Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |      demonstrative, and dialectical premisses, may be taken as sufficiently
  2      I, 1 |            been expressly stated as premisses.~That one term should be
  3      I, 2 |     attribute of something else; of premisses of these three kinds some
  4      I, 2 |            affirmative and negative premisses are universal, others particular,
  5      I, 3 |             in respect of necessary premisses. The universal negative
  6      I, 3 |              In respect of possible premisses, since possibility is used
  7      I, 3 |             possible), the negative premisses can no longer be converted
  8      I, 3 |         sequel. In conversion these premisses will behave like the other
  9      I, 4 |         syllogism by means of these premisses. As an example of a universal
 10      I, 4 |           completed by means of the premisses originally taken) and that
 11      I, 5 |            merely from the original premisses; others also are needed.~
 12      I, 5 |            and when not: but if the premisses are similar in form, I mean
 13      I, 5 |           now either.~Again let the premisses be affirmative, and let
 14      I, 5 |         white, stone, raven. If the premisses are affirmative, terms for
 15      I, 5 |        Evidently then, whenever the premisses are similar in form, and
 16      I, 6 |              no matter which of the premisses is universal. For if R belongs
 17      I, 6 |         other not to all, or if the premisses are indefinite. Common terms
 18      I, 7 |         belongs to no C: for if the premisses are converted it is necessary
 19      I, 7 |    syllogisms; but, when one of the premisses is particular, by means
 20      I, 8 |           syllogisms from necessary premisses and syllogisms from premisses
 21      I, 8 |       premisses and syllogisms from premisses which merely assert. When
 22      I, 9 |          belonging to C: for if the premisses are taken in this way, A
 23      I, 10|       necessary conclusion from the premisses. For example let A be animal,
 24      I, 10|           man, C white, and let the premisses be assumed to correspond
 25      I, 11|             to the middle, and both premisses are affirmative, if one
 26      I, 11|       necessary. First let both the premisses be affirmative, and let
 27      I, 11|         accept these.~If, then, the premisses are universal, we have stated
 28      I, 11|             necessary. But when the premisses were thus, the conclusion (
 29      I, 12|             not reached unless both premisses are simple assertions, but
 30      I, 12|            although one only of the premisses is necessary. But in both
 31      I, 13|       possible. It results that all premisses in the mode of possibility
 32      I, 13|        proof is identical. And such premisses are affirmative and not
 33      I, 13|        syllogism made from possible premisses. The expression "it is possible
 34      I, 13|         subject of B. For thus both premisses are assumed in the mode
 35      I, 13|     Consequently we must start from premisses which are similar in form,
 36      I, 14|          syllogism results from the premisses assumed, but if the premiss
 37      I, 14|            Similarly if in both the premisses the negative is joined with "
 38      I, 14|            results from the assumed premisses, but if they are converted
 39      I, 14|             is negative, or if both premisses are negative, either no
 40      I, 14|       conversion.~But if one of the premisses is universal, the other
 41      I, 14|             result from the assumed premisses, but if the particular premiss
 42      I, 14|          some or not to some, since premisses in the mode of possibility
 43      I, 14|           we take terms; for if the premisses are as assumed, the major
 44      I, 14|           are universal in possible premisses a syllogism always results
 45      I, 15|       result if the modality of the premisses is reversed, must be proved
 46      I, 15|         proof proceeds not from the premisses assumed. First we must state
 47      I, 15|             at least, i.e. when the premisses are related in the manner
 48      I, 15|             one should indicate the premisses by A, and the conclusion
 49      I, 15|           it is by the help of such premisses that we make syllogisms,
 50      I, 15|            the the minor "man". The premisses then will be as before,
 51      I, 15|        possibility, from the actual premisses taken there can be no syllogism,
 52      I, 15|         belong to no C. Through the premisses actually taken nothing necessary
 53      I, 15|           universal, and one of the premisses is assertoric, the other
 54      I, 15|       sometimes it results from the premisses that are taken, sometimes
 55      I, 15|           problematic, whether both premisses are negative or affirmative,
 56      I, 15|         syllogism possible when the premisses are particular or indefinite,
 57      I, 16|        premiss is necessary. If the premisses are affirmative the conclusion
 58      I, 16|             assertoric, whether the premisses are universal or not: but
