Book, Paragraph

  1      I, 1 |            happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant,
  2      I, 1 |         persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated.
  3      I, 2 |             true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not,
  4      I, 3 |            sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he
  5      I, 3 |              die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient
  6      I, 3 |             him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.~It is evident
  7      I, 3 |      impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred,
  8      I, 4 |             set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we
  9      I, 6 |           Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure
 10      I, 6 |        general.~We may define a good thing as that which ought to be
 11      I, 6 |      destroying their opposites. One thing may entail another in either
 12      I, 6 |      Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature
 13      I, 6 |               that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.~
 14      I, 6 |             have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt
 15      I, 6 |              time it takes. Again, a thing is good if it is as men
 16      I, 7 |              and relative utility.~A thing which surpasses another
 17      I, 7 |         regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and
 18      I, 7 |       something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being
 19      I, 7 |            is contained in the first thing. Now to call a thing "greater"
 20      I, 7 |           first thing. Now to call a thing "greater" or "more" always
 21      I, 7 |             for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils
 22      I, 7 |            for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of
 23      I, 7 |              the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by another
 24      I, 7 |             less of the other two. A thing productive of a greater
 25      I, 7 |              than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself
 26      I, 7 |             is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in
 27      I, 7 |          easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot
 28      I, 7 |              has been said, that one thing may be shown to be more
 29      I, 7 |              beginning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because
 30      I, 7 |              beginning and the other thing is-on the ground that the
 31      I, 7 |             it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it
 32      I, 7 |               Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful:
 33      I, 7 |            the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we
 34      I, 7 |             More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy,
 35      I, 7 |              and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard,
 36      I, 7 |            an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than
 37      I, 7 |             of the other. Again, one thing is more honourable or better
 38      I, 7 |              the same reason, if one thing is more honourable or better
 39      I, 7 |              has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than
 40      I, 7 |              good thing, or a better thing than something else, by
 41      I, 7 |            clearly follows that that thing is hetter which understanding
 42      I, 7 |             That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better
 43      I, 7 |           lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less
 44      I, 7 |           said; " and so, the more a thing is desired, the better it
 45      I, 7 |          Further, that is the better thing which is considered so by
 46      I, 7 |              all share is the better thing, since it is a dishonour
 47      I, 7 |             partly that the original thing appears to be the cause
 48      I, 7 |       important results. And since a thing is better when it is harder
 49      I, 7 |              the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as
 50      I, 7 |             given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the
 51      I, 7 |            whose addition to a third thing makes a better whole than
 52      I, 7 |             of the other to the same thing will make. Again, those
 53      I, 7 |              what is not-the sort of thing that some people have only
 54      I, 9 |              since it is both a good thing and also praiseworthy. Virtue
 55      I, 9 |            happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the
 56      I, 9 |           actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise
 57      I, 9 |            it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but
 58      I, 9 |           but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and
 59      I, 9 |             your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves
 60      I, 9 |              arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving
 61      I, 9 |             We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in
 62      I, 11|           pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it
 63      I, 11|        virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what
 64      I, 11|             one, or doing any little thing connected with him; all
 65      I, 11|             possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has
 66      I, 11|             and likes To do the same thing often is pleasant, since,
 67      I, 11|          whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a change from
 68      I, 11|             defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own
 69      I, 12|          themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and done by
 70      I, 13|            will admit that he took a thing but not that he "stole"
 71      I, 13|           himself. Nor does taking a thing without the owner’s knowledge
 72      I, 15|        judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [
 73      I, 15|              of Xenophanes) the fair thing is for the impious man to
 74     II, 1 |               they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry
 75     II, 1 |        totally different or the same thing with a different intensity:
 76     II, 1 |            and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if
 77     II, 1 |          that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of
 78     II, 5 |            us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand;
 79     II, 5 |            is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man’s mercy;
 80     II, 5 |              Again, our rivals for a thing cause us fear when we cannot
 81     II, 6 |       presence, and all that sort of thing; all this shows the disposition
 82     II, 6 |       shameless. Another sort of bad thing at which we feel shame is,
 83     II, 6 |             us, who possess any good thing that is highly esteemed;
 84     II, 6 |              feel more shame about a thing if it is done openly, before
 85     II, 7 |       because (1) it is a particular thing, (2) it has a particular
 86     II, 7 |            we may point out that the thing desired was worthless and
 87     II, 8 |             friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn away from friends
 88     II, 9 |        indignation, or even the same thing. But it is not the same.
 89     II, 9 |             due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves,
 90     II, 9 |              or existence of a given thing must be pleased by that
 91     II, 9 |              must be pleased by that thing’s non-existence or destruction.
 92     II, 9 |               for justice is a finer thing than music.~Enough has been
 93     II, 9 |          that we ourselves deserve a thing and that others do not,
 94     II, 9 |          those others so far as that thing is concerned. Hence servile,
 95     II, 10|    distinguished for some particular thing, and especially if that
 96     II, 10|               and especially if that thing is wisdom or good fortune.
 97     II, 10|        particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are
 98     II, 10|        possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us: these
 99     II, 10|              we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys
