Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 3 | speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last
 2      I, 9 |          which are possessed by one person alone-these last are more
 3      I, 9 |             who was just an average person when all went well becomes
 4      I, 10|           Now every action of every person either is or is not due
 5      I, 10|            is or is not due to that person himself. Of those not due
 6      I, 10|       inflicted for the sake of the person punished; revenge for that
 7      I, 11|           no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect
 8      I, 11|           pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a
 9      I, 11|            one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man,
10      I, 11|        another man, horse, or young person. Hence the proverbs "mate
11      I, 13|           ways-towards one definite person, or towards the community.
12      I, 13|        doing wrong to some definite person; the man who avoids service
13     II, 3 |           at all, or not any worthy person or any one like ourselves.
14     II, 3 |           you cannot be afraid of a person and also at the same time
15     II, 3 |             previously taken on one person puts an end to even greater
16     II, 3 |          anger felt against another person. Hence Philocrates, being
17     II, 4 |            who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their
18     II, 7 |        himself, but for that of the person helped. Kindness is great
19     II, 7 |             the first, or the chief person to give the help. Natural
20     II, 7 |            done for the sake of the person helped. Or we may point
21     II, 18|          one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or
22     II, 18|        change his views: the single person is as much your "judge"
23     II, 18|           however, the only sort of person who can strictly be called
24     II, 23|              justly" is true of the person to whom a thing is done,
25     II, 23|        consider whether the accused person can take or could have taken
26    III, 15|       should indeed be a detestable person if I had deliberately intended
27    III, 17|           favourable reception to a person against whom they are prejudiced,
28    III, 17|             the mouth of some third person. This is what Isocrates
29    III, 18|        declared that no uninitiated person could be told of them. Pericles