 59      I, 16|    assertoric negative, whether the premisses are universal or not. Possibility
 60      I, 16|  necessarily not to belong".~If the premisses are affirmative, clearly
 61      I, 16|       directly through the original premisses.~But if the premisses are
 62      I, 16|      original premisses.~But if the premisses are not similar in quality,
 63      I, 16|            and C follows from these premisses. But if the minor premiss
 64      I, 16|         formed. Nor again when both premisses are negative, and the minor
 65      I, 16|        there cannot be a syllogism. Premisses of this kind are possible
 66      I, 16|         syllogism possible when the premisses are indefinite, or both
 67      I, 17|         second figure whenever both premisses are problematic, no syllogism
 68      I, 17|            is possible, whether the premisses are affirmative or negative,
 69      I, 17|  problematic because neither of the premisses is assertoric; and this
 70      I, 17|           in whatever other way the premisses can be altered, the proof
 71      I, 17|           Clearly then, if both the premisses are problematic, no syllogism
 72      I, 18|            be possible, whether the premisses are universal or particular.
 73      I, 18|            is negative. But if both premisses are negative, one being
 74      I, 18|      follows necessarily from these premisses as they stand, but if the
 75      I, 18|           first figure. But if both premisses are affirmative, no syllogism
 76      I, 18|             follows from the actual premisses, a syllogism can be obtained
 77      I, 18|       conclusion be drawn when both premisses are indefinite, whether
 78      I, 19|                    19~If one of the premisses is necessary, the other
 79      I, 19|          that presupposes that both premisses are necessary, or at any
 80      I, 19|             affirmative.~But if the premisses are similar in quality,
 81      I, 19|             not belong to C: if the premisses are converted B belongs
 82      I, 19|             is negative. But if the premisses are affirmative there cannot
 83      I, 19|       conclusion possible when both premisses are affirmative: this also
 84      I, 19|             as above. But when both premisses are negative, and the premiss
 85      I, 19|        follows necessarily from the premisses as they are stated, a conclusion
 86      I, 19|             whether the mode of the premisses is assertoric or necessary.
 87      I, 20|             both or only one of the premisses is problematic. When the
 88      I, 20|            is problematic. When the premisses are problematic the conclusion
 89      I, 20|            as before.~First let the premisses be problematic and suppose
 90      I, 20|             conversion. But if both premisses should be negative no necessary
 91      I, 20|         they are stated, but if the premisses are converted into their
 92      I, 20|       conversion. But if one of the premisses is universal, the other
 93      I, 20|             conversion. But if both premisses should be negative-the one
 94      I, 20|     conclusion will follow from the premisses as they are put, it will
 95      I, 20|             as above. But when both premisses are indefinite or particular,
 96      I, 21|            as before. First let the premisses be affirmative: suppose
 97      I, 21|             Bs. For when one of the premisses in the first figure is problematic,
 98      I, 21|             is negative, or if both premisses are negative, no syllogistic
 99      I, 21|    conclusion can be drawn from the premisses as they stand, but if they
100      I, 21|            as before.~If one of the premisses is universal, the other
101      I, 21|            to some C.~Whenever both premisses are indefinite or particular,
102      I, 21|            in the case of universal premisses, and proceeds by means of
103      I, 22|                    22~If one of the premisses is necessary, the other
104      I, 22|         other problematic, when the premisses are affirmative a problematic
105      I, 22|              Suppose first that the premisses are affirmative, i.e. that
106      I, 22|           problematic: for when the premisses stand thus in the first
107      I, 22|             necessary. But when the premisses stood thus, it resulted
108      I, 22|          the other in part. If both premisses are affirmative, the conclusion
109      I, 22|            same course as where the premisses are universal; and the same
110      I, 23|           relation to B through the premisses taken. Nor when C belongs
111      I, 23|           in general is made out of premisses, and a syllogism referring
112      I, 23|            referring to this out of premisses with the same reference,
113      I, 23|            to that proceeds through premisses which relate this to that.
114      I, 24|          every syllogism one of the premisses must be affirmative, and
115      I, 24|          present: unless one of the premisses is universal either a syllogism
116      I, 24|            proved only when all the premisses are universal, while a particular
117      I, 24|             both from two universal premisses and from one only: consequently