100     II, 10|             spent little on the same thing. And men who have not got
101     II, 10|           And men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy
102     II, 11|          honoured, looking upon that thing as really our own, and therefore
103     II, 12|          hate too much, and the same thing with everything else. They
104     II, 15|             is greater than the same thing close to us, and better
105     II, 16|            as if they had every good thing that exists; wealth becomes
106     II, 18|           decisions. (When we know a thing, and have decided about
107     II, 18|            and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen
108     II, 19|             is the easier. That if a thing can come into existence
109     II, 19|           That if the beginning of a thing can occur, so can the end;
110     II, 19|           That if a whole genus is a thing that can occur, so can the
111     II, 19|             then "double". That if a thing can be produced without
112     II, 19|           that it would be a strange thing if he could not discover
113     II, 19|              he could not discover a thing that Euthynus had found
114     II, 19|           occurred also. That if one thing that usually follows another
115     II, 19|            happened, then that other thing has happened; that, for
116     II, 19|             if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt
117     II, 19|           power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it; for every
118     II, 19|             further, he has done the thing in question either if he
119     II, 19|             things. Again, that if a thing was "going to happen", it
120     II, 19|             carried out. That if one thing has happened which naturally
121     II, 19|           has been done. That if one thing has happened which naturally
122     II, 19|          happens with a view to this thing) has also happened; thus,
123     II, 19|          same considerations: That a thing will be done if there is
124     II, 19|               prompting it. That the thing will be done, in these cases,
125     II, 19|            do not mean to do. That a thing will happen if another thing
126     II, 19|         thing will happen if another thing which naturally happens
127     II, 21|           explanation, and the whole thing is an Enthymeme; thus—~It
128     II, 21|            to air them.~To declare a thing to be universally true when
129     II, 22|          upon certainties.~The first thing we have to remember is this.
130     II, 22|             god; we must do the same thing. Suppose it to be Achilles
131     II, 22|            to his interest. The same thing applies to any subject whatever.
132     II, 22|            enthymeme I mean the same thing as a "line of argument".)
133     II, 23| consideration of the opposite of the thing in question. Observe whether
134     II, 23|              of the person to whom a thing is done, you argue that
135     II, 23|             that, if the less likely thing is true, the more likely
136     II, 23|             is true, the more likely thing is true also; for a man
137     II, 23|              may be urged that, if a thing is not true where it is
138     II, 23|            as we have to show that a thing is or is not true. This
139     II, 23|             when you are expecting a thing to be done for you, and
140     II, 23|              to fulfil them when the thing has been done." And, again,
141     II, 23|              cannot say that sort of thing to him. The purpose is to
142     II, 23|   Mixidemides, that it was a strange thing that the Dread Goddesses
143     II, 23|              said, "Death is an evil thing; the gods have so judged
144     II, 23|            it happens that any given thing usually has both good and
145     II, 23|             reason for urging that a thing should or should not be
146     II, 23|              the result of any given thing is always the same: e.g. "
147     II, 23|      probabilities: if, therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable
148     II, 24|           speech is a very excellent thing, since good men are not
149     II, 24|           since the word is the same thing as the letters which compose
150     II, 24|          double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then
151     II, 24|           things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme
152     II, 24|         demonstrative: "For one good thing cannot be made up of two
153     II, 24|         lofty people do this kind of thing, therefore Paris too, we
154     II, 24|              not likely to do such a thing. But if he is open to the
155     II, 24|              not likely to do such a thing, since he could be sure
156     II, 25|           improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable.
157     II, 25|            both respects; for if the thing in question both happens
158     II, 26|           enthymeme" I mean the same thing as a line of enthymematic
159     II, 26|             kind used to show that a thing is great or small; just
160     II, 26|            kinds used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or
161     II, 26|             Thus, if he shows that a thing has happened, we show that
162    III, 1 |        method of delivery; this is a thing that affects the success
163    III, 1 |             do without it. The right thing in speaking really is that
164    III, 1 |           others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its
165    III, 2 |             countrymen, and the same thing is true of their feeling
166    III, 2 |            else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught
167    III, 2 |             fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this,
168    III, 2 |            say that a thief "took" a thing, or that he "plundered"
169    III, 2 |        Bryson, that there is no such thing as foul language, because
170    III, 2 |       whatever words you put a given thing your meaning is the same.
171    III, 2 |              One term may describe a thing more truly than another,
172    III, 2 |     different words will represent a thing in two different lights;
173    III, 2 |        diminutives, which make a bad thing less bad and a good thing
174    III, 2 |            thing less bad and a good thing less good. Take, for instance,
175    III, 3 |         where there is no term for a thing and some compound can be
176    III, 3 |             of compounds is just the thing for writers of dithyrambs,
177    III, 4 |             they are really the same thing except for the difference
178    III, 5 |              apt to put that sort of thing into verse. Empedocles,
179    III, 5 |             if he simply says that a thing will happen than if he says
180    III, 5 |             this, that and the other thing, to set out", rather than
181    III, 5 |            this, that, and the other thing occurred."~
182    III, 6 |       impressiveness. (1) Describe a thing instead of naming it: do
183    III, 6 |              is useful-to describe a thing by mentioning attributes
184    III, 7 |           aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe
185    III, 7 |         poetry, which is an inspired thing. This language, then, should
186    III, 10|         him-that lifeless yet living thing which records his services
187    III, 11|              related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so
188    III, 11|       amounts to saying "it is a fit thing to die when you are not
189    III, 11|             to die", or "it is a fit thing to die when death is not
190    III, 12|     completely". This is the sort of thing that Philemon the actor
191    III, 12|          since he can take the whole thing in better, and judge of
192    III, 14|            dealing with this sort of thing, the prosecutor will take
193    III, 14|       ridiculous to put this kind of thing at the beginning, when every
194    III, 16|           hearer to believe that the thing has happened, or that the
195    III, 16|             has to maintain that the thing has not happened, or did
196    III, 16|            contention; e.g. that the thing was done, but was not wrong.
197    III, 16|             makes it do so. One such thing is the indication of moral
198    III, 19|           your opponent, the natural thing is to commend yourself,
199    III, 19|             been proved, the natural thing to do next is to magnify