Book, Paragraph

 1      I, 1 |    prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to
 2      I, 2 |        branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the
 3      I, 2 |     proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction
 4      I, 4 |        and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have
 5      I, 4 |      causes are likely to have similar results.~With regard to
 6      I, 11|      therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant
 7      I, 14| measures to prevent and punish similar crimes-thus in Argos a penalty
 8     II, 8 |  condition of remembering that similar misfortunes have happened
 9     II, 11|       those who have these and similar things-those already mentioned,
10     II, 19|     contraries. That if of two similar things one is possible,
11     II, 24| variety is based on the use of similar words for different things;
12     II, 24|      way rakes behave. Another similar argument points out that
13     II, 25|     induction from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general
14     II, 25|     positive examples are more similar and more frequent. And if
15    III, 2 |    remote but from kindred and similar things, so that the kinship