
293     II, 7 |          for in no other way can a syllogism be formed.~It is clear then
294     II, 7 |            middle figure, when the syllogism is universal, proof is possible
295     II, 8 |                     8~To convert a syllogism means to alter the conclusion
296     II, 8 |        conclusion and make another syllogism to prove that either the
297     II, 8 |         its contrary. For the same syllogism does not result whichever
298     II, 8 |          extreme. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. Suppose it
299     II, 8 |        will be particular. Let the syllogism be affirmative, and let
300     II, 8 |            all B. Similarly if the syllogism is negative. For if A belongs
301     II, 8 |            cannot be affected by a syllogism at all: for if A does not
302     II, 8 |        universal. Similarly if the syllogism is negative: for if it should
303     II, 9 |         saw) there is no universal syllogism. The other premiss can be
304     II, 9 |            conclusion of the first syllogism is converted into its contrary,
305     II, 9 |      belong to some C, so that the syllogism results in the contradictory
306     II, 9 |           of their quality.~If the syllogism is particular, when the
307     II, 9 |         some C and A to some C, no syllogism will be possible: for neither
308     II, 10|         but B belongs to all C, no syllogism is formed about A and C.
309     II, 10|           belongs to all C, will a syllogism be possible about B and
310     II, 10|      extreme. But we found that no syllogism is possible thus either
311     II, 10|          Similarly if the original syllogism is negative. Suppose it
312     II, 10|            thus that, as we saw, a syllogism could be made. Whenever
313     II, 10|            conclusion is assumed a syllogism will not be possible. For
314     II, 10|         some B, and B to all C, no syllogism is possible (as we saw)
315     II, 10|         some B, and to no C, was a syllogism possible concerning B and
316     II, 10|         some B and B to some C, no syllogism results: nor yet if A belongs
317     II, 10|        been said it is clear how a syllogism results in each figure when
318     II, 11|           in each figure, and what syllogism results. The syllogism per
319     II, 11|        what syllogism results. The syllogism per impossibile is proved
320     II, 11|     conversion takes place after a syllogism has been formed and both
321     II, 11|            not belong to all B, no syllogism results whichever term the
322     II, 11|          CA is assumed as well, no syllogism results, nor does it do
323     II, 11|           assumed relates to A, no syllogism will be possible. Nor can
324     II, 11|     premiss assumed concerns B, no syllogism will be possible. If the
325     II, 11|          supposed, we shall have a syllogism and an impossible conclusion,
326     II, 11|        concerns B; we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is
327     II, 11|             for thus also we get a syllogism. But if the negative proposition
328     II, 12|          supposed, we shall have a syllogism and a result which is impossible:
329     II, 13|           to no B, we shall have a syllogism and a conclusion which is
330     II, 14|           premisses from which the syllogism starts, the former takes
331     II, 14|           same terms. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the first figure,
332     II, 14|          in the last. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the middle
333     II, 14|       problem may be. Whenever the syllogism is formed in the last figure,
334     II, 14|          and to no B. For thus the syllogism was made and the impossible
335     II, 14|            and C to some B. If the syllogism is negative, the hypothesis
336     II, 14|       first figure results. If the syllogism is not universal, but proof
337     II, 14|             and A to all C. If the syllogism is negative, the hypothesis
338     II, 14|        conclusion of the ostensive syllogism is taken as a premiss. For
339     II, 15|             In the first figure no syllogism whether affirmative or negative
340     II, 15|          premisses: no affirmative syllogism is possible because both
341     II, 15|        other negative: no negative syllogism is possible because opposites
342     II, 15|             In the middle figure a syllogism can be made both oLcontradictories
343     II, 15|       science is supposition. This syllogism differs from the preceding
344     II, 15|        third figure an affirmative syllogism can never be made out of
345     II, 15|       first figure; but a negative syllogism is possible whether the
346     II, 15|         ways and in what figures a syllogism can be made by means of
347     II, 15|     premisses are opposed. For the syllogism is always contrary to the
348     II, 15|          not an animal because the syllogism springs out of a contradiction
349     II, 15|             it is not odd. For the syllogism owed its contrariety to
350     II, 15|          be inferred from a single syllogism in such a way that we conclude
351     II, 16|          both ways, though, if the syllogism is affirmative, only in
352     II, 16|          and first figures. If the syllogism is negative, the question
353     II, 17|        cannot be objected that the syllogism does not depend on the assumption
354     II, 17|             false cause", when the syllogism is concluded in spite of
355     II, 17|           assumption is refuted, a syllogism can no longer be drawn in
356     II, 17|           which is false is when a syllogism drawn from middle terms
357     II, 18|       false statement in it. Every syllogism is made out of two or more
358     II, 18|         for (as we proved) a false syllogism cannot be drawn from two
359     II, 19|            order to avoid having a syllogism drawn against us we must
360     II, 19|    premisses, since we know that a syllogism cannot be drawn without
361     II, 19|            to C, and so on. If the syllogism is drawn through one middle
362     II, 20|            20~Since we know when a syllogism can be formed and how its
363     II, 20|            For as has been shown a syllogism is possible whether the
364     II, 20|       place: for a refutation is a syllogism which establishes the contradictory.
365     II, 20|   refutation is impossible: for no syllogism is possible (as we saw)
366     II, 20|        refutation were possible, a syllogism must be possible; although
367     II, 20|            possible; although if a syllogism is possible it does not
368     II, 20|           fields of refutation and syllogism are defined in the same
369     II, 21|           first premiss of the one syllogism is either wholly or partially
370     II, 21|       thinking one premiss of each syllogism of both premisses of one
371     II, 21|     knowledge obtained through the syllogism, nor is the thought in respect
372     II, 21|           the universal would be a syllogism.~But he who thinks the essence
373     II, 22|           so as in the affirmative syllogism. Again if A and B are convertible,
374     II, 23|        belief comes either through syllogism or from induction.~Now induction,
375     II, 23|           induction, or rather the syllogism which springs out of induction,
376     II, 23|         all the cases.~Such is the syllogism which establishes the first
377     II, 23|         there is a middle term the syllogism proceeds through the middle
378     II, 23|            induction is opposed to syllogism: for the latter proves the
379     II, 23|            In the order of nature, syllogism through the middle term
380     II, 23|        prior and better known, but syllogism through induction is clearer
381     II, 27|       being. Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities
382     II, 27|         other is stated as well, a syllogism, e.g. "Pittacus is generous,
383     II, 27|      conclusion is true, since the syllogism is not universal nor correlative
384     II, 27|            should be good. But the syllogism which proceeds through the
385     II, 27|       refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when