118      I, 24|        conclusion is universal, the premisses also must be universal,
119      I, 24|            be universal, but if the premisses are universal it is possible
120      I, 24|           either both or one of the premisses must be like the conclusion.
121      I, 25|  proposition E is inferred from the premisses A, B, C, and D. It is necessary
122      I, 25|           have A and B for its sole premisses. But if C and D are so related
123      I, 25|         conclusion follows from two premisses and not from more than two.
124      I, 25|            the three terms make two premisses, unless a new premiss is
125      I, 25|            syllogistic argument the premisses through which the main conclusion
126      I, 25|       preceding conclusions must be premisses) are not even in number,
127      I, 25|          with respect to their main premisses, every syllogism will consist
128      I, 25|        consist of an even number of premisses and an odd number of terms (
129      I, 25|            for the terms exceed the premisses by one), and the conclusions
130      I, 25|           be half the number of the premisses. But whenever a conclusion
131      I, 25|        similarly exceed that of the premisses by one (for the extra term
132      I, 25|             terms related), and the premisses will be equal in number
133      I, 25|       relations of predication. The premisses however will not always
134      I, 25|             will alternate-when the premisses are even, the terms must
135      I, 25|             the terms are even, the premisses must be odd: for along with
136      I, 25|              Consequently since the premisses were (as we saw) even, and
137      I, 25|      respect to the terms or to the premisses. For if one term is added,
138      I, 25|      numerous than the terms or the premisses.~
139      I, 26|             number of the terms and premisses through which it proceeds,
140      I, 26|       proceeds, the relation of the premisses to one another, the character
141      I, 27|          things. We must select the premisses suitable to each problem
142      I, 27|          proceeds through universal premisses. If the statement is indefinite,
143      I, 27|    established syllogistically from premisses which obtain normally, some
144      I, 27|             can be made out of such premisses. The reason why this is
145      I, 28|             three terms and the two premisses, and that all the syllogisms
146      I, 28|             middle figure with both premisses affirmative: if the antecedents
147      I, 28|       identical, e.g. C and H, both premisses are negative, either in
148      I, 28|            Es, not however from the premisses taken but in the aforesaid
149      I, 29|           ad impossibile one of the premisses is assumed falsely.~These
150      I, 29|            from these we obtain the premisses and find the middle term.
151      I, 30|      pursuit of truth starting from premisses in which the arrangement
152      I, 30|            must start from probable premisses. The principles of syllogisms
153      I, 30|             well how we must select premisses: we have discussed the matter
154      I, 32|           attempt to select the two premisses of the syllogism (for it
155      I, 32|             particular, and if both premisses have not been stated, we
156      I, 32|              or men put forward the premisses of the principal syllogism,
157      I, 32|             we have reached the two premisses: for unless we have these,
158      I, 32|           propositions assumed, but premisses are wanting. Again if it
159      I, 32|            syllogistically: for the premisses are not in the shape we
160      I, 32|            must first state the two premisses, then divide them into their
161      I, 32|             should be found in both premisses in all the figures.~If then
162      I, 32|         placed similarly too if the premisses are not universal: for the
163      I, 34|             clear then that in such premisses what possesses the condition
164      I, 36|         term. The same holds if the premisses are negative. But we must
165      I, 36|             the extreme, but in the premisses one thing is not stated
166      I, 36|              of contraries, but the premisses ought to be understood with
167      I, 38|            which is repeated in the premisses ought to be joined to the
168      I, 41|             demonstrate without the premisses of the syllogism.~
169      I, 42|       conclusion in what figure the premisses should be sought.~
170      I, 44|      syllogisms; for with the given premisses it is not possible to reduce
171      I, 45|           the statement BC and both premisses will be particular.~It is
172      I, 45|        possible: for neither of the premisses is universal after conversion.~
173     II, 1 |         character and number of the premisses, when and how a syllogism
174     II, 2 |            2~It is possible for the premisses of the syllogism to be true,
175     II, 2 |        false necessarily. From true premisses it is not possible to draw
176     II, 2 |             may be drawn from false premisses, true however only in respect
177     II, 2 |           be established from false premisses: why this is so will be
178     II, 2 |          false conclusion from true premisses, is made clear by this consideration.
179     II, 2 |            subject and predicate or premisses. If then it is true that
180     II, 2 |             as one thing, being two premisses taken together. The same
181     II, 2 |          false conclusion from true premisses.~But from what is false
182     II, 2 |             drawn, whether both the premisses are false or only one, provided
183     II, 2 |           this is not either of the premisses indifferently, if it is
184     II, 2 |        consequently though both the premisses are false the conclusion
185     II, 2 |             belong, though both the premisses are false the conclusion
186     II, 2 |              But if one only of the premisses is false, when the first
187     II, 2 |            swan, then if we take as premisses that A belongs to all B,
188     II, 2 |        proof.~(11) Also though both premisses are false the conclusion
189     II, 2 |           will be true, though both premisses are false. Similarly also
190     II, 2 |    conclusion then is true, but the premisses arc false.~
191     II, 3 |            conclusion through false premisses, whether the syllogisms
192     II, 3 |          particular, viz. when both premisses are wholly false; when each
193     II, 3 |             matter which of the two premisses is false); if both premisses
194     II, 3 |        premisses is false); if both premisses are partially false; if
195     II, 3 |            every horse, then if the premisses are stated contrariwise
196     II, 3 |             and to no C, though the premisses are wholly false they will
197     II, 3 |           true.~(4) And if both the premisses are partially false, the
198     II, 3 |             all B and to no C, both premisses are partially false, but
199     II, 3 |          clear too that though both premisses are false they may yield
200     II, 3 |             no B and to some C, the premisses are both false, but the
201     II, 3 |           not to follow some C, the premisses are false but the conclusion
202     II, 4 |           is false, alike when both premisses are wholly false, when each
203     II, 4 |            is possible to alter the premisses. For (1) nothing prevents
204     II, 4 |          and B belong to all C, the premisses will be wholly false, but
205     II, 4 |      conclusion is true, though the premisses are false.~(2) Also if each
206     II, 4 |          and B belong to all C, the premisses are partially false, but
207     II, 4 |             C, and B to all C, both premisses are partly false, but the
208     II, 4 |             Similarly if one of the premisses assumed is wholly false,
209     II, 4 |             proof. Also if both the premisses assumed are affirmative,
210     II, 4 |           true. Similarly if of the premisses assumed AC is true and BC
211     II, 4 |            have been taken when the premisses are universal, positive
212     II, 4 |            conclusion is false, the premisses of the argument must be
213     II, 4 |           is not necessary that the premisses should be true, either one
214     II, 5 |            by converting one of the premisses simply and inferring the
215     II, 5 |             middle, only one of the premisses of the first syllogism can
216     II, 5 |             convertible, one of the premisses from which the syllogism
217     II, 5 |             demonstrated: the other premisses had ex hypothesi been proved.
218     II, 5 | demonstrating this premiss, all the premisses will have been proved reciprocally.
219     II, 5 |            and B to all A, both the premisses assumed have been proved,
220     II, 5 |           proved of A through these premisses, so that we use the conclusion
221     II, 5 |          the converse of one of the premisses, and deduce the remaining
222     II, 5 |             the result is that both premisses are particular. But the
223     II, 6 |             not proved because both premisses of the new syllogism are
224     II, 6 |              as we saw) proved from premisses which are both affirmative.
225     II, 6 |           either both or one of the premisses is negative; consequently
226     II, 7 |             third figure, when both premisses are taken universally, it
227     II, 7 |        sometimes not. When both the premisses assumed are affirmative,
228     II, 8 |             opposite and one of the premisses stands, that the other premiss
229     II, 8 |           is necessary to take both premisses in reference to the minor
230     II, 8 |             its contradictory, both premisses may be refuted, but when
231     II, 8 |           belong to no C. Thus both premisses are refuted. But neither
232     II, 8 |           of the Cs, neither of the premisses is universal. Similarly
233     II, 8 |            A belongs to all C, both premisses are refuted: but if the
234     II, 9 |           proof can be given if the premisses are transposed in respect
235     II, 9 |             its contradictory, both premisses can be refuted. Suppose
236     II, 9 |        possible: for neither of the premisses taken is universal. Consequently
237     II, 9 |             its contradictory, both premisses can be refuted. For if B
238     II, 10|            contrary, neither of the premisses can be refuted in any of
239     II, 10|             its contradictory, both premisses may be refuted and in all
240     II, 10|            taken as middle, and the premisses being universal. If then
241     II, 10|           proof can be given if the premisses are not universal. For either
242     II, 10|          universal. For either both premisses arrived at by the conversion
243     II, 10|             contradictory, both the premisses can be refuted. For if A
244     II, 10|             similarly if one of the premisses is not universal. For if
245     II, 10|   concerning B and C. Therefore the premisses are not refuted. But when
246     II, 10|            proof is possible if the premisses are not universal. For AC
247     II, 10|           no C. Thus in one way the premisses are refuted, in the other
248     II, 11|            been formed and both the premisses have been taken, but a reduction
249     II, 11|          are alike in both, and the premisses of both are taken in the
250     II, 11|          false conclusion from true premisses: but in fact it is true:
251     II, 14|              Both, indeed, take two premisses that are admitted, but the
252     II, 14|            but the latter takes the premisses from which the syllogism
253     II, 14|            some B, and the original premisses that C belongs to all A
254     II, 14|          And it is clear from these premisses that A belongs to no B.
255     II, 14|             all B; and the original premisses are that C belongs to all
256     II, 14|           to no B; and the original premisses that B belongs to all C,
257     II, 14|          And it is clear from these premisses that A must belong to some
258     II, 14|             all B, and the original premisses that A belongs to all C,
259     II, 14|           to no B, and the original premisses that A belongs to all C,
260     II, 14|            some B, and the original premisses that A belongs to no C,
261     II, 14|      belongs to all B, the original premisses that A belongs to no C,
262     II, 14|             all B, and the original premisses that C belongs to all B,
263     II, 14|        impossible. And the original premisses form the first figure. Similarly
264     II, 14|           to no B, and the original premisses that C belongs to some B,
265     II, 14|            some B, and the original premisses that C belongs to no A and
266     II, 14|             A belongs to all B, the premisses that C belongs to no A and
267     II, 15|           to draw a conclusion from premisses which are opposed, and in
268     II, 15|          can be made out of opposed premisses: no affirmative syllogism
269     II, 15|            is possible because both premisses must be affirmative, but
270     II, 15|            something else: but such premisses are not opposed.~In the
271     II, 15|           it is impossible: for the premisses cannot anyhow be either
272     II, 15|             be made out of opposite premisses, for the reason given in
273     II, 15|         science is not science, The premisses are contrary if the terms
274     II, 15|         contradiction through other premisses, or to assume it in the
275     II, 15|        statements may be assumed as premisses in six ways; we may have
276     II, 15|             can be made by means of premisses which are opposed.~It is
277     II, 15|           clear too that from false premisses it is possible to draw a
278     II, 15|           it is not possible if the premisses are opposed. For the syllogism
279     II, 15|    contrariety to its contradictory premisses; if we assume such premisses
280     II, 15|        premisses; if we assume such premisses we shall get a result that
281     II, 15|             is it possible that the premisses should be really contrary.~
282     II, 16|           all, or he may argue from premisses which are less known or
283     II, 16|          the same subject; and both premisses do not beg the question
284     II, 17|       results through the remaining premisses; since it is not perhaps
285     II, 18|             made out of two or more premisses. If then the false conclusion
286     II, 18|        conclusion is drawn from two premisses, one or both of them must
287     II, 18|            cannot be drawn from two premisses. But if the premisses are
288     II, 18|           two premisses. But if the premisses are more than two, e.g.
289     II, 19|         same term twice over in his premisses, since we know that a syllogism
290     II, 19|             they take the necessary premisses and leave the conclusions
291     II, 21|          possible to think both the premisses with reference to each of
292     II, 21|           of each syllogism of both premisses of one of the two syllogisms:
293     II, 21|           is limited to each of the premisses and who has not previously
294     II, 26|        knowable and the unknowable. Premisses from which it is possible
295     II, 26|            made clear only by other premisses. But an objection ought